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Ideologies and the party-state system are key to understanding the transformation of 
sports policies and systems in Communist China, as they impact significantly on the 
manner and role of government in developing sport and sports policies. This thesis 
seeks to analyse the extent to which dominant ideology impacted upon sports policies 
and systems in China. It also explores the changes in sports policies under dominant 
ideologies between the Mao and post-Mao era from 1949 to 1989. 
 
 
Gramsci’s contextualised theory of cultural hegemony and Weber’s revised 
classification provide a critical perspective for analysing the relationship between 
dominant  ideology  and  sports,  enabling  us  to  decipher  the  relationship  between 
State-Party     and     sports     throughout     the     shift     of     political     legitimacy 
from 1949 to post-Mao China (1977–1989). This research has adopted an interpretive 
perspective to elucidate social construction and changes in political ideology that 
impacted upon the development of sports policies and systems in Communist China 
between 1949 and 1989. The transformation of China’s state sports policy is treated as 
a synthesis of historical narrative, blended with interpretation and reflection of policy 
documents  and  interviews,  in  which  key  themes  are  fully  explored. Data was 
collected from a number of sources, including official government documents, news 
media, and a series of 13 interviews with Chinese officials, scholars and people who 
experienced this transformation.   
The analysis reveals that Maoism in practice had a greater influence on sports policies 
than Communism in China. A contribution made by this thesis is its analysis of the 
relationship between the components of Mao Zedong Thought or Maoism, including 
the mass line, and sports policies after the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
11  
(PRC), especially in relation to the early years of the PRC. Secondly, compared with 
the Maoist era, sports policies in the 1980s were less affected by ideological 
requirements, as political ideology in the Party and government policy began to 
transition into economic pragmatism. This transition fostered the growth of pragmatic 
and performance-based features in sports policies, which constitutes another 
contribution of this thesis to the existing research. Thirdly, the party-state system that 
was formed and developed in the Maoist era remained fundamentally the same during 
the next era, from 1977 to 1989. However, the launch of market-oriented reform 
affected more and more aspects of Chinese society, including the sports system. This 
led to the following contradictions: political and ideological requirements under the 
party-state  system  shaped  the  development  of  sports  policy  and  system,  while 
post-Maoist market-oriented reform played a profound, irrefutable role in the shaping 
of sports policy and system by promoting the modernisation of Chinese sports. 
 
Key  words:  sports  policy  and  system;  China;  ideology;  party-state  system; 
hegemony; legitimacy; Maoism 
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Physical fitness has a long cultural history in China, dating back to ancient times, 
although it was not until the late 19
th 
century that Chinese vocabulary introduced the 
Mandarin word of tiyu, which represents the concept of sport and can be broadly 
translated  as  ‘body  cultivation’,  ‘physical  education’,  or  ‘physical  culture’. 
1   
In 
ancient China, sport and physical education was a highly valued aspect of society and 
cultivated by three types of sports. The first encompassed health-related sports, such 
as daoyin (Qigong), strolling, walking and sightseeing. The second embodied military 
sports, including various martial arts, while the third consisted of entertainment 
activities and folk programmes, such as Jirang (a throwing game),
2   
Baixi (acrobatics), 
boat racing, swimming and water-play activities. Physical education was regarded as 
an important part of the Confucian education system during the Zhou dynasty (1046 
BC to 256 BC). Conducting oneself with a chivalrous spirit and being highly trained 
in martial arts was highly prized in ancient Chinese society. This emphasis on 
intellectual and physical accomplishments continued from the Qin dynasty (221 BC to 






Nevertheless, sport as physical exercise has not always been an important aspect of 
life in China.
3   
For centuries, Confucian principles influenced societal obligations to 
serve and academic pursuits, government and civil examinations were highly valued. 
Confucian ideas favoured intellectual ability over military expertise during the Song 
dynasty (960 AD to 1279 AD), an era that tended to value physical education less 






1   For ancient Chinese people, sports were not seen as a whole until the late 19th century, when the terms of 
Chinese physical culture (tiyu and ticao, ‘calisthenics and gymnastics’) were imported from Japan. 
2   The Jirang is an ancient throwing game, which was popular in the era of Emperor Yao (2356–2255 BC). 
3   Xu Guoqi. Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 
14. 










Under the influence of Confucianism, traditional Chinese sports emphasised unity of 
mind and body, respecting morality and art, so sports such as archery lost their 
competitive aspects and eventually were practised primarily for performance and 
exhibition. 
5   
Patriarchal  power  and  filial  piety  prevailed  for  centuries  in  China 
throughout  all  social  strata,  family,  community  and  politics. 
6   
Competition  was 
 




The first Opium War (1839–1842) marks the beginning of China’s modern history and 
challenges to traditional culture and nationalism. In reaction to military confrontation 
with Western powers during the Opium Wars, the ruling elite in the Qing imperial 
court  launched  the  Self-Strengthening  Movement  (1861–1895),  then  the 
Constitutional Reform in 1898, in an attempt to learn from the advanced technologies, 
culture and institutions of the West and thus resist the influence of the Western powers. 
At that time, these ideas and actions were strongly opposed by conservative ruling 
elite, as they contravened the Confucian code of ethics. Resentful of the influence of 
Western  culture,  many  self-proclaimed  guardians  of  Chinese  traditional  culture 
emerged and there was much conflict and confrontation between conservatives and 
radicals in Chinese society at this time. Following the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese 
political  elite  called  for  the  creation  of  a  new  Chinese  culture  based  on  global 
and Western standards. The process of modernisation of Chinese society provided a 
catalyst for the growth and development of modern sports, which gradually replaced 
traditional sports and became a major part of modern Chinese culture. A new physical 






4   This is illustrated by this saying from the Song Dynasty: ‘Those who use their minds and brains rule, and those 
who use their physical strength are ruled’, see ‘Duke of Teng wen’(《孟子·滕文公上》)in Mencius by Menciu 
(Harbin: North Literature and Art Publishing House, 2014), 15. 
5   Fan Hong and Tan Hua. ‘Sport in China: Conflict between Tradition and Modernity, 1840s to 1930s’, The 
International Journal of the History of Sport, 19, no. 2–3 (2002): 189–212. 
6   Chu Chai, Winberg Chai. Confucianism (New York: Barron's Educational Series, 1973), 2. 
7   Fan Hong and Tan Hua. ‘Sport in China: Conflict between Tradition and Modernity, 1840s to 1930s’, The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 19, no. 2-3 (2002): 189–212. 







Following  the  establishment  of  the  first  Chinese  Republic,  1912  to  1927  was  a 
 
tumultuous time for China. After the death of China’s first president Yuan Shih-kai in 
 
1916, the warlords carved the country up into autonomous districts containing their 
own armies and tax systems. This weakened time enabled Japanese and Western 
imperialism to infiltrate China on a grand scale.
8  
Educationalists and politicians used 
physical education to strengthen the nation, fuelling a new anti-imperialistic 
nationalism and national unity. Sport became a central part of this nationalistic trend.
9
 
From 1912 to 1917, the government endorsed military citizenship education as the 
guiding philosophy of the educational system, officially promoting militaristic and 
social Darwinist forms of sport and physical education.
10   
In 1927, the Kuomintang of 
China (KMT) came to power, guided by the dominant ideology of anti-imperialism 
and self-strengthening. Under the KMT, government policy regarding sport and 
physical education served to consolidate national unity, cultivate patriotism, and build 
the physical and moral strength of the people. 
 
 
The formation of Chinese Communist sports policies can be traced back to the 1920s 
and  1940s  during  the Chinese Soviet Republic  (CSR)  in  Jiangxi  and  to  China’s 
political power in Yan’an through the Red Sports Movement (1929–34) to the New 
Sports  Movement  (1936–48).
11   
Between  1929  and  1934  the  Chinese  Communist 
Party (CCP) and its Red Army established the Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin, 
Jiangxi province, and launched the Red Sports Movement, a formal physical exercise 
system for workers and peasants. This system was viewed as the basis of physical, 







8   Russia invaded Mongolia and Britain invaded Tibet, while Japan occupied Shandong province, with a view to 
dominating China. 
9   Lu Zhouxiang. ‘Sport, Nationalism and the Building of the Modern Chinese Nation State (1912–49)’, The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no.7 (2011): 1030–54. 
10   Tony Hwang and Grant Jarvie. ‘Sport, Nationalism and the Early Chinese Republic 1912-1927’, Sports 
Historian 21, 2 (2001): 1–19. 
11   Fan Wei, Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang. ‘Chinese State Sports Policy: Pre and Post-Beijing 2008’. The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 27, no.14–15(2010): 2380–402. 





The ending of the Jiangxi in October 1934 was followed by the birth of the Yan’an era 
in late 1936, under which physical education was systematically promoted in the army, 
schools, counties and villages. A Physical Education and Sports Committee was 
founded under the leadership of the Chinese New Democracy Youth League 
(CNDYL).
12   
This Committee supervised clubs and groups, established regulations for 
games and sports events, and promoted a New Sports Movement with the slogan 
‘everybody is to do exercise’. Thus, the policy and structure of post-1949 physical 
 






Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, sport 
became an important concern for policy makers. State control of Chinese sports 
policies since 1949 has shaped sport to meet political and ideological requirements. 
The Soviet model had a profound impact on China's sports policy and system, giving 
contemporary China a powerful, centralised and hierarchical government organisation 
during  the  Mao  era  and  beyond.  The  events  of  the  Great  Leap  Forward  (GLF, 
1958–1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) were major political upheavals 
that have also resulted in important legacies for Chinese sport in the post-Mao era. 
Dramatic transformation of China’s economy in the 1980s enabled market forces to 
begin to play a major role in the economy. From the 1980s onward, commercialisation 
and globalisation of sport gradually became a focus of Chinese sports policy 
reformation. It is important to understand the fundamental driving forces underlying 
the change and transformation of China's sports policies and systems. In the process 
of the evolution of sports policies and systems, it is necessary to discuss the structural 





12  Founded in May 1922, it was originally named as the Socialist Youth League of China (SYLC). Following the 
official establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July 1921, the SYLC was organised at the 
same time that the Party was set up throughout the country. In January 1925, at the Third National Congress of 
the League, the SYLC was renamed as the Communist Youth League of China. After the end of the War of 
Resistance Against Japan, in response to the new situation and required tasks, the Central Committee of the CCP 
passed a resolution to establish the Chinese New Democracy Youth League (CNYL), which was officially 
launched in April 1949. It was not renamed as the Communist Youth League of China (CYLC) until 1957. 
13   Jinming Zheng, Shushu Chen, Tien-Chin Tan and Patrick Wing Chung Lau. ‘Sport policy in China (Mainland)’, 
International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 10, no.3 (2018): 469–91. 





focuses on the relationship between sport, ideology and political legitimacy to explain 




1.1 Sport, Ideology and Legitimacy in Communist China 
 
Ideology is key to understanding the transformation of sports policies and systems in 
Communist China. For any political  party,  organisation  and ideology are 
indispensable. In modern terms, organisations represent hard power, while ideology 
represents soft power. As Zheng has observed, the survival and development of the 
CCP depends not only on its organisational construction, but also on its ideological 
construction.
14   
As the CCP represents the only ruling party in China since 1949, the 
 
significance of ideology largely transcends its significance as an organisation. The 
one-party state system and the CCP’s ideology penetrates every aspect of political, 
social and economic life throughout China, including culture, arts and education. Thus, 
the Party has overwhelmingly dominated the entire country since 1949. Sport is no 
exception. The party-state system and its ideology impact significantly on the manner 
and role of government in developing sport and sports policies. Any analysis of the 
transformation of sports policies and systems in China should also examine ideology 
and organisation, namely the political party system. 
 
 
The concept of legitimacy is closely related to politics and ideology. A widespread 
belief amongst Western scholars is that economic reforms launched in China from 
1978 onwards have rendered ideology obsolete. However, the Party still claims its 
legitimacy on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Arguably, performance 
legitimacy 
15 
has  become  far  more  important   than  ideology  in  justifying  the 
government’s continued rule.
16   





Zheng Yongnian. Reshaping Ideology (Beijing: Oriental Press, 2016), 3. 
15  Performance legitimacy means that a state's right to rule is justified by its economic and/or moral performance, 
and by the state’s capacity of territorial defense. For more explanation on performance legitimacy, See Dingxin 
Zhao, ‘The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China’American 
Behavioral Scientist 53, no.3 (2009), pp.416-433. 
16   Joseph Fewsmith. China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 5. 





only phenomenal economic growth, with profound social, ideological and cultural 
changes, but also spectacular political crises and unrest (culminating in the Tiananmen 
events of 1989). 
 
 
It is certain that since 1978, China’s political, cultural and social life, including arts 
and sports, has entered a post-revolutionary phase, even if only in a narrow, 
chronological   sense. 
17 
Has   revolutionary   ideology   and   its   discourses,   which 
legitimated the rule of the CCP in Mao’s era, lost its influence on sport and its sports 
polices in Deng Xiaoping’s era and beyond? What kind of ideology supports the rise 
of China's Olympic policy since 1980, Xi Jinping's football dream and the prosperity 
of  China's  campus  football  policy  today?   What  ideology  will  influence  the 
formulation and development of China's sports policy in the future? 
 
 
Since 1978, China has vigorously embraced market-oriented economic reform, with 
the huge acceleration in privatization of business becoming even more profound after 
1992. Arguably, the Tian'anmen event in 1989 greatly disrupted China's economic 
development
18
, while the conservatives, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, 
strengthened ideological control over Chinese society, and suspended the call for a 
radical political reform.
19  
It was not until 1992, when China restarted its upgraded 
market economy reform, that Chinese society, economy and sports experienced rapid 
growth again. Thus, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, reform between  1978 and 
1989 was  a  period  of  innovation,  breaking  away  from  ideological  shackles  and 
 
 
17   Liu, Kang. Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), 1. 
18   The negative impact on the economy can be seen more clearly in the following year. In 1990, profits of 
in-budget state firms fell 57 percent. At the same time, inventory stocks shot up, enterprises losses jumped 89 
percent over the same period the previous year, and retail sales of commodities fell 1.9 percent. To address the 
difficulties in state-owned sector, Government was forced to pump an additional 270 billion yuan of loan into 
that sector in 1990 on top of the 126 billion yuan of loans issued in the fourth quarter of 1989. See Wu Jinglian. 
Planned economy or market economy( Beijing: China Economic Publishing House, 1993), 12-13. 
19   Deng dismissed his successor, Zhao Ziyang, because Zhao acquiesced and even spearheaded student political 
movement. In Deng’s mind, these movement, supported and incited by western forces, aimed to overthrow the 
CCP regime and demolish the socialist system. Putting hegemony in a multi-scalar framework, Su Xiaobo 
asserts that he find that crackdown in Tiananmen square trauma revealed the CCP’s force in maintaining 
hegemony (What Gramsci refers to as coercion) within China, one the one hand, and its arduous struggle against 
Western hegemony beyond China, on the other. See Su Xiaobo, Revolution and Reform: the role of ideology and 
Hegemony in Chinese politics. Journal of Contemporary China. 69, no.20 (2011), 307-326. 









Although it may be difficult to make predictions about the future of China’s sports, 
we can at least examine a particular period of history, not only to analyze the policies 
that were enacted under Mao’s revolutionary ideology, but also to better understand 





1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
In contemporary society, most governments have paid significant attention to sports, 
as means of meeting a variety of goals; to elevate national image, display supremacy, 
or out of concern for public welfare, education, or health. Lv Shuting (1990) has 
noted that government intervention in sport has manifested in two critical ways: as a 
means to channel propaganda or as a political tool in its own right; and as an agenda 
or intention to influence international sports events by establishing or improving 
international  relationships,  strengthening  nationality  and  encouraging  a  sense  of 
national spirit. 
20   
A good example of this type of intervention is the 1936 Berlin 
 
Olympics, widely referred to as the Nazi Games, consisting of a two-week interlude 
in Germany’s escalating campaign against its Jewish population and the country’s 
march towards war. Sport was deeply linked with German nationalism and political 
ideology. Sport has also been used by government as a means of resolving or 
improving social, urban developmental or environmental problems. For instance, the 
London Plan 2004 identified the staging of the 2012 Games as a ‘major catalyst for 
change and regeneration in east London, especially the Lower Lea Valley, levering 
resources,   spurring   timely   completion   of   already   programmed   infrastructure 






20   Lv Shuting. ‘Analyzing Relationship between Sports, Politics and Economy from the perspective of Rise and 
Fall of Competitive Sports in China and Japan’, Sports Science 10, no.3 (1990): 41. 
21  
Mayor of London. Spatial Development Strategy for London: the London Plan ( London: Greater London 
Authority, 2004). 







In China, sport has attracted long-term government attention. Researchers have 
addressed the impact of formalisation and the profound influence Chinese state 
investment has had upon sport policy and systems since 1949 (Fan et, 2010, Cui 
Lequan, 1998, Hu Xiaoming, 2002, Men Lan, 2005, Xia Chengqian and Tian Yupu, 
2010; Tan, T.C. 2015; Zheng, J. 2018). However, little systematic research has been 
undertaken. Various texts that have traced the evolution of the state policies and 
systems in China have demonstrated the interwoven ties between sports and the 
transformation of Chinese society (Shen Liang and Fan Hong, 2012; Fan Wei, 2010; 
Cui Lequan 1998; Hu Xiaoming 2002; Men Lan 2005; Xia Chengqian and Tian Yupu 
2010), although scant analysis has focused on the transformation of state sports 
policies and systems by adopting specific theoretical perspectives at the meso or 
macro levels. This thesis undertakes to rectify this by applying Gramscian notions of 
hegemony  and  a  revision  of  Weber’s  classification  on  legitimacy  to  provide  an 
in-depth analysis of the evolution and transformation of Chinese sports policies and 
systems between 1949 and 1989. 
 
 
A thorough understanding as to how sports policies have evolved within 
transformations in the socio-political setting is crucial for a complete understanding of 
the sporting world in which we live. According to Krüger, transformation in a wide 
sense implies general social and cultural change or processes of reorganisation.
22   
The 
transformation of Chinese sports policy during 1949–1989 needs to be critically 
examined in context in order to fully appreciate how this policy arrived at its modern 
form as we know it. We also need to understand what sports meant as a concept 
before this transformation. Only by appreciating this pivotal change in policy can we 








22   Michael Krüger. ‘Transformationen des Wir-Gefühls in Turnen und Sport–eine Einführung in das 
Tagungsthema’ in idem ed., Transformationen des deutschen Sports seit 1939 (St. Augustin: Academia, 2001). 





In sum, the main purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between 
dominant ideology and the transformation of sports policy and system in China during 
the period between 1949 and 1989. The thesis focuses on macro-level analysis of the 
change of Chinese state sports policy and system in the sociohistorical and ideological 
context. In consideration of the close relationship between sport, ideology, party 
system and legitimacy, the objectives of this study are as follows: 
 
 
    To document changes in sports policies and systems in Communist China from 
 
1949 to 1989. 
 
 To investigate the effects of dominant ideologies on sports policies and systems 
throughout different historical stages between 1949 and 1989. 
 To explain the role played by the party system that influenced changes in sports 
policies and systems between 1949 and 1989. 
 To evaluate how the change in dominant ideology impacted on sports policies 
between the Mao and post-Mao eras, specifically the era of Deng Xiaoping, 
between 1949 and 1989. 
 
 
The following research questions will be addressed: 
 
 To what extent did dominant ideology affect changes in sports policies and 
systems? (after accounting for the influence of dominant ideology) 
 Have any changes occurred in the dominant ideology? (in the process of changes 
in sport and sports policies) 
 What were the changes in sports policies between the Mao and post-Mao eras 




1.3 Historical timeline of the PRC and this research 
 
Views  differ  as  to  how  best  to  divide  the  historical  sports  eras  of  the  PRC. 
According to criteria from the sixth Plenary Session of the 11
th 
Central Committee of 
the CCP, held on 27 June 1981 (a ‘Resolution on Several Historical Issues since the 





Foundation of PRC’), 4 periods have occurred over the 32 years since 1949. Most 
scholars, including Rong Gaotang (1984)
23 
and Gu Shiquan (1989)
24 
favour this 
division of sports history, as follows: 
1.   The first 7 years of the PRC from 1949 to 1956 represent the completion of 
the socialist transformation phase; 
2.   The  10  years  from  1957  to  1966  represent  the  so-called  “comprehensive 
 
construction of socialism”; 
 
3.   The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976); 
 




An alternative viewpoint argues for the simultaneous development of sport in parallel 
with society. Just as politics, economy and law in contemporary Chinese society 
greatly impacted the development of sport, it also developed within a framework of its 
own law.
26   
Based on this, Wu has suggested four divisions: 
 
 
1. An initial development of sport in the PRC (1949–1966); 
 
2. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when sport in China was significantly 
destabilised; 
3. The period of Reform and Opening Up (1976–1993); 
 
4.  The  fourth  period  commences  from  1994,  with  the  launch  of  substantial 





Wu groups the first and second period by Rong (and other scholars) together, with an 
additional period after the Cultural Revolution. Other scholars have proposed further 
definitions, such as Wu Shaozu, who has defined the following seven periods (1999): 
1.   October 1949 to November 1952; 
 
2.   December 1952 to May 1957; 
 
 
23   Rong Gaotang. Contemporary History of Sport (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1984), 5–10. 
24   
Gu Shiquan, Chinese Sports History (Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 1997), 221–39. 
25   
The CCP Central Committee. Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of the 
Party Since the Founding of the Country (June, 27th-29th, 1981) (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1981). 
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3.   June1957 to May 1966; 
 
4.   June 1966 to October 1976; 
 
5.   October 1976 to 1985; 
 
6.   1985–1992; 
 
7.   1993–1998. 
 




1.   1949–1956, the initial establishment of sport in the PRC, a period of tortuous 
development; 
2.   1956–1965, the Cultural Revolution phase; 
 
3.   1966–1976, a transitional period; 
 
4.   1977–1980, an initial reform of sports; 
 






In contrast, Dai and Lin Ping
29   
argue that the historical periods of sports should not 
be based solely on the defined periods of Party history. They outline 7 stages in the 
evolution of the sports administration system, which played a key role in shaping 
sport in the PRC:
30
 
1. The establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949 (accepted as a starting point 
for the sports history of the PRC); 
2. Nevertheless, Dai and Ling maintain that a substantial sports governing body 
was not established the PRC until 26/27 October, at the Preparation Meeting for the 
Committee of the All-China Sport Federation (ACSF) on 26 & 27 October 1949. Dai 
and Ling therefore accept this date as the starting point in the history of sports 
development in the PRC; 
3.  The  establishment  of  the  State  Physical  Culture  and  Sport  Commission 
 






Tan Hua. Sports History (Beijing: High Education Press, 2005), 390–438. 
29   
Dai Jingdong and Ling Ping. ‘On New China's Sports History Stage – Concurrent Discussion with Mr. Wu 
Zaitian’, Journal of Physical Education 16, no.2 (2009): 6–11. 
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4. Dai and Ling chose the year of 1956 as a division point, not because of its 
official recognition as a starting point of socialist society in China,31   but because 
sport in rural areas was included in the main agenda of the 1956 National Sport 
Meeting and led to an enthusiastic nationwide embrace of sport. Prior to 1956, mass 
sport was largely confined to urban areas and elite sport was not officially encouraged. 
After 1956, elite sports and sports in other areas such as urban environments, 
particularly factories and institutes, also underwent significant development; 
5. In December 1966, the entire sports administrative system collapsed and did 
not recover until the end of the Cultural Revolution in October 1976; 
6. After the Third Session of the 11
th  
Central Committee of the CCP in 1979, a 
 
variety of reform policies were launched in rural areas; 
 








According to Dai and Ling, rural area reform undermined rural communes and militia 
organisations, which had previously played a critical role in promoting sports in rural 
areas. The Third Session of the 12
th 
Central Committee of the CCP in October 1984 
marked the end of reform in rural areas, leading to a collapse of the organisation’s 
base. Thus, Dai and Ling consider October 1984 to be another dividing point. 
 
 
In general, these 7 divisions of sport history of PRC seem plausible. However, some 
of them are questionable. For example, the preparation meeting held in October 1949 
for the ACSF is selected as a dividing point, although the establishment of the 
Preparation Committee for the ACSF marks the establishment of the national sport 
governing bodies in the PRC. The ACSF was only a nominal sports organisation, with 
most functions and responsibility assumed by the CNDYL. Furthermore, Dai and 
Ling select the Third Session of the 12
th 
Central Committee of the CCP in December 
 
 
31   
According to the ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the 
People's Republic of China’, the transition period of the RPC refers to the period of time from October 1949 to 
1956. For more detailed information, see the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since 
the Founding of the People's Republic of China in Important literature selection since the third plenary session. 
(Beijing: People's Publishing House,1982), 789. 





1984 as a dividing point, as it marks a thorough reform of urban areas and an end of 
reform in rural areas. In fact, however, the basic organisation of mass sports in rural 
areas became very disorganised shortly after the rural reform commenced at the end 
of the 1980s, rather than in the mid-1980s. Although mass sport was officially 
launched after 1984, it did not involve aspects of public ownership until 1992, with 
the re-launching of economic reforms. 
 
 
Although uncertainties surround the appropriate selection of representative periods, it 
is  undeniable  that  the  dramatic  development  of  Chinese  sport  from  formerly 
semi-colonial and semi-feudal eras leading up to the 1980s was largely politically 
motivated. Events related to sports systems and policies will be considered for various 
divisions (e.g. mass sports, elite sports) in each chapter. 
 
 
In general, this thesis will be organised around the following four divisions: 
 
•    The establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949; 
 
•    The establishment of the State Physical Culture and Sport Commission, marking 
the centralised state-run sport system in November 1952; 
•    The launch of the Cultural Revolution on 8 August 1966; 
 
• The Eleventh National Congress of the CCP will be chosen, as it marks the 
official end of the Cultural Revolution in October 1977. 
 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters in total, with Chapter One being the introduction, 




Chapter Two presents a critical literature review of previous, related research and 
outlines two theories adopted in this research. Firstly, Gramsci’s cultural hegemony 
provides a critical perspective, helping us to understand why Chinese Communists 
have always stressed the importance of ideological homogeneity as a means of control. 





Both Mao and Gramsci believe that superstructure is not always determined by 
economic foundation, but by ideology. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is used to apply 
a critical thinking approach to understand the relationship of sport, as a part of 
superstructure, and ideological hegemony during Mao’s China and thereafter (1949–
1989). Secondly, Weber’s concept of ‘legitimacy’ is introduced and expected to assist 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony in not only explaining the impact of the Mao’s 
revolutionary ideological hegemony upon sports and sports policies before 1978, but 
also in deciphering the change of sports polices and the paradoxes of communist 
revolutionary ideology and pragmatic economic development in the 1980s. Weber’s 
classification neglects the dynamic aspect of authoritative relations and isolates 
emotional and rational bases of authoritative relations. Therefore, an adapted version 
of Weber’s classification is expected to explain not only why the Communist Party of 
China has adopted modernisation and economic performance to consolidate its 




Chapter Three sets out the methodology for the research. The first section of the 
chapter reviews three major ontological and epistemological paradigms and then 
specifies  critical  realism  as  the  philosophical  position  for  the  study.  The  second 
section of the chapter discusses theories underpinning the research, which explains the 
choice of method adopted. The third section of the chapter outlines the methods 




In chapters Four through Seven, changes in state sports policies and systems are 
examined in chronological order from 1949 through 1989. They follow a similar 
structure, in which each chapter concludes by analysing the function, value and the 
implications of state sports policies and systems during defined periods. 
 
 
Chapter Four documents and explores the emergence and development of state sports 





policies and systems during the early period of the PRC, from 1949 to 1952. The first 
section of the chapter provides a brief historical overview of the development of state 
sports policies pre-1949, followed by the political, social and cultural contexts of 
Chinese society in the early period of the PRC, during which time sports policies and 
systems emerged. The third section of the chapter examines the establishment of the 
‘Semi-Government’ state sports governing body, the ACSF, and its significance. The 




Chapter Five examines the changes in state sports policies and systems during the 
period of transition to socialism and the period of socialist construction from 1953 to 
1965. The first section of the chapter explores the effect of the Soviet model on 
Chinese sports from 1953 to 1960 in the areas of sports policies, administrative 
structure, training system, sports schools, athletic ranking system and mass sports. 
This section examines the impact of the Soviet model on the establishment of the 
Chinese  State  Sports  System,  and  the  Sovietisation  of  state  sports  policies  and 
practices during the GLF. The second section examines the changes in state sports 
policies and systems from 1961 to 1965, after the failure of the GLF. 
 
 
Chapter Six explores the changes in state sports policies and systems during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). In this chapter, 1971 was chosen as a dividing point 
because it was then that the SCSPE was re-established. This chapter includes two 
sections: the state sports policies and systems from 1966 to 1970 and the state sports 
policies and systems from 1971 to 1976. 
 
 
Chapter Seven, based on empirical findings, draws attention to the changes in state 
policies and systems from 1977 to 1989. The first part of the section examines 
changing priorities in sports policies from 1977 to 1980, providing a detailed 
explanation for the emergence of elite sports as a key policy concern during this 
period. The second section of the chapter examines the development of the elite sport 





policy and system in the 1980s, in which the rise of the elite sports policy and the 
emergence of the ‘Olympic first’ strategy is examined through an analysis of the 
advent of sporting nationalism and in the context of the overall systematic reform of 
Chinese society. The third section explores the development of state policy for mass 
sports in the 1980s in rural and urban areas. 
 
 
Finally, Chapter Eight forms the conclusion. The first section of the chapter discusses 
how this thesis contributes to existing knowledge and theory, then explains how the 
research findings relate to the questions raised in Chapter One. The final section 
discusses several inherent limitations in this research and considers the key 
methodological reflections in this thesis, ending with suggestions for future research. 
17 












This chapter is divided into two main parts. Part One provides a critical review of the 
literature related to the research questions. The literature review serves two main 
purposes. Firstly, it is to determine what has already been established in the empirical 
literature about a particular topic of interest. Secondly, it aims to identify the gaps 
where further research is necessary. Thus, the literature review summarises five areas 
and aspects of information and knowledge with regard to Chinese state policy and 




Part Two introduces the notion of a theoretical framework within which existing 
theories can be examined, as well as new arguments and theories. The aim is to 
evaluate the concepts and theories adopted for explaining the relationship between 
sports, ideology and policy evolution. This process of assessment is essential in order 
to help form a framework for the research analysis of the state sports policies and 
systems. As this study explores the transformation of state sports policies within a 
particular system, it is crucial to examine the existing theories in order to provide a 
theoretical and conceptual context for this thesis. 
 
 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony was selected in order to establish reference 
points for measuring the research findings and enable a critical perspective on policies 
set out by the ruling party in China. This theory will be evaluated in relationship to 
the Chinese context, as a means of understanding the changes that have occurred in 
China in state sports policies and systems since the 1980s. This Chapter ends with an 
assessment of the usefulness of the analysis for studying state-mandated changes in 
18 








2.2 Review of Research on the Chinese State Sport Policy 
and System 
2.2.1 Research on the Development of Strategic Focus or 
 
Guidelines of Chinese Sport Policy 
 
A  strategic  focus  or  guidelines  for  Chinese  state  sports  policies  have  been  an 
important issue since the mid-1980s; the focus has been on the relationship between 
mass sport and elite or competitive sports. First of all, it is necessary to review the 
formation of Chinese state sports policies. As Kolatch noted in 1972, the origin of 
many sports policies in Mainland China can be traced to pre-1949 Communist ideas.
1
 
Wei et al. (2010) observed that the formation of the PRC’s sports policies can be 
 
traced back to the 1920s, during the Communist years in Jiangxi.
2   
In Jiangxi, the 
CCP formulated a policy and established a formal system of physical exercise for 
workers and peasants called the Red Sports Movement.
3   
At that time, the Red Army 
considered recreation and sport activities as important work that combined military 




Fan (1998) argued that sport during the Jiangxi era was one of the best ways of 
uniting the masses into a disciplined, patriotic and successful martial force.
4   
‘Sports 
and physical education… on the one hand aim to train physique, on the other hand 
they can also implement revolutionary political education on them.’
5   




1   Jonathan Kolatch, Sport Politics and Ideology in China (Middle Village, N.Y.: Jonathan David Publishers, 1972), 
5. 
2   Fan Wei, Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, ‘Chinese State Sports Policy: Pre and Post-Beijing 2008’, The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 27, no. 14-15 (2010): 2380-2402. 
3   The term ‘Red Sports Movement’ originated in 1929 after the Party’s Gutian Conference and was adopted 
officially in 1932. In the Resolution of the Gutian Conference, the Party decided to establish in each company of 
the Red Army a physical training programme and a club system. See details in Mao Zedong, The Resolution of 
the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Division Red Army, October 1929, in Mao Zedong’s Selected Works (Chang 
chun: Dongbei Press, 1948), 3-7. 
4   Fan Hong, Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom: The Liberation of Women's Bodies in Modern China (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 155. 
5   Zhen Peng, ‘The Task and Work of Youth in the Soviet Region Currently’, Lenin's youth, vol.2, no.11 (1930). 
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guideline ‘All Soviet work obeys the requirements of revolutionary war’, despite 
difficulties  of  conditions  in  CCP ruling  areas,  sport  and  physical  activities  were 
widely organised to serve the revolutionary war and political struggle (Cui 1998; Yu 
1991; Zhang, 1991).
6   
According to China’s official sports history, the aims of the 
 
Red Sports Movement, in essence, were ‘to cultivate worker-peasant class team spirit 
and to make strong bodies to suit the needs of the class struggle’ and ‘to train the 
worker-peasant class to be an iron force in order to defeat all its enemies’.
7   
On the 




After the Jiangxi era ended in October 1934, the CCP launched a New Sports 
Movement and the Yan’an era began in late 1936 with the establishment of a new 
Communist regime, with Yan’an as its capital. The aim of the New Sports Movement 
was to promote sport for the masses by introducing the latest theories of physical 
education and publishing physical education textbooks. Ultimately, the emphasis on 
military training typical of the Red Sports Movement in the Yan’an era gave way to a 
new focus. Under the slogan ‘Everybody is to do exercise’, physical exercise and 
education were systematically promoted in the army, schools, counties and villages 
controlled by the Communists. Fan (1997) notes that Chinese communist sport policy 




In contrast to mass sport, competitive sport led to narrow specialisation and diverted 
attention away from the basic aim of providing healthy exercise for the masses. 
Despite slight differences in the focus of sports policies from the Jiangxi era (1931–
1934) through the Yan’an era (1936–1948), the CCP established a series of 






6   Cui Lequan, The History of Modern Chinese Sport and Story (Beijing: China Publishing House, 1989),156; Yu 
Jianyong, ‘On the Internal Relationship between Red Sports and New China Sports’, Sports Literature and 
History 9, no. 2 (1991): 36-38; Zhang Ming, ‘The Development and Characteristics of Competitive Sports 
Policy in New China’, Sports Literature and History, 9, no. 2 (1991): 2-5. 
7   State Committee of the History of Sport and Physical Culture (SCHSPC), eds., Modern Chinese Sports History, 
(Beijing: Beijing Physical Education Press, 1989), 367. 
8   See Fan Hong, Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom: The Liberation of Women's Bodies in Modern China, 
(London: Routledge,1997), 207. 
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Policies and systems in post-1949 Chinese state sport were pioneered in the Red 
Sports and New Sports Movements (Yu 1991; Cui, 1999; Fan, et al., 2012). Yu (1991) 
refers to sport during the communist years in the Jiangxi and the Ya’an eras (1929 to 
1948)  collectively  as  Red  Sports. 
10   
Yu  has  argued  that  Red  Sports  provided  a 
 
reference  model,  cultivated  sport  officers  and  workers,  created  socialist  sports, 
initiated school-sponsored sport, and during the Mao era turned away from the 





Cui (1998) examined the strategic focus of Chinese state sport policy from the 1950s 
through the 1980s. Cui points out that participation in sport in the early years of the 
PRC required further improvement in the face of the relatively weak base of China’s 
economy, culture and sport.
12   
Feng (2008) notes that after the founding of the PRC, 
economic and national defence construction became the most important issues for 
the new regime.
13   





Cui (1998) observes that the guideline ‘developing mass sport and elite sport 
simultaneously’, also known as the ‘leg strategy’, was put forward for the first time in 
1959,  when  emphasised  by  Zhou  Enlai,  Premier  of  the  State  Council,  in  his 
 
Government Work Report. Cui argues that this guideline was formed in the practice of 
 
9   For example, in the Soviet Area of Ruijin, Jiangxi province (1931–1935), physical education classes and sport 
activities were widely set up in the Lenin primary school, the Marx Communist University, the Red Army 
University, the Soviet University, drama schools, health schools and normal schools. During the anti-Japanese 
War (1937–1945), the Shaanxi Gansu Ningxia Border Area Sports and Transportation Committee was 
established in Yanan, and mass sport programs were carried out. The Yanan Sports Association was the earliest 
mass sports organisation and was established on 4 May 1940. For more detail, see the State Committee of the 
History of Sport and Physical Culture (SCHSPC), Modern Chinese Sports History (Beijing: Beijing Physical 
Education Press, 1989), 368-404. 
10   Yu Jianyong, ‘On the Internal Relationship between Red Sports and New China Sports’, op. cit. 
11   See Yu Jianyong, ‘On the Internal Relationship between Red Sports and New China Sports’, op. cit; Zhang 
Ming, ‘The Development and Characteristics of Competitive Sports Policy in New China’, Sports Literature 
and History, op. cit. 
12   Cui Lequan, ‘The Evolution and Development of The Basic Guiding Principles of Contemporary Chinese 
Sports’, Sports Literature and History,16, no.2 (1998): 6-7. 
13   Feng Huohong, ‘China's Mass Sports Policy at The Beginning of the Founding of New China’, Journal of 
Beijing Sport University ,31, no. 7 (2008): 904-907. 
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Red Sports and the New Sports Movements, as well as in the context of political, 
economic and cultural development in the early days of the PRC.
14   
After this time, 
official government documents and National Conference of Sport texts supported the 






Xiao Linpeng et al. (2002) has argued, however, that the ‘two-legs strategy’ may be 
traced back to 1952. According to Xiao, when China was preparing for the 15
th 
Olympic Games, the Central Committee of the CCP and the Chinese New Democracy 
Youth League (CNYL) stated that performance needed to be improved in competitive 
sport alongside the development of mass sports. For the first time, the guideline 
‘developing mass sport and elite sport simultaneously’ was espoused by Chinese state 
sport policy.
15  
Xiao’s point of view is echoed by Fan Hong (2008), who explicitly 
attributes the selection of the strategy to develop competitive sport in 1952 to political 
factors.
16   
Fan asserts that China’s experience at the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952 
stimulated the Chinese government’s determination to use sport as a valuable weapon 
to  help  restore  the  nation’s  position  in  international  politics.
17   
In  other  research 
co-authored with Shen Liang (2012), Fan have observed that the development of 
sports in the early PRC was deeply embedded within political and ideological 
circumstances. They assert that since Chairman Mao Zedong adopted the policy of 
‘Lean to one side towards the socialist-communist camp’, Chinese state sport policy 
in the 1950s was substantially viewed as Sovietisation.
18   
Jarvie, Hwang and Brennan 
note that China adopted much of the Soviet sports system in the early years of the 
PRC (2008).
19   
The Party’s political and ideological choices contributed greatly to the 
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16   Fan Hong, ‘Elite Sport in China: Politics, Policy and System’ in Comparative Elite Sport Development: systems, 
structures and public policy, edited by Barrie Houlihan and Mick Green (Oxford Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007), 
28. 
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18   Shen Liang and Fan Hong, Historical Review of State Policy for Physical Education in the People's Republic of 
China, The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no.4 (2012): 583-600. 
19   Jarvie, Grant, Dong-Jhy Hwang and Mel Brennan, Sport, Revolution and Beijing Olympics (London: Berg 
22 




formation of Chinese state sports policies in the Mao era. Substantial Soviet influence 
 




Liu Yu (2012) notes that the Chinese government’s strategic approach to sports 
changed in the years prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976): mass sport was 
prioritised  up  to  the  1960s,  whereas  competitive  sport  was  emphasised  after  the 
1960s.
20   
Liu Yu asserts that the formation of guidelines and strategy of Chinese 
 
government sports policies was not a natural process of evolution, but was driven by 
an impetus aimed at resolving social and economic problems, and reducing the gap 





Cui Lequan (1998) declared that, under the strategy of ‘developing mass sport and 
elite sport simultaneously’ from the late 1950s to the first half of the 1960s, the 
Chinese government widely promoted mass sport, while it simultaneously helped to 
rapidly develop competitive sport. However, Fan Wei et al. (2010) argue that after the 
failure of The GLF (1958–1960), China implemented a new national policy in 1961 in 
order to concentrate all resources on only a few elite athletes, to produce high 
performance in the international sports arena. Fan Wei et al. (2010) assert that this 
policy marks a turning point in Chinese sport, whereby the sports ideology and system 





Differing views exist amongst sports historians as to state sports policies during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). One view is that the politicisation of sport during 
the Cultural Revolution developed to the extreme, leading to disastrous results for the 
development of China's sports (Cui 1998;
23   
Xiao 2009;
24   





Publishers, 2008), 69. 
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Mouwen (2009) claims that no explicit sports policy existed during the Cultural 
Revolution, as the entire system of sports was completely destroyed; Party slogans 
and instructions from leaders were the only available views on sports at this time.
26
 
Another view holds that although the early period of the Cultural Revolution was 
 
disastrous for the development of China’s sports system, particularly elite sport, both 
mass sport and competitive sport flourished in the middle and later periods of the 
Cultural Revolution (Fan Hong 1999; Sun Baoli 1999;








Despite the different points of view in relation to sport during the Cultural Revolution, 
there is as yet no systematic analysis of the evolution of sports policies and systems 
during this period. 
 
 
State sports policies were relaunched after the Cultural Revolution. Xiong Xiaozheng 
et al. (1997) notes that after China renewed its International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) membership in 1979 in preparation for the 1980 Olympic Games, the 
government adopted a strategic focus to prioritise competitive sport. This strategy 
assisted with the development of state sports policies throughout the 1980s and 
extended into the 1990s. This strategy was aimed at using the country’s limited 
resources to develop elite sport, to ensure that China would become a leading sporting 
power by the end of the 20
th  
century.
30   
Cui Lequan (1998) has observed that the 
 
guideline of ‘developing mass sport and competitive sport simultaneously’ or ‘two leg 
strategy’ was  not  implemented  until  1995,  when  the  ‘Sport  Law’ was  issued,  a 
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China. However, Fan Wei et al. (2010) argue that the fundamental change in Chinese 
state sports policies occurred in 1993, when the Chinese Sports Ministry held a 
conference entitled ‘The Urgent Promotion and Development of Sports Business’. At 
this  conference,  the  Chinese  Sports  Ministry  publicly  advocated  the 
commercialisation of sport for the first time and they declared this to be a milestone in 





Furthermore, Fan Wei et al. (2010) note that ‘in order to set the framework of the 
development of sport in an increasingly marketised economy, the Chinese government 
set three targets: the Olympic Strategy in 1995; the Development of Sports Industry 
and Commerce Strategy; and the National Fitness for All Programme’.
32  
In 2001, 
China won the bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games. Jin Shibing (2013) has stated 
that in the period between 2001 and 2008, Chinese state sports policy centred around 
the Beijing Olympic Games.
33   
The views expressed by Fan Hong (2007) coincide 
with those of Jin, asserting that China’s bids in 1993 and 2001 to host the Olympic 
Games  ensured  that  elite sport  remained  the priority;  the  right  to  host  the 2008 
Olympic Games stimulated a new set of Olympic-related objectives.
34   
During this 
 
period,  both  the  content  and  priorities  of  sports  policies  focused  on  the  Beijing 
 




With regard to state sports policies and the strategic focus following the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics, Fan Wei et al. (2010) note that there has been little change.
35   
It is likely 
that, on the one hand, the government will continue its economic reformation of sport 
in the areas of mass sport and sport industry and will speed up the commercialisation 
of sport, while elite sport will continue to develop in the traditional form of ‘whole 
country support for the elite sport system’, a product of the planned economy, and will 
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2.2.2  Research on  the  Change of  Function of  Sport and 
 
Government Intervention in Sports in China 
 
As Blanchard (1995) notes, no Chinese vocabulary existed for terms such as sport and 
physical education in pre-modern China. Physical culture and activity was often 
associated with labour, military training and scholarly thought.
37   
The Opium Wars, 
also  known  as  the  Anglo-Chinese  Wars,
38   
destroyed  the  closed  state  of  Chinese 
 
society and enabled the introduction of Western sports. According to Hu Xiaoming 
(2002), the development of modern sports in China since 1840 was perceived as a tool 
to strengthen the country and the Chinese people.
39   
As Lu Zhouxiang and Fan Hong 
(2010) note, the history of the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republic clearly 





As Liu Qing et al. (2004) note, after the founding of the PRC in 1949, the government 
played a very important role in promoting the development of Chinese sports.
41   
Bi 
Shiming (2007) echoes Liu, arguing that in the first 30 years since the founding of the 
PRC, in the light of serious domestic and international political realities and 
circumstances, Party and government policy emphasised that ‘sport serves politics’. 
Indeed, the political function of sports was emphasised in China up until the 1980s. 
Men Lan (2005) has observed that during the early years of the PRC, there were 
relatively  few  sport  policies,  most  of  which  were  operated  by  the  Party  and 
government leaders.
42   
Liu Qing (2003) has noted in his essay entitled ‘the Role of 
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Government in Sports Development in the New Period’ that the Chinese sports 
administrative system was formed in 1952, with the establishment of the State 
Committee of Sport and Physical Education (SCSPE), characterised by a cooperative 
model that combines the government and governing body of sport in the industry 
sectors.
43   
According to Liu Qing (2003), this model did not change until the early 
1960s, when most sports associations of industry sectors were cancelled. The previous 
 
model formed in the 1950s was replaced by one that was run completely by the 
government from 1960 to the 1970s. During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese sport 
entered a non-rational or radical period. All sports participation and organisations 
were completely under the control of the Party and government. Sport became a 
political tool. As Yan Hua (2010) asserts, a ‘no law’ period of state sports policy 






Hao  Qin  (2004)  has  argued  that  the  ‘no  law’ policy was  in  essence  a  result  of 
excessive government intervention in sports in China, which alienated the function of 
sports from its nature, namely, entertainment and recreation.
45   
According to Hao Qin, 
the development of modern sports in both the West and East is inseparable from 
government intervention.
46   
He notes that strong government support and intervention 
was necessary for the development of modern sport for developing countries such as 
Germany, Japan and China. From the perspective of the evolution of modern sport, 
government involvement in sport was not only a historical necessity, but the driving 









17, no. 13 (2005): 218. 
43   Liu Qing, ‘The Role of the Government in the Development of Sports in the New Period’, Journal of Chengdu 
Sport University 29, no.1 (2003): 12-15. 
44   Yan Hua, ‘Research on the Development and Change of China’s Sports Policy before and after Holding the 
Olympic Games’, Liaoning Sport Science and Technology, 32, no. 2 (April 2010): 1-2. 
45  Hao Qin, ‘The Position and Role of the Government in Sports Development’, Journal of Physical Education, 11, 
no. 2 (2004): 5-8. 
46   Ibid. 
47   Ibid. 
27 




contributed to a transformation of function of sports from being an ‘instrument’ or 
tool to a ‘toy’; the ‘function of sports [in China] should transform from political needs 
to people’s development, from utilitarian and mandatory demands to an individual’s 
healthy and happy life.’
48   
Hao Qin (2004) asserts that the Chinese government has 
adopted a series of measures to promote socialisation and marketisation of sports 
since the 1980s. According to Hao, government intervention in sports in China will 
not fundamentally change in the short-term.
49   
The Party and Chinese government 
will continue to attach great importance to politics and ideology, so the political 






2.2.3 Research on the Development of Chinese Mass Sports 
 
Policies and Systems 
 
As Dennis Whitby (1999) notes, sport in pre-1949 China existed for the wealthy. The 
general poor health and weak physique of the Chinese people resulted in the country 
being described as ‘the sick man of Asia’.
51   
China searched for ways to make ‘the 
sick man of Asia’ healthy and strong again in the late 19
th  






For the Chinese political elite, sports were considered to be a possible 
solution. Training strong bodies for the nation, therefore, became a widespread slogan 





Mao extended the ideal ‘the training of the body for the strength of the nation’ into 
the practice of China’s revolution (Susan Brownell 1995; Fan Hong 1997; Xu Guoqi 
2008), which prioritised mass sport in Chinese Communist sports policies. However, 
 
opinions differ as to the development of mass sports policies since 1949. Ma Xuanjian 
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(2005) divides the development of Chinese mass sports policies after 1949 into three 
main stages: initial development (1949–1965); severely disrupted and destroyed 
(1966–1976);  and  recovery  and  rapid  development  (1977–2005). 
54   
Other  sports 
historians and writers make further divisions for the development of mass sport prior 
to 1978. Xiao Mouwen (2009), for instance, divides the development of Chinese mass 
sport policy into four main stages: emergence and formation (1949–1957); a stage of 
tortuous development (1958–1976); exploration and innovation (1977–1994); and 





As Susan Brownell (1995) notes, Mao placed a great deal of importance on the health 
 
of people’s bodies as a basis for the health of the nation.
56   
Xiao (2009) indicates that 
 
‘popularisation’ served as the guideline for state sports policies between 1949 and 
 
1957. Mass sport was prioritised through different channels. This can be seen from the 
features of mass sport in the early years of the PRC: 
 
 
1) Comprehensiveness: Mass sport in this period included near-total sport, including 
physical education and sport in school; 2) Fairness and uniformity: Mass sport in the 
early years of the PRC emphasised fairness in sport participation, justice among 
different regions and people from different walks of life; 3) Militarisation: Mass sport 
in this period was coloured with a strong militarisation, in which ‘sport for defence 
services’ and ‘sports defend the socialist motherland’ were identified as the main 




With regard to the system of mass sports in the early PRC, under the leadership of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, the ACSF became responsible 
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agencies, such as the Ministry of Education and the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions   (ACFTU). 
58 
After   the   establishment   of   the   SCSPE   in   1952,   sports 
commissions were successively established nationwide, above the county level. Fu 
Zhengming (2011) asserts that the Chinese mass sports system was initially composed 
of three major parts, including state, department and work units (danwei), collectively 





Between 1958 and 1976, mass sport underwent a tortuous development along with 
political campaigns, including the ‘Anti-Rightist Movement’ (fan you yun dong), ‘The 
Great  Leap Forward’ and ‘the Cultural Revolution’. Xiao asserts that  mass sport 
during this period involves several main characteristics: idealisation, strong 
politicisation and instability. Mass sports during this period was strongly militarised, 
whereby ‘sport for defence services’ and ‘sport defends the socialist motherland’ were 





Most sports historians agree with Chinese official conclusions that the Cultural 
Revolution resulted in 10 years of unprecedented disaster for sports. Wu Shaozu, the 
former  Director  of  the  SPCSC,  has  even  claimed  that  the  Cultural  Revolution 
destroyed the development of sports and that the entire sports system was at or nearly 
at  a  standstill.
61   
Traditional  sports  were  boycotted.  Xiong  and  Zhong  assert  that 
during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, mass sport activities all but 
disappeared in cities, except for politicisation of mass rallies and activities, notably 
‘loyalty dancing’ (solo or group dancing to express loyalty to Chairman Mao) as a 
fixture of the Cultural Revolution.
62   
In Chinese martial arts (wushu), experts were 
condemned as vestiges of feudalism, monsters and academic reactionaries; martial 
arts activities were accused of  ‘spreading feudal superstition’ among the masses, 
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The development of mass sports during the Cultural Revolution was not 
straightforward. During the early part of the Cultural Revolution, the intense violence 
of the Red Guard movement led China to the brink of internal war between 1966 and 
1969. After the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, the country’s political environment 
began to stabilise. In 1969, Premier Zhou Enlai set about restoring scientific and 
educational  standards,  which  encouraged  a  positive  all-around  attitude  toward 
sports. 
64    
National  rural  sport  development  meetings  and  national  work  sports 
meetings were held in 1972 after Premier Zhou’s recognition of sports achievements 
between 1949 and 1966 at the first National Physical Culture and Sport Conference 
held in July 1971. Thus, mass sport development became an important policy of the 
Chinese government in 1972. However, the process of building up all-around sport 
development and physical culture was again affected when Zhou’s restoration was 
attacked in subsequent political campaigns initiated by the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, 
Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan) led by Jiangqing, Mao’s wife. 




Although most Chinese resources condemn the Cultural Revolution for disrupting 
Chinese physical culture and sport and its system,
65 
including mass sport, some 
scholars, mainly in the West, contend that the Cultural Revolution was not all bad for 
sport. As Fan Hong argues, ‘the Cultural Revolution, in fact, pushed the roots of 
sports deep into Chinese society… Sport in the Cultural Revolution developed under 
very complex and unique social, cultural and political circumstances. It is curious that, 
unlike  arts,  education,  industry  and  agriculture,  on  which  the  revolution  had  a 
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64   Grant Jarvie and Dong-Jhy Hwang, and Mel Brennan, Sport, Revolution and the Beijing Olympics, (Oxford and 
New York: Berg, 2008), 87. 
65   For more detail on the effect of the Cultural Revolution on mass sport, please see Xiong and Zhong, The 
60-year History of Sport in New China, op. cit. 129-134; Gu Shiquan, History of Chinese Sport, (Beijing: 
Beijing Sport University Press, 2002), 85-87; Hao Qin, The History of Sport, Beijing: People Sport Press, 





destructive  effect,  sport  survived  and  even  developed’. 
66    
After  reviewing  the 
development of sport during the Cultural Revolution, Grant Jarvie concluded that the 






Sport in China has developed, opened up and reformed since the 1980s (Grant Javie, 
 
2008: 95). Nevertheless, mass sports and competitive sports did not experience the 
synchronous development in the 1980s that they had during the first 30 years after 
1949. The strategic focus of Chinese state sport policy was to ‘prioritise competitive 





From 1995 to the present day, mass sport has been re-emphasised. Xiao (2009) 
attributes  this  to  two  main  reasons:  national  physical  fitness,  particularly  among 
young people, experienced a dramatic decline since the 1980s; insufficient investment 
in sports was rectified with China’s rapid economic growth and enhanced overall 
national strength. These events made it possible for the Chinese government to 
substantially and financially strengthen mass sport. Xiao (2009) asserts that 
emphasising  mass  sport  was  symbolised  by  the  issue  of  the  ‘National  Fitness 
Programme’ and the ‘Sport Law’ in 1995.
69   
A report issued by Xu Hongfeng et al. 
 
(1999) discusses the developing tendency of social sport and Chinese mass sports 
policies. Xu Hongfeng et al. (1999) considered the ‘National Fitness Programme’ in 
1995 as a milestone of development of sport in China. She asserts that the ‘Sport Law’ 
ensured  sport  participation  for  the  majority  of  people  and  the  effective 





Compared with the mass sports policy, relatively few studies have examined the mass 
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sports systems. With regard to the mass sports systems in the early years of the PRC, 
Fu Zhengming (2011) notes that after the establishment of the SCSPE in 1952, sports 
commissions were successively set up at above county level. Subsequently, sports 
organisations and associations were set up in industry sectors. According to Fu, 
Chinese mass sports organisations and management systems initially consisted of 





Zhou Jianjun (2004) conducted an analysis of change of the mass sports systems from 
the perspective of the evolution of Danwei (work units) sports. He claims that in the 
traditional planned economy era, Danwei served as the political, economic and social 
foundation of Chinese society
72 
Under the highly centralised management system, 
Danwei has become an organisational means of allocating national resources and 
social  management.  The  state  has  the  right  to  mobilise  and  allocate  human  and 
material resources in Danwei. Zhou asserts that Danwei sport has, in reality, served as 
a basic form of mass sports organisations in China. According to Zhou, in post-Maoist 
China,  the  mass  sports  system  experienced  transformation,  but  Danwei  sport 







2.2.4 Research on the Development of Chinese Elite Sports 
 
Policies and Systems 
There is little doubt that elite sport has been the most prominent sport policy area in 
China
74
,  especially in  the  last  20  years.  However,  elite  sport  did  not  attract  the 
attention of the Party, who even suppressed its development in the early days of the 
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sport was not included in the Party and government agendas until 1952, when China 
participated in the 15
th 
Olympic Games. China’s poor performance in the Games 






In English academic literature, scholars Fan Hong and her colleagues were the first to 
describe the history of China’s sports policy and system, most notably elite sport and 
mass sports in China during different periods after 1949. As Fan Hong (2008) notes, 
the establishment of China’s elite sport system began in the 1950s, developed in the 
1960s and 1970s and matured with its own characteristics in the 1980s.
76   
According 
 
to Fan Hong (2008), the triumph of Chinese sport is deeply rooted in China’s elite 
sport  system,  which  in  Chinese  is  termed  ‘Juguo  tizhi’ and  translates  as  ‘whole 
country support for the elite sport system’. 
 
 
Other scholars have also contributed to the literature relating to the development of 
Chinese elite sports policies and systems. For instance, Chen Yu (2009) has examined 
the transformation of the Chinese sports system since 1949 and divides the 
development of the elite sports system into six stages: initial establishment (1949–
1957); tortuous development (1958–1965); 10 years of turmoil (1966–1976); 
socialist  construction  exploration  (1980–1984);  a  gradual  expansion  of  reform 







Based on the Soviet system, the Chinese State Physical Education and Sport 
Commission (SPESC) was formally established in November 1952. Fan, Wu and 
Xiong (2005) note that throughout the 1950s, sport was closely linked to the PRC’s 
domestic  and  foreign  policies.
78   
The  Sovietisation  of  Chinese  sport  introduced  a 
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The time between 1958 and 1966 was characterised by Cao and Brownell (1996) as a 
period of ‘political upheavals’ (the anti-rightist movement and ‘the Great Leap 
Forward’, GLF
80
) and ‘economic difficulties’ (the Three Hard Years, as a consequence 
of both the deterioration in the Sino-Soviet relations and natural calamities from 1959 
to 1961).
81   
Both Xiong (2007) and Fan (2012) select 1960 as the tipping point in the 
history of the development of Chinese elite sports and systems, as this is when the 
Party discourses development into the following slogan: to ‘Readjustment, 
consolidation, filling out and raising standards’.
82   
Subsequently, in 1961, the SPESC 






According to Johnson (1973), ‘the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s smashed 
across China like a violent sandstorm’. The elite sports system came under attack 
during the Cultural Revolution. Fan Hong relates the decline of the elite sports system 





, Jarvie ( 2008) and Xu (2008) all 
discussed the impact of ideology on sports, they did not expound the relationship of 
ideology and sport from the perspective of the Party’s or Mao’s ideological control on 
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The situation changed in the early 1970s, due to the urgent need to establish better 
Sino-American relations. ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’ not only changed the status of the 
nation but also the direction of competitive sports in China in 1971.
86   
China initiated 
a profound economic reformation and made great efforts to integrate with the world 
economy from the end of the 1970s. China’s return to the Olympics and high standard 
of performance became a symbolic means of catching up with and even overcoming 
Western  powers  that  ultimately  led  to  the  ‘Olympic  strategy’,  which  has  been 





Sports historians and writers (Wu, 1999; Fan, 2008; Xu, 2008; Tan, 2008; Cha, 2010； 
Zheng, 2018) have highlighted the ‘Olympic strategy’ as an important part of Chinese 
elite sports policy since the 1990s. Most of them agree with Hao Qin’s view (2004) 
that the ‘Olympic strategy’ and China’s remarkable achievements in the Olympics 
have benefited from the ‘whole country support for the elite sport system’ or ‘Juguo 
tizhi’. Hao Qin (2004) explains that ‘Juguo tizhi’ channelled all resources for sport in 
the country into elite sport and effectively produced hundreds of thousands of young 
elite athletes in a short time, all in pursuit of ideological superiority and national 
status; the characteristics of ‘Juguo tizhi’ are supported by centralised management 
and administration and guaranteed financial and human resources from the entire 





Tan and Green (2008) assert that well-developed ‘whole country support for the elite 
sport  system’  matches  China’s  Olympic  medal  ambitions. 
89    
This  support  has 
channelled sports resources throughout the country into elite sports and effectively 
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produced hundreds of thousands of young elite athletes within a short time, in pursuit 





Since the twenty-first century, elite sport success has gained more diplomatic 
legitimacy, providing the government with an ideal   platform to showcase its soft 
power  and  ideological  superiority.
91   
Furthermore,  China’s  right  to  host  the  2008 
Olympic Games stimulated a set of Olympic-related objectives and policies issued by 
 
the Chinese government. In July 2002, the government issued the policy document 
 
Further Strengthening and Progressing Sport in the New Era, which stressed the 2008 
 
Beijing Olympic Games as the paramount priority for the whole country. The Party's 
decision soon became the government’s policy. The General Administration of Sport 
(GAS) issued two documents: The Outline of the Strategic Olympic Glory Plan: 
2001–2010 and The 2008 Olympic Glory Action Plan, both of which emphasised 
Olympic medal success. The 2004 Athens Olympic Games was the first rehearsal for 
China’s Olympic-oriented elite policy in the new century. In Athens, Team China 
‘stole the limelight’: 407 Chinese competed in 203 events and won 32 gold, 17 silver 
and 14 bronze medals.
92   
Four years later, ‘Juguo tizhi’ once again proved to the world 
that China had become a sports superpower, dominating in the gold medal table at the 




Some people predicted that the Chinese elite sport system would fade away after the 
 
2008  Beijing  Games. 
93   
Dong  Xinguang,  who  participated  in  the  design  of  ‘the 
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However, the ‘Juguo Tizhi’ remained and was improved after 2008.
95   
At the National 
Sports Congress in 2009, the continuity of the elite sport system ‘Juguo Tizhi’ was 
confirmed by Chairman Hu Jintao, who for the first time, mentioned the idea of 






Since  then,  some  scholars  (Dong,  2009;  Hao,  2011;  Chen,  2014;  Xu,  2014) 
97 
mainly  from  China,  have  extensively  examined  the  origin  and  evolution  of  the 
concept ‘major sports country ‘and ‘world sports power’, as well as the construction 
of China's competitive sports system against the background of the transition from 
‘from a major sports country to a world sports power’. Notably, the imbalance in 
sports development appears to have changed after an official speech by the President 
of the PRC. According to Dong Xinguang (2009), ‘China has become a major elite 
sports country, which is a consensus both at home and abroad. China has achieved the 
goal of a major elite sports country, while mass sports is quite backward, which has 
become a “prominent weak link” in the construction of a world sports power. 
Therefore, it is an inevitable choice for our country (China) to choose the policy of 
emphasising  the  development  of  mass  sports  on  the  basis  of  maintaining  the 
characteristics and advantages of competitive sports’.
98   
Xu Benli (2014) asserts that 
‘changing from a major sports country to a world sports power’ is a developmental 
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However, ‘to build a world sports power, China will not weaken competitive sports, 
but   rather   vigorously   develop   them’. 
100 
The   Director   General   of   the   State 
Administration of Sports (GAS) claimed that: ‘While adhering to China's competitive 
sports  “Juguo  Tizhi”,  China  will  maintain  the  characteristics  and  advantages  of 
China's competitive sports. We (China) should actively tap the potential, optimize the 
structure and improve efficiency to promote the balanced development of various 
categories within competitive sports.’
101 
China’s competitive sports ‘Juguo Tizhi’ 
continued to show its strong vitality. China defended and consolidated the 
achievements gained at Sydney 2000,
102  
coming second in the gold medal table at 
London 2012, third in the gold medal table and second in the overall medal tally at 
Rio 2016, without the home advantage. 
 
 
Although much research has explored the evolution of China’s competitive sports 
policy and system, Tien-Chin Tan and Mick Green (2008) have claimed that very little 
in-depth  analysis  explores  the  experiences  of  the  Chinese  government  in  their 
attempts to construct systems for supporting elite (Olympic) athlete development, 
whereas there is a growing literature about the efforts of Western nations in this 
regard.
103   
Fan Hong (2008) has attempted to analyse the strategies and policies of the 
 
Chinese government for winning Olympic medals in 2008 in terms of selection of 
Olympic sports, training of Olympic athletes, increasing Olympic resources and 
preparation for Olympic competition.
104   
By drawing on a framework of 10 elements 
considered crucial for Olympic success in the West, Tan and Green (2008) explored 
China’s construction of an elite development system as it strove for Olympic glory in 
Beijing.  Their  analysis  reveals  a  remarkable  degree  of  similarity  between  the 
mechanisms in place in China with those in Western nations, including Australia, 
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With regard to the research on China’s sports policy and system, in particular elite 
sports, Chinese scholars focus more on the historical narrative and the structural 
evolution of the system itself, while Western or Chinese scholars engaged in academic 
research in the West focus more on the critical analysis of the impact of society, 
politics and economy on the evolution of the  policy and system,  as  well as the 
political significance of policy change(s). For example, Tan and Green (2008) have 
paid special attention to the overarching and strategic role of the Chinese government 
(one-party system), which was set as the point of departure for the analysis of China’s 
elite sport system for winning Olympic success in 2008. They observed that subtle 
‘domestic’ (national) variations are apparent in the implementation of these 
mechanisms, reflecting different national political and cultural histories, as well as 
traditions.
105   
Fan  and  her  colleagues  (2010)  assert  that  China’s  new  nationalism 
focuses on the restoration of ‘the great Chinese civilisation’ and supports the 
consolidation of the elite sport system.
106 
Elite sports policy documents, political 
statements on sport and Olympic phenomena, and commentaries of leading Chinese 
sport academics have been examined by Hu and Henry (2016) in their analysis of the 
discursive construction process involving key stakeholders regarding the Olympics in 
the Chinese elite sports system. Hu and Henry assert that ‘the Chinese Olympic 
discourse has thus been associated with nationalist and patriotic rhetoric, such as the 
restoration of the Chinese nation from its century of humiliation; and with socialism 
and other related ideologies, such as collective interests and values.’
107   
The political 
connotation of, and political influence on, Chinese Olympic discourse (reflecting the 
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2.2.5 Research on the Development of Chinese State Policy 
for Sports Industry and Commerce 
Chinese state policies for sports industry or commercialisation of sports dates back to 
 
the end of the 1970s. Bao (1997) divided the development of Chinese state policy for 
the sports industry and commerce into two stages: the initial phase from 1979 to 1992, 
followed  by the  adjustment  and  reformation  period  from  1993  to  the  present.
108
 
According to Bao, in the initial period, under the guideline of developing a ‘planned 
 
commodity economy’, the SCSPE identified ‘socialisation’ as one of the principles for 
state sports policy, requiring sport commissions at all levels to broaden investment 
channels for sports and transfer the system from one in which sport totally depended 
on government investment to one relying on a combination of government and social 
forces. After the 14
th 
Party Congress in 1992, when the market-oriented economy 
reform was established, the economy began to transform from a planned system to a 
market economy with socialist characteristics. Bao (1997) argues that with the gradual 
decline of the plan-based economic system that the sports system had previously 
relied upon, the backing of the government for market-oriented reform of the sports 






In a review by Yi (2009) of the development of Chinese policy of the sport industry 
and commerce, up until the 1980s the National Games had largely been working for 
political and diplomatic purposes. Following that time, political and diplomatic 
energies no longer completely dominated sport policy and practice.
110   
China began to 
break away from the traditional model of running the National Games under the 
funding of government grants, towards one of commercialisation, industrialisation 
and marketisation of sports. 
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Fan et al. (2010) note that after 15 years of development from 1994 to 2009, the sports 
industry no longer had to rely on government support.
111   
The period from the 1990s 
to the 2000s experienced the commercialisation of professional sports. According to 
Fan, prior to the 1990s, competitive sports in China were not market-oriented. In 1994, 
led by the professional football league ‘Jia A’, China’s sports associations began to 
embrace the market economy.
112   
Fan (2010) asserts that, according to the ‘Outline of 
Development of Sports Industry and Commerce (1995–2010)’ in 1995, 
commercialisation became a fundamental policy for the future development of the 
sports industry. The Chinese government issued three targets, including the Olympic 
Strategy,  the  Development  of  Sports  Industry  and  Commerce  Strategy,  and  the 
National Fitness for All Programme, to set the framework of the development of sport 
in an increasingly marketised economy.
113   
However, few of them provided in-depth, 
detailed analysis of the development of change of state policy for sports industry and 
commerce against the background of macro level social and economic change. 
 
 




Based upon the review of research in relation to Chinese state sports policies and 
systems, the basic messages arising from the current research are as follows: 
1)   Post-1949 state sports policy and systems in China were pioneered in the Red 
Sports and the New Sports Movements during the Communist years in Jiangxi and 
Yan’an from the 1920s to the 1940s. 
2)  The development of state sports policies in China has always been state-controlled 
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3)  The strategic focus of state sports policies changed from one that focused on mass 
sports in the early years of the PRC to the ‘two-legs strategy’, represented by 
simultaneous development of mass sport and elite sport in the 1950s and 1960s, 
which  was  interrupted  by  the  Cultural  Revolution  (1966–1976).  This  was 
followed by the ‘one-leg’ strategy – development of elitism in the 1980s, after 
which time the government has followed three targets – the ‘Olympic strategy, 
sports industry and commerce strategy, and National Fitness Programme’ – since 
the 1990s. 
4)   Since  1949,  sports  functions  in  China  changed  from  an  overemphasis  on 
political contestation to one that gradually paid attention to the individual needs of 
recreation and fitness. Government involvement in sport has served as the driving 
force in the formation and development of sports. 
5)   From 1958 to 1976, mass sports in China experienced large fluctuations, due to 
political and ideological campaigns; from 1978, mass sports were not substantially 
emphasised until 1995, when the ‘National Fitness Programme’ and the ‘Sports 
Law’ were issued. Although the Chinese government launched market-oriented 
sport reform, Danwei sport has been an integral part of mass sport organisation 
and basic forms of mass sport systems in China. 
6)   In contrast, elite sport was not emphasised at the state level until 1952. China has 
gradually developed its elite sport system since the 1950s; the triumph of Chinese 
sport since the 1980s is rooted deeply in China’s elite sports system, termed 
‘whole country support for the elite sport system’, or ‘Juguo tizhi’. The Chinese 
policy for sport industry or commercialisation of sports originated in the 1980s 
and has experienced rapid development since the 1990s. 
 
 
Current  research  is  limited  by  three  key  drawbacks.  Firstly,  despite  a  growing 
literature exploring the evolution of Chinese sports policies and systems, there are 
scant detailed and in-depth analyses on the transformation of sport policy and systems 
after 1949 comparing sports policies between the Mao regime and the post-Mao era. 








Secondly, although political and ideological requirements arguably play a critical role 
in shaping Chinese state sports policies and systems, few scholars have attempted to 
examine the relationship between the dominant ideology and the change in sports 
policy through the use of theoretical perspectives. 
 
 
Thirdly, although the concept of the party-state system is thought to be fundamental to 
understanding the role of the state and the government in developing sports, as well as 
the changes in sport policy in China since 1949, no research has as yet thoroughly 





2.3 Key Theories and Concepts in This Research 
 
To address the above limitations, this research has examined in detail the relationship 
between sports and the dominant ideology in sports policies and systems through the 
lens of theoretical frameworks, including Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Max 




2.3.1 Gramsci’s Concepts of Cultural Hegemony 
 
The Marxist theory of class struggle mainly bases its argument on the differences in 
people’s  economic  status  and  ownership  of  production.  Marx  recognised  that 
economic exploitation was not the only driver behind class struggle and that the 
capitalist system was reinforced by a dominance of ruling class ideas and values, 
leading to Engels’ famous concern that ‘false consciousness’ would keep the 
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The  Italian  communist  Antonio  Gramsci,  imprisoned  for  much  of  his  life  by 
Mussolini, developed this viewpoint with his widely influential theory of ‘hegemony’. 
In his Prison Notebook, Gramsci analysed why the proletarian revolution failed to 
occur in Italy, where objective conditions were encouraging in many respects, and he 
noticed a flaw of traditional Marxism: the inability to explain the obedience of the 
ruled class by the ruling class.
115   
Gramsci confirmed that Lenin’s leadership thoughts 
influenced his view of cultural leadership. While stressing political leadership, Lenin 
also affirmed the power of revolutionary ideology, will and other cultural factors as 
revolutionary weapons and pointed out that: ‘Without revolutionary theory, there 
would be no revolutionary action. . . Only the party with advanced theory can realise 
the   function   of   advanced   demonstration’. 
116    
In   ‘Selections   from   the   Prison 
Notebooks’, Gramsci pointed out that ‘it was Lenin himself who re-evaluated the role 
of the Cultural struggle front in opposing various economic “tendencies”’.
117   
Lenin 
endorsed the theory of Leadership (ruling thought and moral leadership) as the 
supplement of the country force theory (the dictatorship of the proletariat), as a form 
of contemporary Marxist theory. The meaning is clear: rule (coercion) is a way of 
exercising power, which is necessary in a certain historical period, whereas leadership 
is a method of stability for regimes based on broad agreement.
118   
It follows that, in 
Gramsci’s  view,  the  leadership  of  the  proletariat  does  not  reject  a  revolution  of 
political violence; what is more important is that the leadership of the ideological field 
should be acquired before violent revolution. 
 
 
Gramsci coined the word ‘hegemony’, which means that the ruling class can create a 
‘social consensus’ through the culture and media, so that the ruled are willing to 
accept and obey the rule, even when this rule may run counter to the interests of the 
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leadership over allied and subordinate groups’.
119   
According to Gramsci, the ruling 
ideas or ideological factors were not powerful enough to eliminate class struggle, but 




Three important concepts were introduced or redefined in Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony. One is ‘consent’, that is, through spiritual and moral leadership to obtain 
voluntary acceptance and consent of the people. In the view of Gramsci, ‘consent’ and 
‘force’ nearly always coexist. The traditional imperial regime, such as the Tsarist 
regime, ruled primarily through domination by monopolising the instruments of 
coercion. The parliamentary regime, by contrast, rules through hegemony, while the 
threat of officially sanctioned force remains implicit. Ruling classes or groups do not 
always maintain their hegemony merely through the creation and perpetuation of 
legitimate symbols, but they must also seek to win the consent of subordinate groups 






How can the ruling class acquire the consent of the subordinated classes or groups? 
According to Gramsci, ‘The foundation of a ruling class is equivalent to the creation 
of a Weltanschauung (worldview)’.
121 
In this case, cultural hegemony essentially 
creates   the   worldview,   ideas   and   morality   through   gaining   acceptance   and 




From the perspective of Gramsci, there is a difference between ‘domination’ based on 
force and cultural hegemony based on consensus. The formation of cultural hegemony 
is based on free consent, through which ordinary people actively accept the political, 
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political platform of ruling class or party must actively combine with the moral values 
upheld by the ruled, otherwise the subordinated or ordinary people will feel they are 
placed under control or are being dominated, forced to accept policies enforced by the 
ruling group. They will then revolt, eventually causing the use of violence and 
coercion by the state or ruling party. Thus, to achieve cultural hegemony, the ruling 
party or politicians should not merely rely on conspiracy to manipulate the masses. 
Instead, they should actively seek the ‘free’ consent of the ruled and implement the 
policy on behalf of the people rather than for those with narrow interests. 
 
 
Another key concept in the concept of ‘hegemony’ is civil society. In his effort to 
reappraise the Marxist concept of ‘superstructure’, Gramsci redefined the term ‘civil 
society’. For Gramsci, superstructure could no longer be construed as a pale reflection 
of economic foundation. He argued that the state, or whole society, broadly comprises 
two main spheres: ‘political society’ and ‘civil society’. Political society is formed by 
coercive agencies, including prisons, courts and military, to exercise mandatory 
function, by which the dominant class retains its legal monopoly of repression and of 
violence. Civil society is composed of those organisations responsible for the 
elaboration  and/or  spreading  of  ideologies,  including  schools,  churches,  clubs, 
political parties, unions and material organisations of culture (magazines, newspapers, 
mass media), and so on. According to Bobbio’s analysis, differences exist in the 
concepts of civil society as held by Gramsci and Marx: Marx viewed civil society as 
material relations of production, which constituted the economic infrastructure of 
society, whereas Gramsci held that civil society does not belong to the economic 
infrastructure, but rather to the superstructure and refers to the entire intellectual and 
spiritual life.
123   
Together, they form ‘the State’, yet they differ in function: within 
civil society, social classes intend to exert hegemony, i.e. they try to win allies for 
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Civil Society Political Society 
Ideologies   and   cultural   systems,                   Political-military bureaucra 
such  as  schools,  churches,  clubs,                   as prisons, courts and the mi 
political     parties,     unions     and 
material organisations of culture 
 
 
society, classes always exert a dictatorship, or dominate through coercion.
124  
Thus, 
political society or coercive state is the common of the state-phenomenon primarily 
discussed by Marx and Lenin, whereas the novelty contributed by Gramsci lies in 
what he redefined as ‘civil society’, in which he introduced the term hegemony linked 
to free consent (see Table 2.1). 
 
 
Table 2.1. The difference between ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’, 


















Source:    Carlos    Nelson    Coutinho,    ed.    Gramsci’s    Political    Thought    ( Boston,    MA: 




The third concept in the theory of hegemony is ‘intellectual’. Gramsci distinguishes 
two major types of intellectuals: traditional and organic, defined in terms of the 
functions attributed to them by the social group. They originated first in the sector of 
economic activity and then in that of ideology, politics and culture. Traditional 
intellectuals present themselves as an ‘uninterrupted historical continuity’, much as 
ecclesiastical hierarchies legitimate their status by tracing their origin to the Apostles 
and Christ.
125   
For Gramsci, ‘traditional’ intellectuals are thought to be disinterested in 
sectarian or topical interests, rising above them in the name of reason and truth. In 
comparison, organic intellectuals refer to those whose origin coincides with that of the 
group they represent. They are a function of class interest and also an instrument of 
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126   
Gramsci believed that every newly emerging class will create, 
incubate  and  breed  organic  intellectuals  belonging  to  their  own  class  and  thus 
maintain the stability of that class. For Gramsci, in capitalist society, if traditional 
intellectuals are thought to be ‘interested’ on behalf of a bourgeois class to maintain 
hegemonic order, then in order to effect revolution, the working class should create 
organic intellectuals of their own to win consent to counter-hegemonic ideas and 
ambitions. That is, intellectuals tend to bear historical tasks: they provide the public 




To conclude, Gramsci’s theory of Cultural Hegemony emphasises the importance of 
the ideology of the ruling class in realising the domination of society. It describes the 
domination of a culturally diverse society by the ruling class through manipulating the 
ideology of civil society, including the worldview, beliefs, perceptions, values and 
societal mores, so that the ruling class worldview becomes the worldview of the 
whole society and is accepted as the cultural norm. Through the universally valid 
dominant  ideology,  the  ruling  class  or  group  justifies  the  social,  political,  and 
economic status quo as natural, perpetual and beneficial for everyone in the society, 
rather than one that only benefits the ruling class. 
 
 
Gramsci’s  theory  of  hegemony  can  help  to  explain  the  impact  of  the  dominant 
political ideology upon sport, leading to the changes in sports policies and systems. 
This  theory can  be used  to  apply a critical  thinking approach  to  understand  the 
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2.3.2 Legitimacy and Max Weber's Classification 
 
It is impossible for a regime to maintain a durable, stable order that relies solely on 
violence. The maintenance of a rule or the perpetuation of a system depends upon the 
authority of the rule or the system, as well as the public’s acceptance of the rule or 
system. As Rousseau said, ‘power does not constitute rights, but people are only 
amenable to lawful authority’.
127   
Thus, political rule must be based on political 
legitimacy or legitimacy. 
 
 
Scholars have generally studied the legitimacy of the government from two different 
aspects. The first has analysed the legitimacy of political power from the people’s 
point of view. Lipset defines legitimacy as ‘the capacity of the political system to 
engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate ones for the society’.
128   
Linz regards legitimacy as ‘the belief that in spite 
of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than others that might 





Friedrich held that legitimacy is ‘a special form of consensus, which involves the right 
to rule or the name of rule’.
130   
Studies on political legitimacy from this angle display 
the ability of a country to build a consensus belief. Another angle comes from the 
perspective of critical scholars, who study the legitimacy of the regime from two 






In their eyes, these beliefs are considered to be mere products of false consciousness. 
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While incisive, the analysis of critical theorists of the regime’s legitimacy is often 
clouded by elitism and arrogance; moreover, the conclusions are often difficult to 
confirm  and  even  beset  by mistakes.  Max  Weber  has  explicitly put  forward  the 
concept of legitimacy and systematically studied it. His study of the legitimacy of 
governance is the acknowledged cornerstone of this field. Indeed, Weber’s concept of 
legitimacy has become the key term in modern political analysis.
132   
Weber believed 
that to determine whether a regime is legitimate does not require moral judgment 
from a philosophical or ethical point of view, but is legitimate as long as people 
believe that the regime is legal. Legitimacy comes from, and even equates to, belief in 
legitimacy. Weber analysed the legitimacy of political power from the people’s point 
of view. As Robert Crafstein said, ‘in the eyes of Weber, legitimacy no longer means 





Weber believes that habit, affection and rational calculation are the three bases of 
human compliance. Accordingly, he proposes three ideal, typical aspects of state 
legitimacy: A. a state enjoys traditional legitimacy when its power is seen by the 
people as being inherited or always existent; B. a state has charismatic legitimacy 
when the head of the state is perceived by the people as having exceptional quality by 
virtue of some kinds of mystical experiences and personal qualities; and C. a state 
possesses  legal  legitimacy when  its  power is  derived  from  a set  of judicial  and 







More severe criticism comes from Beecham, who believes that the influence of 
 
Weber on legitimacy is almost a disaster, because Weber transformed a question of 
 
value related to legitimacy into an empirical problem of people’s faith in the system 
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135   
However,  Weber’s  classification  of  ideal  legitimacy has  met  with 
many objections. Parkin pointed out that the three legitimacy requirements put 
forward by Weber are actually legalisation efforts endorsed by the ruling group, 
who naturally want to be rulers to accept this request, whereas ‘on the other hand, 
legitimacy refers to that in which the above requirements are accepted   by the 
conditional  recognition  of  the  oppressed  group.  That  is  to  say,  the  basis  for 





These criticisms of Weber show that we must value the legitimacy of the rule. 
Obviously, Parkin’s standard is that to ‘rule by consent’ is the ultimate source of all 
governance legitimacy. Parkin believed that in some cases, the legitimacy of 
charismatic rule is the only legitimate rule, because leaders with charisma do not 
control more than belief, unlike their followers and believers, who are willing to grant 
such leaders legitimacy. According to Parkin, the touchstone of true legitimacy is 
exemplified by the willingness of a master’s subordinates to obey his (or her) orders 






Rousseau represents another important school of the legitimacy argument. In the first 
volume of the ‘Social Contract Theory’, Rousseau stated: ‘I want to explore whether 
there is a certain legitimate and definite regime rules in the social order, from the 
point of view of the human actual situation and the possibility of the law.’138  However, 
when we apply Weber’s classification to understand state power, it leads to two 
problems.
139   
Firstly, according to Yang and Zhao, Weber’s classification is static, as 
any authority relationships in real life are interactive and dynamic. Second, while 
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Weber’s ideal type separates the emotional and rational aspects of human perception, 
 







Max Weber’s Ideal Type of Legitimacy and This Research 
 
Since Weber’s classification ignores the dynamic aspect of authoritative relations and 
their emotional and rational bases, it is hard to apply this classification in empirical 
analysis. Weber proposed three ideal types of legitimacy, noting at the same time that 
this is simply a ‘pure’ classification; it is impossible for any society to completely 
satisfy these three ideals. 
 
 
This study will therefore not only describe the changes in the legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist regime, but will also strive to explore the reasons for these 
changes. Secondly, although this research follows the ideas and methods of Weber, it 
does not specifically borrow from the legitimacy of his classification. By referring to 
Weber’s revised classification of legitimacy in research conducted by Yang and Zhao 
in ‘Performance Legitimacy, State Autonomy and China’s Economic Miracle’ and 
‘The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and 
Contemporary  China’, 
141    
this  research  makes  some  modifications  to  Weber’s 
empirical analysis. Firstly, according to Yang and Zhao, I plan to use ideological 
legitimacy   to   replace   traditional   legitimacy   to   cover   the   legitimacy   of   any 
values-based evaluation and rationality of a regime. Secondly, I attempt to omit 
charismatic legitimacy from the ideal type of legitimacy. Although charismatic 
legitimacy is very important, it is only an extreme form of ideological legitimacy. 
Finally, and most importantly, I position performance legitimacy as one of the main 
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Accordingly, this research identifies legal electoral, ideological and performance as 
the three bases of state legitimacy.
142   
Specifically, when a legal regime is based on all 
social groups, including the binding principle of the national elite and senior leaders 




Ideological legitimacy refers to the legitimacy of a regime derived from a value 
system, such as tradition, religion, and political ideas. Performance legitimacy refers 
to the legitimacy of a regime built upon economic performance, the promotion of soft 
power (including sports, educational and cultural), health, national or moral merit and 
defence ability. However, Weber did not include the performance of the regime in his 
original theory of political legitimacy. Lipset highlighted the importance of political 
achievements  for  the  stability  of  a  regime. 
143  
However,  he  also  believed  that 
 
performance  should  not  be  viewed  from  the  perspective  of  legitimacy,  because 
 






Nevertheless, evaluation is an essential part of the legitimacy of performance. Just as 
people naturally evaluate their performance in different ways, people evaluate the 
legitimacy of government based on other standards. The only difference is that the 
basis for such an evaluation is different. In short, the legitimacy of a regime’s election 
in accordance with the rule of law can become an evaluation process related to 
theoretical instrumental rationality. The legitimacy of ideology will lead people’s 
attention to evaluation and reason based on values. Finally, the legitimacy of a 
regime’s legitimacy promotes practical reason. Therefore, the legitimacy of 
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These are not pure classifications, but rather, purely theoretical constructs. No regime 
can guarantee its survival with a single legitimacy; within any given period of time, a 
country often has a dominant legitimacy to determine the nature of the regime. 
 
 
In Weber’s revised classification, ideology legitimacy and performance legitimacy are 
compelling. Firstly, from the point of view of international background, after the 
‘October  Revolution’  in  Russia,  the  rise  of  the  regime  characterised  by  the 
 
‘Supremacy of the Party’ and ideological legitimacy has become a common choice in 
a socialist country, so ‘the victory of the revolution is the victory of the party 
government’.
145   
The CCP’s model is in line with the trend of the 20
th 
century. There 
has never been any disagreement between the CCP and the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) as to the ultimate goal of the Party, and their demands for the 
legitimacy of Communist ideology have never been relinquished. Throughout its 
revisions of the ‘Party Constitution’, the realisation of Communism in China has been 
the Party’s highest goal.
146  
As far as ideology is concerned, it is a key concept in 
understanding the change of sports policies and systems in modern China. 
 
 
In the era when ideology constitutes the basis of the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party, what characterises the relationship between sports, sports policy, 
ideology and the legitimacy of political parties? One of the key questions or aims in 
this research is to explain what kind of role the party-state system has played behind 
the change of sports policies and systems, and the connection between sports and the 
Party. In reference to the concept of political legitimacy and revised classification, it 
may help to clarify the relationship between the party-state system and sport 
throughout the Mao era. 
 
 
In post-1978 China, reform has often been portrayed in dualistic terms, stating that 
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either politics or economics were ‘in command’.
147   
This rivalry has been explained 
by the fact that the Communist regime generally lacked procedural legitimation, 
compared with the authority and political legitimacy in Mao’s era, and thus relied 
heavily on economic performance for legitimacy.
148  
This concept has already been 
proposed by some political scientists. How did the sports policy and system reflect 







The first part of this Chapter explores the literature that has been created in relation to 
the development of the Chinese state sports policy and system. Six different areas are 
reviewed. The first of these relates to current research that has been carried out on the 
evolution of the strategic focus of Chinese state sport policy. The basic message from 
the research is that the post-1949 state sports policy and system in China were 
pioneered in the Red Sports and the New Sports Movements during the Communist 
years in Jiangxi and Yan’an from the 1920s to the 1940s; state sports policies 
experienced a change from a focus on mass sport in the early PRC to a two-legs 
strategy ‘developing mass sport and elite sport simultaneously’ in the 1950s and 
1960s, which was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution, followed by the ‘one leg’ 
 
elite strategy in the 1980s, then the setting of three targets since the 1990s: the 
 
‘Olympic strategy, sports industry and commerce strategy, and National Fitness 
Programme’. The second literature review examines the change of function of sport in 
China and government intervention in sports. It determines that the development of 
state sports policy in China has always been state-controlled and shaped by political 
and ideological requirements. Government involvement in sport has acted as the 
driving force in the formation and development of sports in China. The third review 
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policies experienced large fluctuations between 1958 and 1976 due to political and 
ideological campaigns in the country; mass sports policies from 1978 were not 
substantially emphasised until 1995, when the ‘National Fitness Programme’ and the 
‘Sports Law’ were issued. After 1995, the development of mass sports policies in 
general witnessed a process of gradual legalisation; however, despite some obvious 
transformation, danwei sport remains an integral part of mass sports organisation and 
basic forms of mass sports systems in China. 
 
 
The fourth review examines research into the development of Chinese elite sport 
policies and systems. It determines that attending the Olympics and other international 
competitions and performing well became a symbolic means of catching up with and 
even overcoming Western powers. China has gradually developed its elite sports 
system since 1949; the triumph of Chinese sport is rooted deeply in China’s elite 
sports system ‘Juguo tizhi’, with guaranteed financial and human resources from the 
entire country to ensure maximum support. The final review then examines Chinese 
State Policy in the sports industry and commerce, which originated in the 1980s when 
China launched market-oriented reforms. To set the framework for the development 
of sport in an increasingly marketised economy, the Chinese government has enacted 
a sports industry and commerce strategy since the mid-1990s. 
 
 
Furthermore, the fourth part also provides a critical review for current research related 
to the research questions: firstly, despite a growing literature that explores Chinese 
state sport policy and systems, the current research is limited by the fact that very few 
scholars have conducted a detailed, in-depth analysis of this topic since 1949. 
Secondly,  political  and  ideological  requirements  arguably  play  a  critical  role  in 
shaping Chinese state sports policies and systems, but very few researchers have used 
particular theoretical frameworks of perspectives to analyse the relationship between 
ideological requirements and state sports policies. Thirdly, current research has not yet 
explored the role played by the party system in changing sport policies and systems, 






despite the fact that the concept of the party-state system is thought to be fundamental 




In the second part of Chapter 2, based on a review of Gramsci’s theory of cultural 
hegemony and Weber’s ideal type of political legitimacy, the analysis revised these 
theories to improve their explanatory power and applicability in empirical analysis. 
Gramsci's contextualized theory of cultural hegemony in China provides a critical 
perspective for analysing the relationship between dominant ideology and sports, 
which is one of the key aims of this thesis. In comparison, Weber’s revised 
classification is expected to decipher the relationship between party and sports in 
China throughout the shift of political legitimacy from 1949 to post-Mao China. 
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Methodology involves more than just research methods, which are understood to be 
the ‘techniques or procedures used to collate and analyse data’.
1   
This chapter outlines 
the methodology for the investigation, epistemological a n d  o n t o l o g i c a l  positions 
adopted for the research methods and examines the methods used for gathering the 
empirical materials. The structure of this chapter includes three sections: firstly, a 
review of the research paradigm and research questions provides the basis for the 
selection of the interpretative philosophical assumptions in this research. Secondly, 
the chapter discusses the theories that underpin the research and inform the choice of 
methodology. Section three discusses the research design and covers the research 
process, the specific methods, critical discourse analysis (CDA) and semi-structured 
interviews employed in this study, as well as the approaches to the data analysis. 
Furthermore, this chapter covers the contribution made by the research design to 




3.2 Philosophical Approaches 
 
Ontology is the starting point of all research, after which one’s epistemological and 
methodological positions logically follow.
2   
If a simple definition of ontology is that it 
concerns what exists in the world, then epistemology concerns what we know about 
what exists. Marsh and Furlong (2002) assert that epistemological assumptions 
incorporate  two  questions,  asking  whether  we  can  identify  ‘real’  or  ‘objective’ 
relations between social phenomena and if so, how?
3   
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assumptions  exist:  positivism,  interpretivism  and  realism,  all  of  which  relate  to 





Positivists generally assume that ‘reality is objectively given and can be described by 
measurable properties, which are independent of the observer (research) and his or her 
instruments’. 
5   
Positivist  methodologies  are  therefore  concerned  with  objectively 
precision in measuring outcomes, while positivism advocates the application of the 
methods  of  the  natural  sciences  to  the  study  of  social  reality  and  beyond. 
6
 
Interpretivists  argue  that  reality  is  mind-dependent  and  that  the  social  world  is 
 
‘essentially   only   something   dependent   upon   and   still   within   the   operating 
intentionality of ego-consciousness’.
7 
Thus, interpretivism requires a strategy that 
respects the difference between people and the objects of natural science, so requires 
the social  scientist  to  grasp  the subjective meaning of social  action.
8   
Realism  is 
another epistemological position that purports to provide an account of the nature of 
scientific practice.  Realism shares two  features  with positivism: a belief that the 
natural and the social sciences can and should apply the same kinds of approach to the 
collection of data and to explanation, and a commitment to the view that there is an 
external reality to which scientists direct their attention.
9   
However, unlike positivism, 
realism holds that there are some deep-seated structural factors in human society, 
which can not be directly concluded through observation; these structural factors are 
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This research does not merely aim to trace the development of state sport policy and 
system, but it also intends to identify underlying influences and other relevant factors 
informing the Chinese government’s belief system. Given that the positivist 
epistemological position does not endorse non-measurable properties, such as 
consciousness and shared meanings, in the analysis and discussion of transformation 
of sport  policy and  system,  this  research  adopts  an  interpretive  approach,  which 
allows a comprehension of the social construction of phenomena and the issues 
affecting the development of sports policy and system. In accordance with the 
interpretive position, the development and characteristics of state sport policy and 
system will be analyzed through an ‘interpretive understanding’ of policy documents 
and expert interviews. In short, this research adopts an interpretive perspective to 
elucidate the social construction and the change of political ideology affecting the 




3.3 Methodology Consideration 
 
Methodology  explores  the  philosophy,  application  and  usage  of  methods. 
11   
To 
outline the relationship between ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods and 
sources, Hay (2002) draws on interrelationships between the underpinnings of social 
research, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Although this figure does not show the impact and influence of the questions one is 
asking, nor the type of project one is undertaking – for example, either researching 
individuals’ attitudes or institutional change – in relation to the methods chosen, Grix 
(2002) argues that Hay’s figure shows the directional and logical relationship between 
the key components of research. According to Grix (2002), the research should not 
begin at any of the stages in the figure above; it is possible for a researcher to select a 
favourite  or  familiar  method  and  then  work  back  through  their  methodology, 
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epistemology  and  ontology. 
12   
In  addition,  it  is  ontological  and  epistemological 
positions that shape the very questions researchers ask in the first place, how they 
pose them and how they set about answering them. In other words, the choice of 
research methods follows from an allegiance to a distinctive position in relation to 
how social reality ought to be studied,
13   
and how the data arising from the research 
ought to be collected and interpreted. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The Interrelationships between the Building Blocks of Research 
 











What and how can we 




How  can  we  go  about 
acquiring that knowledge? 
 
 
Which precise procedures 








Source: A Critical Introduction ( 2002)
14
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3.4 Research Design 
 
3.4.1 Consideration of Qualitative Research 
 
As Bryman (2004) has stated, ‘quantitative research can be construed as a research 
strategy that emphasizes quantification in the collection and analysis of data’.
15  
In 
contrast, ‘qualitative research can be construed as a research strategy that usually 
emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data’.
16
 
From the epistemological perspective, quantitative methodology is consistent with the 
positivist paradigm and believes that social observations should be treated as entities, 
just as physical scientists treat physical phenomena. Qualitative researchers hold the 
interpretivist  or  constructivist  paradigm,  emphasising  the  significance  of  social 




Despite the significant differences between quantitative and qualitative research 
outlined above, neither type of research outweighs the other as to superiority. The 
choice between quantitative and qualitative research concerns their suitability in 
answering particular research objectives and questions.
17  
Gratton and Jones (2004) 
explain that research focusing on the measurement of a particular phenomenon must 
collect quantitative data.
18 
Qualitative data are more appropriate for investigators 
exploring the feelings or experiences of people. 
 
 
When an investigation requires an understanding of process, events and relationships 
in the context of the social and cultural situation, qualitative research aims to answer 
questions about the ‘what’, ‘how’, or ‘why’ of a phenomenon. In contrast, quantitative 
methods explore the ‘how many’, or ‘how much’. As far as this research is concerned, 
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throughout different periods, but interprets and elaborates how the state sport policy 
and system took shape throughout different periods of the PRC. Furthermore, it will 
rethink and argue how Chinese sports policy is embedded in the practice of politics, 
economy and culture of Chinese society. 
 
 
To answer the questions in this research, an interpretative approach is adopted in 
order to understand the views of the policymakers and scholars, as well as participants’ 
attitudes towards state sport policy. Quantitative research is unsuitable for this study, 
because the small amount of numeric data is unlikely to provide detailed or in-depth 
explanations of the topic. Instead, qualitative methodology, using methods such as 
discourse analysis and thematic analysis, can lead to a ‘deeper’ understanding of the 




3.4.2 Research Methods 
 
Common methods of qualitative research include individual interviews and focus 
groups, discourse analysis, field notes and thematic analysis. O’Leary (2004) claims 
that ‘collecting credible data is a tough task, and it is worth remembering that one 
method of data collection is not inherently better than another.’
19   
In other words, 
which data collection method to use would depend upon the research goals and the 
advantages and disadvantages of each method. Considering that this study is a 
combination of history and social sciences, a mixed-methods approach is adopted, 
including critical discourse analysis (CDA) and semi-structured interviews, among 
which thematic analysis is used with the interview data. This section aims to explain 
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3.4.2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Fairclough identifies discourse as a manifestation and regulation of social identity, 
social practice, and social construction.
20  
Wodak and Meyer further this point and 
believe that discourse is as an element of the social process, stating that discourse 
analysts should focuses on ‘a dialect relationship  between a particular discursive 





There are many different versions of discourse analysis, drawing on a wide range of 
theoretical  traditions  in  social  theory. 
22   
Among  those  approaches  to  discourse 
analysis, Fairclough distinguishes them on the basis of whether or not they pay close 
attention to linguistic features of texts. The approaches that usually pay scant close 
attention to the linguistic features of texts generally focus on the historical and social 




Using CDA in critical policy analysis 
 
As Van Dijk has indicated, CDA ‘focuses on social problems, and especially on the 
 




Within the CDA perspective, the term ‘critical’ is not understood in the common 
sense of the word, i.e., of being negative, criticising. Wodak and Meyer emphasise 
that ‘critical’ within CDA means ‘not taking things for granted, opening up 
complexity,    challenging    reductionism,    dogmatism    and    dichotomies,    being 
self-reflexive  in  one’s  research,  and  through  these  processes,  making  opaque 
structures of power relations and ideologies manifest’.
24   
Therefore, the purpose of the 
 
CDA is to explore the relationships between discursive practices and events; uncover 
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power relationships and demonstrate inequalities embedded in society; and reveal the 
 
‘ideological’ and ‘political investments’. When doing CDA, one needs to make a 
description  of  linguistic  properties  so  as  to  disclose  or  unravel  the  ideologies 
embedded in the discourse under study. 
 
 
Compared with Van Dick’s sociolinguistic model, Fairclough pays more attention to 
the position and role of discourse in social and cultural practice. He believes that 
discourse practice is embedded in social and cultural practice, which is shaped by its 
social and cultural practice, and that different social actors (media, government, 
hospitals, etc.) constantly produce various words within a certain framework of 
knowledge, power, social relations and identity. On the other hand, discourse practice 
constitutes a part of social and cultural practice in a broad sense. Then, knowledge, 
power, social relations and identity is reproduced in discourse practice. Therefore, the 
production and reproduction of discourse is not only a static linguistic structure, but 
also a linguistic text, and will reappear and consolidate the unequal social power 






From this perspective, policy making is seen as an arena of struggle over meaning, or 
 
as ‘the politics of discourse’,
26   
and policies are seen as the outcomes of struggles 
 
‘between contenders of competing objectives, where language – or more specifically 
discourse – is used tactically’.
27 
CDA is therefore appropriate for policy analysis, 
because it allows for a detailed investigation of the relationship between language and 
other social processes, and of how language works within power relations. 
 
 
According to Fairclough, there are three discourse-analytical categories corresponding 
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structural feature in a certain society.’
28   
It is worth noting that these three concepts 
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are dialectically related to each other: ‘discourses are enacted in genres, discourses are 





Table 3.1. Protocol of Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 
Chronology   Between 1949 and 1989  
Genre  The ways of (inter)acting or relating, interactions (relationship with, and 
attitudes towards, others; action over others)  
Discourse  The ways of representing, representations, topics (knowledge about event 
& structure; control over things)  
Style  The ways of being, identities (knowledge about, relations with self, e.g. 




In this research, as shown in Table 2, the data analysis follows Fairclough’s concept 
of the order of three textual elements. From the   perspective of Fairclough’s CDA, 
genre can be expressed at different levels: an abstracted level, i.e. abstraction, 
argument, discussion and statement; a more concrete level, i.e. interview, 
advertisement and report; and a micro level, which constructs relationships in 
communication through conveying different concrete active meanings via terms such 
as ‘to promote’ or ‘to implement’.
30   
This research focuses on investigation of the 
 
genre at the micro level, which aims to explore purposes of the relationship with, the 
communication, and attitude towards others constructed in the discursive actions over 
others. Discourses  include not only the perspective of  representation and 
interpretation (e.g. the diverse ways in which the modern sport in China are framed). 
They also reflect the structural elements, facilitating or constraining the actors’ 
knowledge of events (elite sport priority policy, especially Chinese Olympic 
development strategy in the 1980s) and of social structure. The objects that fall into 
the column of style symbolise the discursive facet of identity, namely, how actors 
view and construct their own and another’s social identity. For example, a party 
 
 
28   
Ibid. 
29   
Norman Fairclough, Analysing discourse and text: textual analysis for social research (London, Routledge, 
2003), 45 
30   
Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (London: Routledge, 2003), 37. 
67 




leader or sport official requires not only certain managing behaviour, but also certain 
discursive ‘manners’, such as speaking like other administrators do.
31   
In this research, 
through investigating the style constructed with Chinese sport discourse, I explore the 





Document sources involved in discourse analysis 
 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), documents are not only often rich sources of 
information, ‘contextually relevant and grounded in the contexts they represent’, but 
they are also ‘almost always available, on a low-cost (mostly investigator time) or free 
basis’ and they can provide an insight into the programme and decisions that have 
been made. Since the documents have not been created specifically for the purposes of 
research, the possibility of a reactive effect can be largely discounted as a limitation 
for data validity. In a discussion of the different kinds of documents used in social 
research, Scott (1990) suggests that four distinct criteria can be used to assess the 




According to Scott, document authenticity asks whether the evidence or document is 
genuine and of unquestionable origin; credibility asks whether the evidence is free 
from error and distortion; representativeness refers to whether the evidence is typical 
of its kind, and if not, is the extent of its untypicality known; while the question of 
meaning asks whether the document is legible and comprehensible.
33 
This section 
therefore discusses issues associated with document analysis and considers the 
following key questions: 
 
 
 What type of documents should be collected in this research? 
 
 What are their various strengths and weaknesses? 
 
 How might they be identified and analysed? 
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Undoubtedly, government documents are one of the major categories of documents 
involved in this research. Official documents are generally housed in national archives 
or spaces specially created and maintained to store, protect and provide access in 
secure conditions.
34   
It is suggested that the most straightforward demonstration of the 
operations of state power is contained in its folders and bundles, ledgers, lists and 
indictments, and in what is missing.
35   
According to Scott (1990), official documents 
shaped by structure and activities of the state are often the by-products of policy and 
administration and, as the creations of public bodies, they reflect the organisation and 
interest of state agencies.
36   
From this point of view, official documents deriving from 
the state largely reflect official intention and effects of official actions. However, the 
use and analysis of official documents, and statistics in particular, for the purposes of 
academic  research  is  surrounded  by  controversy.  According  to  Bryman  (2004), 
official statistics concerned with an area of social life such as crime can be very 
misleading, because they record only those individuals who are processed by the 
agencies  responsible  for  compiling  the  statistics. 
37   
Researchers  must  not  only 




For this research, official documents have been sourced from the State Committee of 
Sport  and  Physical  Education  (SCSPE)  and  the  State  General  Administration  of 
Sports (SGAS), the sole authoritative governing body for sports in China under the 
leadership of the State Council of Chinese Central Government. The decisions, 
resolutions and policies issued by the SCSPE and SGAS directly impact upon sports 
policies and systems at the national level. Thus, this research is largely drawn from 
documents, meeting minutes and important lectures originating from the SCSPE and 
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the SGAS. In China, the party and government are organised as a vast hierarchy with 
power flowing down from the top. As the higher authority in the administrative 
system, central government plays a critical role in making state policy. The official 
documents analysed in this research therefore include policies, lectures and memos 
issued or delivered by the central government. Many of the official documents are 
public records in printed texts, much of which is available online. Thus, the collection 
of official documents relating to sports policy involved a combination of printed texts 
and  internet  sources.  The  all-pervasive  surveillance  and  censorship  system  over 
official recordkeeping in China prevented collection of all of the original documents 
relating to this study. We had to therefore draw on other document sources of state 
policy as an alternative approach. 
 
 
In general, newspapers, magazines, television programmes and films are potential 
sources for qualitative research. According to Esterberg (2001), media accounts are 
useful for understanding how groups of people are represented in public discourse or 
what norms and ideals for behaviour exist in a particular time and place.
38   
Qualitative 
social researchers have long used media accounts to investigate social life. Likewise, 
media  resources  may  help  us  to  better  understand  and  analyse  public  policy  as 
political  behaviour.  Harrison  (2001)  argues  that  media  resources  can  provide  a 
valuable understanding of the context of political behaviours, particularly when we 




This research follows the advice of Mannheim and Rich (1995) when dealing with a 
broad  range  of  media  data,  who  advise  on  the  necessity of  employing  different 
sources of documents, depending on the particular political question that are being 
examined. Newspapers are an important source of current and historical information, 
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public opinion poll data (Mannheim and Rich, 1995).
40   
In addition to newspapers, 
this research also draws upon documentary films or interviews related to sports or 
sports policies, as it would be difficult or even impossible for us to interview all 
policy-makers. Such media accounts can to a large extent be used as alternative 
methods to help collect information for this research. Other valid reasons for using 
these media are that they are easy and cheap to access, or even free to consult. 
 
 
Notably, media are not completely free of government control. According to Bardes et 
al. (1995), the United States has one of the most democratic media in the world, 
although regulation does exist, particularly of the electronic media.
41 
When state 
control has ownership of the media, bias and distortion are inevitable. Negrine (1989) 
has argued that biases and distortions resulting from patterns of ownership and control 
of the media tend to be politically partisan and are likely to present ‘new value’ rather 
than ‘plain facts’.
42   
With regard to mass media in China, the government has long 
tried to keep a tight rein on traditional and new forms of media, to prevent any 
challenges to its political authority. Media in mainland China, in particular state-run 
media, such as the Xinhua agency and the People’s Day, have had to echo with state 
policy.
43 
According to data triangulation, findings can be corroborated and any 
weaknesses in the data can be compensated for by the strengths of other data. In order 
to  provide  balance  and  triangulate  the  data  from  Chinese  media,  this  research 




To sum up, by employing Fairclough’s discourse analysis framework, all Chinese 
official sport policy documents and speeches delivered by top sport officials and 
political  leaders  between  1949  and  1989  were  reviewed.  In  addition,  supporting 
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references include other documents concerning concrete practices, e.g., major sport 
events, ideological education of Chinese elite athletes, and academic and media 





3.4.2.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
 
Interviewing is probably the most widely employed method in qualitative research, as 
a means of collecting data and gaining knowledge from individuals.
44   
It emphasises 
human interactions as a construction site for knowledge. As Kvale (1996) observes, 
‘interviewing is literally an interview, an inter-change of views between two or more 
people on a topic of mutual interest’.
45 
The interview method is based on the 
conversations of daily life and is a professional conversation. It attempts to acquire 
descriptions from the various qualitative aspects of the interviewee’s lived world, and 
works with words rather than numbers. In brief, the interviewees are able to discuss 




The structure-based interview generally considers three major categories: the 
unstructured interview, the semi-structured interview and the structured interview. A 
structured interview is designed to answer a set of clearly specified research 
questions.
46   
The structured interview is usually classified as a quantitative method. 
The major types of qualitative interviewing are unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews. Unstructured interviews tend to be very similar in character to a 
conversation.
47   
In the process of interviewing, there may be just a single question that 
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Semi-structured interviewing, in contrast, requires the researcher to list questions or 
an  interview  guide,  but  leaves  much  leeway  for  the  interviewee  to  reply. 
48   
As 
Beardsworth and Keil (1992) explain, as the interview progresses, interviewees raise 
additional or complementary issues, which form an integral part of the study’s 
findings.
49 
By adopting the semi-structured interview, the interviewer can record 
qualitative information about the topic and can seek both clarification and elaboration 
on the answers as they are supplied. In the words of May (1993), the semi-structured 





As far as this research is concerned, the interview process has been adopted mainly 
either because the type of information we wished to glean does not exist in official 
published documents or contemporary media accounts, e.g. television interviews or 
newspaper reports, or because we required more detailed elaboration and explanation. 
Although  policymakers  play a  critical  role in  the process  of  policymaking,  their 
beliefs,  opinions  and  attitudes  associated  with  policymaking  are  not  normally 
indicated  in  official  documents.  As Lane  (1962)  has  claimed:  ‘Extended 
conversational interviews of this character provide an opportunity for contextual 
analysis. An opinion, belief, or attitude is best understood in the context of other 
opinions, beliefs and attitudes, as they illuminate its meaning, mark its boundaries, 





To truly understand the formation and change of policy making, we needed to conduct 
interviews.   As   noted   above,   the   semi-structured   interview   not   only   allows 
interviewees to answer more than is permitted by the standardised interview, but 
provides a structure for comparison with the focused interview.
52   
The semi-structured 
interview was adopted in this study as the most appropriate means of obtaining 
information from our research subjects. 
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Undoubtedly,  with  the  tightly  centralised  system  in  China,  the  highest-ranking 
officials play a critical role in policymaking. The policy in this research mainly 
involved elite sports, mass sports and the sports industry. In China, the SCSPE and 
SGAS are responsible for both elite and mass sports, as well as relevant policymaking 
throughout different periods, so those officials serving in government agencies at 
different periods are involved. My preferred interviewees were as senior as possible 
and involved in strategic decision-making rather than operational matters. However, 
the reality of researching in China is that it is extremely difficult for ordinary 
researchers to directly communicate with those high-ranking officials, even for 
academic research. This research therefore adopted a relatively pragmatic approach. 
Instead of interviewing those highest ranking officials, such as government ministers, 
we turned to officials at more junior levels; heads or deputy heads of departments 
within the SCSPE or SGAS (e.g. department of policy and regulation, SGAS) 
specifically responsible for policymaking. In addition, the research involves ordinary 
officials who have been serving in relevant departments for a reasonable length of 
time and know the operational characteristics of Chinese sports policy. 
 
 
Furthermore, this researcher conducted interviews with staff in other organisations 
besides academic scholars, to examine and supplement information that would have 
been  obtained  from  the  officials  in  the  departments  directly  responsible  for 
decision-making.  Although  people  in  these  organisations  do  not  participate  in 
decision or policymaking, they are implementers or operators of policy and they have 
experienced changes of sport policy and systems; their opinions may reflect how the 
policy works in practice. I also interviewed scholars who have conducted research 
related to these research objectives and questions, so that I could glean a non-official 
but critical point of view. 





Rationale for Selection 
 
According to Manion, conducting interviews in relation to Chinese politics presents 
two challenges. The first is to find suitable Chinese official interviewees and the 
second is that party (CCP) and government officials are normally reluctant to interpret 






Dealing with these challenges became a key issue for not only how to succeed in 
conducting interviews as one of the key qualitative research methods for this study, 
but also for the consideration as to whether research objectives and research aims 
could be achieved with accuracy. To identify relevant officials, I adopted three 
strategies, as per Tien-Chin Tan’s research on Chinese sports policy and globalisation. 
The first strategy used a ‘direct approach’, whereby this researcher directly contacted 
some of the Chinese sports officials working in the SCSPE (Sports Ministry) when 
they were attending an academic conference in Shanghai in July 2010. The official 
contacted at the time was Mr. Xie Qionghuan, a former director of the department of 
sport policy and regulation of the Sports Ministry. Mr. Xie provided access to several 
sitting officials. Some were interviewed via phone or email; others were unavailable 
due to their busy schedule. 
 
 
The second strategy was an ‘indirect approach’. This researcher contacted academics 
in both China and Ireland, including some Chinese visiting scholars in Ireland and the 
researcher’s teachers and colleagues in China who had ‘private’ friendships with 
Chinese sports officials, asking for introductions to their friends and support for 
interview requests. 
 
The third strategy for identifying suitable interviewees was by snowball sampling. 
According to De Vos et al. (2002), snowball sampling is valuable in qualitative 
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research, as it is directed at individuals that are difficult to identify.
54 
After the 
researcher contacts one appropriate case from the population, that person connects the 
researcher with another ‘like’ case. Thus, snowball sampling is based on social 
networking that informally accesses the required population.
55   
When implementing 
this  method,  at  the end  of each  interview, this  researcher asked  the respondents 
whether they knew of someone else who might be willing to be interviewed. A 
limitation of this method is that the technique inevitably results in a biased sample, 
because the researcher is reliant on others to make appropriate contacts. Since the 
population  is  hidden, its  characteristics  are  likely to  be  unknown  and  it  will  be 
virtually impossible for the researcher to make any judgement as to its 
representativeness.
56   
In an attempt to avoid this methodological weakness, we sought 
interviewees from a wide range of organisations; from sports institutions and scholars 




Interview Guide and Questions 
 
Unlike a questionnaire or a precoded survey instrument, which provides a rigid order 
and specific wording for the questions that the interviews must follow, an interview 
guide helps the interviewer to focus the interview.
57   
The interview guide involves the 
main topics and the wording of questions that the researcher wants to ask. According 
to Kristin (2001), it also usually includes suggestions about follow-up questions (or 
probes). However, the researcher does not strictly follow this guide when conducting 
the interview. Rather, the researcher adapts questions during the course of the 
interview, changing both the phrasing and their order. According to Kvale (1996), 
guides for semi-structured interviews include an outline of topics to be covered that 
 
assist  with  the researcher’s  preparation  for the  interview.
58   
The interview  guides 
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employed in this research were as follows: 
 
 Their experience associated with sports policymaking. 
 
 The context under which sports policy was made. 
 
 The cause and effect of the sports policy and system during a certain period. 
 
 The process of implementation of sports policy. 
 




According to Kvale (1996), a good interview question should not only contribute 
thematically to knowledge production, but also dynamically, to promote a good 
interview interaction.
59   
In regard to the thematic dimension, the questions should 
relate to the topic. The dynamic dimension emphasises the interpersonal relationship 
in the interview, aiming to keep the flow of the conversations going and motivate the 
subjects to talk about their experiences and feelings. Kvale (1996) suggested that 
when preparing an interview, it may be useful to develop two guides; one with the 
project’s main thematic research questions and the other with the questions to be 
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Table 3.2. Research Question and Interview Questions 
 





To  what  extent  did 
dominant ideology affect 
changes in sports policies 
and systems? (after 
accounting for the influence 
Do you think the state sports policy is a 
reflection    of    the    Party’s    will    and 
zhidao sixiang    (guiding    ideology)    on 
sports? In what aspects? 
of dominant ideology) What’s  your  opinion  about  the  effect  of 
politicisation on sport policy and systems? 





Have any changes occurred 
in the dominant ideology? 
(in the process of changes 
in sport and sports policies) 
What is your opinion about the difference 
in  the  influence  of  the  Party  on  sports 





Before and after the Reform and Opening 
Policy, do you think the government has 
made     any     fundamental     changes     in 
formulating sports policies? 
 
What were the changes in 
sports policies between the 
Mao and post-Mao eras from 
1949 to 1989? (from the 





What is your opinion about the role of sport 
and government-oriented sports systems in 




Do you think the influence of the Party on 
Sports in the Mao era continued or retained 
in Post-Mao ear, specifically in the 1980s 
and after that? In what aspects? 
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Academic research questions need to be delivered in an easy-going, colloquial format, 
to generate spontaneous and rich descriptions.
61  
In addition, the interview question 
should be approached from different angles, enabling the research questions to be 
investigated through several interview questions and allowing that one interview 
question to potentially provide answers to several research questions. For instance, 
one of the key questions in this research was: ‘To what extent did dominant political 
ideology affect changes in sports policies and systems? (after accounting for the 
influence of dominant ideology)’. During the interview, specific questions were posed 
as follows: ‘Do you think the state sports policy, to some extent, is a reflection of the 
Party’s ideology?’, ‘What’s your opinion about the effect of politicisation on sports 
policy and systems?’, ‘What is your opinion about the difference in the influence of 
political parties on sports policy between the Mao era and the post-Mao era?’. 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the second challenge we encountered in this research was how 
to elicit useful information from interviewees, most of whom were cautious about 
talking about policy, in particular the essential relationship between politics and 
policymaking, due to restrictions on freedom of expression in China. To tackle this 
problem, this researcher not only designed the interview guide, but also ensured that 
the questions were open-ended. According to Esterberg (2001), the goal of 
interviewing in this research is not only to make sure that the questions make sense to 
the research participants, but should open up discussion, not close it down.
62   
To 
encourage the interviewees to talk about more detailed information and reveal their 
perceptions of the development of state sports policy and its practice, the questions in 
this research were ‘open-ended’ (see Table 3.2). In order to encourage the interviewee, 
especially sports officials or officials in the education sector, to freely express their 
opinions, we undertook that their names would not be used in anything we made 
public but would be drawn upon for analysis of this research. To properly set up the 
interview in advance, I calculated how long the interview would normally take by 
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testing the materials with fellow academics. The selection of interview location was 







The interviews involved a total of 15 participants, mainly from government agencies 
and  research  institutions.  Four  were  former  or  current  officials  in  government 
agencies (see Table 3.3); one was the former director of the department of sport 
policy and regulation (SCSPE) who engaged in state sports policymaking, two were 
officials from the Department of Sport policy and regulation, the General 
Administration of Sport of China (GAS), and the National Administrative Centre of 
Football. The fourth participant was from the Shanghai Municipal Sports Bureau. 
 
 
Seven interviewees were employed as research fellows in the fields of sport history, 
sports policy and sports management at either Beijing Sports University, Shanghai 
Sports University, Tsinghua University, North China Normal University, or Ningbo 
University. Some were interviewed by the author on the occasion of a conference held 
in Shanghai in July 2010, while others accepted interviews either in person in Cork, 
Ireland, or via telephone call. The interviewees include a number of participants who 
have experienced different periods of the development of China’s sports. 
80 





Table 3.3. The Interviewee’s Background 
 
 
No. Date Interviewee Background Location 
1 10/07/10 
Former Director of Department of the Department of Policies,  Laws and  
Regulations,  the SCSPE 
Shanghai 
2 12/08/10 Researcher in Sport Policy, Beijing Sport University Beijing 
3 11/07/10 
Researcher  in  Chinese  Sports  History  and  social Vicissitude, South China 
Normal University 
Shanghai 
4 25/08/14 Researcher  in  Chinese  Sports  History,  Shanghai University of Sport Shanghai 
5 12/07/10 Researcher in Chinese Sport History, South China Normal University Shanghai 
6 20/08/12 Researcher in Sport Management, Guangzhou Sport University Shanghai 
7 24/08/11 Official  from  National  Administrative  Centre  of Football, the GAS Beijing 
8 11/07/10 Official in Shanghai Municipal Sports Bureau Shanghai 
9 12/01/12 
Official  in  Department  of  Department  of  Sport Policy and Regulation, the 
GAS 
Telephone 
10 15/01/13 Researcher  in  Sports  History  and  Sports  Policy, Ningbo University Cork, Ireland 
11 16/08/13 Researcher in Sports Sociology, Shanghai University Shanghai 
12 5/08/13 Retired athlete 
Nanjing, 
Jiangsu 
13 10/07/13 Director of Shanghai Jingwu Sport Study Centre Shanghai 
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Thematic analysis with interview data 
 
Thematic analysis is the process of identifying, analysing and reporting themes or 
patterns within data. Boyatzis (1998) characterises it not as a specific method, but as a 
tool to use across different methods.
63   
Similarly, Braun & Clarke (2006) suggest that 
thematic  analysis  is  the  first  qualitative  method  that  should  be  learned  as  ‘…it 





The goal of a thematic analysis is to identify themes, i.e. patterns in the data that are 
important or interesting, which are then used to address the research or say something 
about an issue. Through its theoretical freedom, thematic analysis provides a flexible 
and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet 
complex, account of data, e.g. interview data. Thematic analysis is therefore widely 
used  by  researchers  and  scholars  in  literature,  sociology,  cultural  anthropology, 
history, art, political science, and many other fields.
65   
In this study, thematic analysis 
will be used to help analyse the data obtained by interviewing, to generate the themes 




Braun  and  Clark  (2006)  distinguish  between  theoretical  thematic  analysis  and 
inductive analysis.
66   
The former is driven by specific research question or issues, 
while the latter is driven by data itself. The data analysis in this study is driven by 
research  questions  and  is  more  top-down  or  theoretical  thematic.  In  this  study, 
drawing on Braun and Clarke’s (2006) 6-step framework,
67   
I outline the analysis 
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Step 1: Becoming familiar with the data. 
 
The first step in any qualitative analysis is reading, and re-reading the transcripts. 
Esterber (2001) explicitly states that data analysis in qualitative research generally 
involves three stages: first, to physically manage or organise the data (e.g. put it into 
three-ring binders or files or load it into the computer); to immerse yourself in the 
data and become familiar with what you have gathered; and finally, to find ways to 
present the analysis to others.
68   
At the first stage, I familiarised myself with the data 
 
by developing an overview of each interview, through repeated readings of the 
interview transcripts and listening to the tapes. At this stage, it is useful to make notes 




Step 2: Generating initial codes. 
 
The second stage mainly necessitated a focusing on those parts of the text considered 
to be ‘significant’ or directly related to research issues. In this phase I started to 
organise the data in a meaningful and systematic way. These parts of the data are 
underlined. Of course, at this early stage, the remaining data that did not initially bear 




As I adopted a theoretical thematic analysis instead of an inductive one, I was 
concerned with addressing specific research questions and analysed the data with this 
in mind. Based on the research questions, three main themes were initially formed: 
‘Guiding ideology affects sports policies and systems in the PRC’, ‘The dominant 
ideology  of  Chinese  society  and  guiding  ideology  of  Chinese  sports’,  and  ‘The 
changes in sports policies between the Mao and post-Mao eras between 1949 and the 
1980s’ (see Table 3.4). The coding of data was guided by each main theme. I 
specifically coded each segment of data that was relevant to or captured something 
interesting about the research questions, rather than line-by-line coding for every 
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coding. I did not have pre-set codes, but developed and modified codes as I worked 
through the coding process. 
 
 
Step 3: Searching for themes. 
 
There are no strict rules about what makes a theme. A theme is characterised by its 
significance. During this identification process, one should maintain an open mind, 
welcoming and accepting alternative views and sustain this during all stages of the 
data analysis. In this case, I examined the codes and identified subthemes that could 
be clearly grouped together under main themes and research questions. For example, I 
had  several  codes  that  related  to  perceptions  of  how  dominant  ideology  affects 
changes in sports policies. I collated these into an initial theme (e.g. The domination 
of Maoism on sport policy). At the end of this step, initial subthemes were organised 
to cover all coding data and explain something about or relate to research questions. 
 
Step 4: Reviewing themes. 
 
This stage is about checking that the themes ‘work’ in relation to both the coded 
extracts and the full data-set. The researcher should reflect on whether the themes tell 
a convincing and compelling story about the data, and begin to define the nature of 
each  individual  theme,  and  the  relationship  between  the  themes. 
69    
Following 
above-mentioned principles, during this stage I reviewed, modified and developed the 
preliminary themes that I identified in Step 3, searching for the themes. It is essential 
to think about if the broad themes make sense. I read the data associated with each 
theme and considered whether the data really did support it, and considered how the 
theme worked both within a single interview and across all of the interviews. Aspects 
that had to be considered included: 
• Do the themes make sense? 
 
• Does the data support the themes? 
 
• Am I trying to fit too much into a theme? 
 
• If themes overlap, are they really separate themes? 
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• Are there themes within themes (subthemes)? 
 




For example, following the principle ‘If themes overlap, are they really separate 
themes?’, for this phrase, the themes ‘How is the influence of guiding ideology on 
sport policies and systems’ and ‘Reasons for the influence of guiding ideology on 
sport policies and systems’ did not seem to be distinct enough to be considered as two 
separate themes. The two themes reflect different aspects of the impact of Maoism on 
sport policy. I therefore combined these into a new theme, ‘The influence of guiding 
ideology on sport policies and systems’ (see Table 3.4). 
 
 
At the end of this step, as indicated in Table 3.4, the process of combing, deleting and 
revising initial themes led to the identification of six subthemes that covered all of the 
main themes and related to six research questions: ‘The formation of guiding ideology 
of Chinese sports after 1949’, ‘The influence of guiding ideology on sport policies 
and systems’, ‘The guiding ideology of sport is a reflection of the Party’s will and 
dominant  ideology’,  ‘The  change  of  dominant  ideology  and  its  characteristics’, 
‘Characteristics of sport policy making and sports system in the Mao Zedong era’ and 
 
‘Characteristics of sports policy making and sports system in the post-Mao era’ (see 
Table 3.4). It is worth noting that not all individual interviews covered all subthemes, 
as some interviewees did not or were reluctant to talk about topics relating to certain 
subthemes (e.g. The guiding ideology of sport is a reflection of the Party’s will and 
dominant ideology), because of their knowledge, background and identity. 





Table 3.4. Thematic Clusters (identified at the end of step 4) 
 
Main themes 
Guiding ideology affects sports 
policies and systems in the PRC 
The dominant ideology of 
Chinese society and guiding 
ideology of Chinese sports 
The changes in sports policies 
between the Mao and post-Mao eras 
between 1949 and the 
1980s 
Subthemes 
The formation of 
guiding ideology 












sport is a 
reflection of 
the Party’s will 
and dominant 
ideology 
The change of 
dominant 












and the sports 
system in the 
post-Mao era 
Interview No. 1 √ √   √ √ 
Interview No. 2 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Interview   No. 3 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Interview No. 4 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Interview No. 5 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Interview   No. 6 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Interview   No. 7 √ √   √ √ 
Interview   No. 8 √ √  √ √ √ 
Interview No. 9 √ √  √ √ √ 
Interview No.10 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Interview No.11 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Interview   No. 12     √ √ 




Step 5: Defining and naming themes. 
 
As Braun & Clarke (2006) indicate, this phrase is the final refinement of the themes 
and the aim is to ‘identify the ‘essence’ of what each theme is about.’
71   
It aims to 
figure out how the themes interact and are related to one another. As far as the phrase 
in this study is concerned, it is about how one individual theme (e.g. The formation of 
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influence of guiding ideology on sport policies and systems’ and ‘The change of 
dominant ideology and its characteristics’). 
 
Step 6: Producing the report. 
 
Writing is an integral part of thematic analysis. This section includes how to weave 
the various parts of narrative analysis and data extracts together, so as to tell the 





3.4.3 Validity and Reliability 
 
Patton (2001) stated that validity and reliability are two factors that any qualitative 
researcher should be concerned about when designing a study, analysing results and 
judging the quality of that study.
72   
Maxwell (1996) offered us three types of validity 
threats that we must be careful to watch out for: description; interpretation; and 
theory.
73   
Valid description involves how we ensure that the description of what we 
saw and heard is accurate and complete. Audio and video recordings are used to 
ensure validity, as these can be played back when transcribing. However, since this 
research is conducted in China, translation skills are crucially important to guarantee 
validity. In general, there are two methods of translation: literal translation, where 
sentences are translated word by word, and translating for meaning. Use of different 
language systems by Chinese and English mean that they differ in terms of 
construction and ways of expression. Word-by-word translation makes the research 
difficult to deliver valid and accurate information, or meaning as articulated in the 
interviews and documents. In contrast, translating the general meaning of data can 
guarantee  methodological  validity.  The  interviews  employed  in  this  research  are 
aimed at illuminating the transformation of Chinese sports policies in an interpretive 
manner, and should not be conducted literally. In this way, we hope that we can 
ensure validity as much as possible. 
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With regard to the threat of valid interpretation, Maxwell (1996) explains that this 
consists of ‘imposing one’s framework of meaning, rather than understanding the 
perspective of the people studied and the meaning they attach to their words and 
actions’.
74   
To tackle this threat, I attempted to understand the data generated by the 
participants in this research, which involved a wide range of political, economic and 
cultural contexts. According to Miles & Huberman (1984), triangulation is typically 
perceived to be a strategy for improving the validity and reliability of research or 
evaluation of findings.
75   
Mathison (1988) elaborates on this by saying: ‘Triangulation 
has risen to an important methodological issue in naturalistic and qualitative 
approaches to evaluation [in order to] control bias and establish valid propositions 
because traditional scientific techniques are incompatible with this alternate 
epistemology’.
76   
Thus, I did not assume that the participants’ views were valid before 
their triangulation via crosschecking with other interviewees and relevant documents. 
 
 
Theoretical  validity  poses  the  third  threat.  According  to  Maxwell  (1996),  this 
concerns the failure to collect or pay attention to contradictory data, or to consider 
alternative  explanations  or  understandings  of  the  phenomena  studied. 
77   
For  the 
authors of this research, the main bias comes from the existing research with regard to 
Chinese sport policy and systems, some of which even agree on certain arguments. In 
order to draw more definitive conclusions, I should avoid this bias as well as the 
impact imposed by existing views. To this end, the triangulating method and data was 
implemented throughout this research. First of all, as described in the methods section, 
in addition to the documentary method, this research employed the interview method 
in order to comprehensively inquire about the Chinese sport policy and systems. 
Furthermore, the interviewees comprise three groups: officials, scholars and ordinary 
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Reliability is another concern. Along the lines of the definition offered by Joppe 
(2000), reliability embodies consistency of results over time and accurately represents 
the study population; if it is possible to reproduce the results of a study using similar 
methodology, the research instrument is deemed reliable.
78 
Whereas reliability in 
quantitative research depends on the standardisation of research instruments and 
repeated checking of the data generated by such instruments, reliability in qualitative 
research can barely be achieved by crosschecking the same case, because the 
researchers and  environment  cannot  be completely remade,  controlled,  or remain 
unchanged. In terms of this research, it would be impossible to interview the same 
person multiple times, in particular the officials who participated in this research. 
 
 
To  achieve  reliability  in  this  research,  we  designed  two  strategies  intended  to 
minimise potential errors and biases during interviewing and document analysis. 
Firstly, to gain more accurate and reliable opinions from interviewees, we made a 
commitment to them to not use their names in any publication, despite drawing upon 
their interviews to shape this research and analysis. Secondly, multiple sources of 
evidence, including interviews and document analysis, will be used to triangulate data 
collected. Thus, we attempted to validate information derived from interviews by 
examining accounts, documents and other visual evidence providing the basis for 




3.4.4 Ethical Considerations 
All of the content that we have discussed above is concerned with ‘technique’ and 
research questions that formed the main bulk of the methodology. Beyond these, there 
is another important aspect of research evaluation – namely, ethics. Research ethics 
has become an area of much greater concern in recent years, with many universities 
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and research funders requiring that research receives ethical approval before it is 
carried out.
79   
In general, according to Diener and Crandall, ethical principles include 
four aspects: whether there is harm to participants; whether there is a lack of informed 





To ensure research ethics, first of all, this research was based on informed consent and 
characterised by the honesty and openness of the researcher, participants and 
institutions. Prior to the interview being carried out, the intention of the research was 
declared to each participant. They were presented with the interviewer’s identity as a 
PhD researcher at a university in Ireland with the student ID card and an introductory 
letter on university letterhead. In addition, the fact that the researcher used to work as 
a lecturer at a university in China and still holds a position there, was openly stated to 
make the interviewees feel at ease. 
 
 
Secondly, as noted earlier, all interviewees were guaranteed that their name only 
appeared in this study to avoid an invasion of privacy. To guarantee interview 
confidentiality, all information supplied by the interviewees was used in the research 
only. Moreover, if the interviewees felt uncomfortable being recorded electronically, 
then I took notes on paper instead. 
 
 
Maxwell (1996) reminds us that it is impossible to deal with problems by eliminating 
the researcher’s theories, preconceptions, or values, but we can try to understand how 
a particular researcher’s values influence the conduct and conclusions of a study.
81
 
Prior to 2009, when I started to pursue my PhD in Ireland as a citizen of the PRC, I 
had been receiving education and living in China, which was under the influence of 
the Party-State. Obtaining information from the rest of the world has become easier in 
China due to internet access and increasingly pervasive new forms of media, as well 
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as  a  liberalisation  of  access  to  information  on  many  topics  that  were  formerly 
restricted in China. However, it is inevitable that I may have developed some bias 
based on my prior experiences and knowledge while growing up in China. In 
particular, the political operations and ruling power in China seemed normal and 
natural to me, which could potentially mean that I failed to explore any underlying 
reasons. To overcome this potential bias, while performing data collecting and 
analysis, from time to time I had to remind myself to detach my thinking from the 







The mixed research design selected for this research allows for an in-depth 
understanding of the change and function of sport policy and systems, as well as the 
will of the party-state and the government. Considering that this study straddles both 
history and the social sciences, critical discourse analysis and semi-structured 
interviews together constitute an ideal mix of methods to achieve a successful 
rendering   of   the   research   questions.   Fairclough’s   critical   discourse   analysis 
framework is employed in the research to investigate official sport documents, 
speeches by top sport official that strategically focus on the overall development of 
Chinese sport and other supporting material. 
 
 
Additionally,  semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  with  supporting 
documentary and visual data. Thematic analysis was adopted as an approach to 
interview analysis as it allows for the identification of emergent topics through 
efficient  coding,  which  proved  essential  for  this  study.  Drawing  on  Braun  and 
Clarke’s framework (2006), this research adopted a six-step approach for the analysis 
of interview data. Finally, in order to assist with a smooth research process, a research 
design was implemented and accompanied by explicit introductions for each of the 
procedures and steps in the process. 
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Chapter 4 State Sports Policy and System from 
 







As Alan Bairner has pointed out, ‘sport is frequently a vehicle for the expression of 
nationalist sentiment to the extent that politicians are all willing to harness it for such 
disparate, even antithetical, purpose as nation building, promoting the nation-state, or 
giving cultural power to separatist movements.’
1 
Sport, perhaps more than other 
cultural forms, may provide a useful perspective on how ideologies, including 




After the CCP won the Civil War, the establishment of the PRC in October 1949 
symbolised the end of the dominance of semi-feudalism and colonial influences. 
Nevertheless, the CCP government did not immediately build  a socialist state in 
China. 
2    
Instead,  Chairman  Mao  Zedong  and  his  followers  designed  a  ‘new 
democratic society’, marking the start of a period of ‘transition to socialism’. What 
was the social situation in 1949 at the time of the founding of the PRC? What kinds of 
sports policies and systems did the Communists establish in the early days of this new 
country? From the change in sports policies, is it possible to decipher any associations 
between PRC-mandated sports policies, official ideology and state-building? This 
chapter seeks to answer these questions by examining events in China during the first 










1   Bairner Alan, Sport, Nationalism and Globalization. European and North American Perspectives (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2001),xi. 
2   See ‘The ‘Resolution to some Historical Issues of the CCP since the Founding of the PRC’, People’s Daily, 1 
July, 1981. 
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Immanuel C.Y. Hsü has explained the features of the Chinese revolution. He asserts 
that the classical Marxist pattern of societal development from feudalism to capitalism 
and then to socialism did not happen in China, as the stage of capitalism did not 
properly  exist  there. 
3    
The  Communists  divided  the  development  of  Chinese 
revolution into two successive stages from the end of Qing Dynasty in 1911; namely, 
the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. In its place, the 
Chinese Communists substituted a semi-feudal, semi-colonial period, from which 
China  moved  into  an  intermediary  stage  called  ‘the  New  Democracy’  before 





Mao Zedong in his article ‘The Position of the Communist Party of China in the 
National War’ clearly stated: ‘The Communists of China must combine patriotism 
with internationalism. We are internationalists, and we are patriots.’
5   
From Mao’s 
point of view, nationalism is the concrete ‘implementation’ of internationalism in the 
struggle for national liberation
6
. Therefore, in the early stage of the Communist 
Revolution, especially in the stage of the Democratic Revolution, the Communists 
declared themselves to be patriots first and foremost, that is, nationalists. Relying on 
the combination of nationalism and Communist ideology, the CCP eventually gained 
the support of the Chinese people, especially that of the peasants. The establishment 




Sun  Yat-sen,  the  founder  of  the  Kuomintang of China  (Chinese Nationalist  Party, 
KMT), pointed out in 1926 that ‘Chinese people only have family and clan groups, 
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have no national spirit, so although there are 400 million people united into a China, it 
is a piece of loose sand. Up to this day, it is the world’s poorest country, the lowest 
position in the world. If we want to save China in peril, we should advocate 
nationalism and save the country with national spirit.’
7 
Another modern Chinese 
historian, Jiang Tingfu, posed a profound question in his book ‘Modern History of 
China’ (completed in 1938). He argued: ‘In the past hundred years, the Chinese nation 
has only one problem at all: Can the Chinese people abolish our family and home 
concept and organize a modern nation-state? If we can, the future of our nation is 






The CCP is the only political party to accomplish this historical mission, with its 
legitimacy stemming not only from ideology, but also from its practical policy of land 
reform. Johnson’s viewpoint on the development of the Communist Party of China is 
persuasive. He claimed that ‘the Communist Revolution gains its appeal from 
nationalism, not from the plan of social and economic reform, and strives for its main 
strength;  the  legitimacy  of  nationalism  that  the  Party  gained  during  the  war  is 
essential for the final victory, attracting popular support and neutrality of opposition 
forces.’
9   
Townsend also argued that the CCP’s commitment to social and economic 
 
change, especially their promised land reform, has been a source of popular support 




It is not easy to build a new state from remnants of the old. The CCP and the Chinese 
government inherited a very poor economy in 1949. After decades of civil war and 
Japanese occupation, the country was in terrible shape: roads, railways, farms and 
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previous century had left behind a ruined and almost paralyzed economic system;
11   
a 
few modern power stations supplied electricity to the large cities, while electricity in 
the countryside was virtually unknown; the transport system was inadequate; most 
manufactured goods in everyday use were made by traditional methods; the financial 
system was in chaos; and the banking system was almost bankrupt after the entire 




During the early period of the PRC, the Communists faced a complicated and stern 
international reaction. Although the PRC was recognised by the Soviet Union and 
Communist states in Eastern Europe, it was not recognised by most Western countries, 
a position led by the USA and Western Europe.
13   
The USA maintained its hostile 
attitude towards the newly constituted Communist state throughout the 1950s.
14  
China 
received limited assistance from the Soviet Union, which was fearful of being 
surpassed by the  young Communist country and losing its leadership role in the 
 
11   When the New China took over from the KMT government, it inherited a total collapse of the economy. In 
1949, compared with 1936, industrial output had fallen by 50% and agricultural output was down by about 25%. 
According to statistics (see detail in Baotang Y. The National Government and the Economy of the Republic of 
China. Shanghai: East China Normal University, 1998), during the 12 years from 1937 to 1949, when the KMT 
collapsed, inflation increased 140 billion times and prices rose 3,680.7 times. In 1949, the cities contained 4 
million unemployed people, while in rural areas relief was required for ~40 million survivors of natural disasters. 
Furthermore, because a large number of personnel formerly employed by the KMT government were accepted 
in the newly liberated areas together with civil servants in the old liberated areas, administrative expenses had 
increased. See also: Editorial board of Contemporary China Series, Contemporary Chinese Economy (Beijing: 
China Social Science Press, 1987), 63. 
12   During the last 6 months of KMT rule, the cost of living rose by an average 25% every week. For example, in 
the year before the Communist Party took over Beijing, flour prices in Beijing increased 4,500 times. The 
national currency was so depreciated that it effectively had no worth. See also: Dunn J. Modern Revolution. 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 17. In the 13 days from 28 May, when Shanghai was liberated, to 
9 June, prices in Shanghai increased 2.7 times, including gold, the price of which rose 2.1 times. In Beijing, 
when prices soared, venture capitalists took advantage of the state-run food company’s regulation by which, for 
each bag of flour they sold, they were entitled to buy 66 jin (33 kilos) of wheat, and they undertook large-scale 
arbitrage in food. One private owner, called a ‘food tiger’, on 11 November alone sold 678 bags of flour, but 
most of the flour was bought back. In this way, the nation’s large quantities of wheat suffered arbitrage. See also: 
Jian S. The Economic History of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–early 1990s.( Beijing: China Renmin 
University Press, 1992), 38. 
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1950, but the UK did not establish diplomatic relations with the PRC until March 1972. By 1968, 51 countries 
had recognised the People’s Republic of China, while 65 others chose to recognise the Republic of China (in 
Taiwan) as the legitimate government of all of China. See HsüICY.  The Rise of Modern China, 645. 
14  The Truman administration pursued a hostile China policy of not acknowledging Communist China, instituting 
an embargo and blockade on China and placing restrictions on the Chinese Communist Party. On 3 December 
1950, the USA declared a comprehensive embargo on the PRC, and soon banned all ships registered in the USA 
from entering mainland ports. This US policy was the result of domestic pressures from Asia – the first 
anticommunists to ensure congressional support for crucial European recovery programmes. See Morgenthau HJ. 
In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 
1952), 205–206, 324–335. Also see Snyder J. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International 
Ambition.( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 258–262. 
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Clearly, the immediate strategic objective was to revive the national economy and 
strengthen national unity.
16 
At the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh National 
Congress, Mao delivered a report entitled ‘Struggle for Fundamental Improvement of 
the National Financial Condition’. He pointed out that the key task for the following 
three years was to strive for fundamental improvement, and the three basic conditions 
for the recovery of the Chinese economy included the completion of agrarian reform, 
a reasonable adjustment of industry and commerce, and a considerable reduction in 





The CCP set out to recover the economy. By the end of 1952, the agrarian reform had 
been completed, with about 700 million mus (approximately 116.7 million acres) of 
land redistributed to 300 million peasants. It was largely poor peasants who benefited 
from the redistribution; a completely egalitarian land reform would have alienated the 
middle peasants and disrupted production.
18 
The Chinese government’s efforts in 
rebuilding the economy also involved curbing inflation and stabilising market prices 
in order to achieve a stable regime.
19   




15   The Soviet Union agreed to provide $300 million in low-interest loans to China, with one condition. During the 
14 years from 1950 to 1963, China had to sell all excess industrial raw materials to the Soviet Union, excluding 
any other country. That was an obvious inequality and amounted to a business monopoly. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union insisted that the presence of influence and force of a third country would not be allowed in 
northeast China or Xinjiang. The capital and personnel of a third country were not allowed in any way to be 
involved in institutions and business activities in northeast China or Xinjiang. In Mao’s view, Stalin wanted to 
substantially influence China in these ways. See: Yang Kuisong. Past Kindness and Grudges between Mao 
Zedong and Moscow (Nanchang: Jiangxi People’s Press, 1999), 311. 
16   See Mao Zedong. ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Beijing: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1967, for a graphic account of Mao’s opinion on the difficulties experienced in the 
early years of the PRC. Mao asserted that ‘the creation of a strong centralised state and economic system were 
the immediate tasks’ (ibid., 442). 
17   Guo Dajun, Modern Chinese History: 1949–1993 (Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 1995), 23–24. 
18   Wheelwright EL & McFarlane B. The Chinese Road to Socialism: Economics of the Cultural Revolution (New 
York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 33. 
19   Due to inflation and rising prices, venture capitalists and unscrupulous businessmen took the opportunity to 
conduct speculation and to hoard goods, leading to disruption of the economy nationwide. In order to curb 
inflation and stabilize market prices, the CCP cracked down on speculation. By March 1950, the state’s revenue 
and expenditure were close to being balanced; inflation had come to end and prices had stabilised. Take the 
wholesale price index for example: it fell from 100 in October 1948 to 85.4 in December 1950. Revenue and 
expenditure tended to be balanced. The financial deficit accounted for 43% of the total expenditure in the first 
quarter of 1950; this fell to 40% in the second quarter of the year, and fell still further to 9.8% in the third 
quarter. Ultimately, it accounted for just 6.4% of the total annual expenditure. See Guo Dajun. Modern Chinese 
History, 15–16. 
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and balancing income and expenditure, as well as stabilising market prices from April 
1950 onwards.
20 
By the end of 1951, efforts to achieve economic stability and 
improvement had made considerable progress.
21   
However, although control had been 
secured over economic sectors such as banking and trade, as well as over the railways, 
steel and other key industries, large-scale nationalisation was not adopted. Mao did 
not take extreme measures to completely exterminate capitalism in China, with the 
exception of industrial assets belonging to supporters of the KMT, who were deemed 
 
allied to foreign interests and characterised as ‘bureaucrat capitalists’. Instead, he 
 






After launching a series of policies aimed at consolidating a democratic regime in late 
1949,
23  
the central government appointed governors to the majority of districts and 
provinces to establish its authority at all levels. 
24  
A new, centralised nation state 




20  Compared to 1949, the total output value of state industry in 1951 increased by 148.8%, while the total output 
value of private industry increased by 48.2%. Compared to 1950, turnover from retail sales in 1951 increased by 
133.2%. By July 1951, the number of unemployed shrank from 1.66 million to 0.45 million. See Guo Dajun. 
Modern Chinese History, 28. 
21   On 26 October, the General Committee for Resisting America and Assisting Korea – the committee in charge of 
defending world peace and opposing the US invasion of China – was established. On 4 November, China’s 
democratic parties issued a joint declaration, swearing to fight against the USA, assist Korea and defend the 
motherland  with  all their strength.  Representatives of all walks  of life  then expressed  in  succession  their 
intention to support the joint declaration of the democratic parties and their resolute determination to do their 
utmost to defend the homeland. In the name of resisting the USA and defending the country, the PRC’s 
involvement in the Korean War roused national spirit and promoted domestic production and national 
construction. 
22   At the Seventh Congress of the CCP Central Committee held on 13 April 1950, Mao reiterated the economic 
policy of the ‘Common Program’ and he pointed out that: ‘the key to our struggle is not to overthrow the 
capitalists. Rather, we should cooperate with them’; ‘we should support and develop the privately owned 
economy, which is beneficial to the improvement of the national economy and the people’s livelihoods’. See 
Zhou Enlai. Biographical Chronicle: Part I, 1949–1976. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1997, 33–35. 
23  On 2 December 1949, the ‘Guideline on the Provincial People’s Congress’, ‘Guideline on the City People’s 
Congress’ and ‘General Principles on the County People’s Congress’ were approved at the Fourth Plenary 
Session of the Central Government Committee. 
24   By the summer of 1952, the national economy had recovered remarkably and the Korean War had stablised, so 
China’s communist leaders began to consider the problem of strengthening centralised power in the coming 
period of economic construction. On 27 April 1954, at the outreach session of the political bureau, the CPCCC 
decided to dissolve the regional party and government organs. On 19 June, Liu Shaoqi gave a speech at the 32nd 
session of the Central People’s Government Committee, stating that a centralised, unified leadership was a 
necessary condition for the planned large-scale economic construction and that a lot of construction work 
required a centralised national power, which could by no means be accomplished by a region, province or single 
city. With the dissolution of the regional party and government organs, the leadership of provinces and 
municipalities would have to be strengthened; the central government would have to directly contact and lead 
the various provinces and municipalities. One hundred and fifty thousand personnel and hundreds of thousands 
of cadres from the abolished regional organs would be allocated to reinforce the central, provincial and 
municipal governments. See the Party Literature Research Centre of the CPCCC, Biographical Chronicle of Liu 
Shaoqi: 1896–1966, volume 2 (Beijing: CPC Central Committee’s Literature Research Press, 1996), 324. 
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construction, from 1949 to 1954 – when the first session of the National People’s 
Congress was held – China promulgated and implemented a wide range of laws and 
policies, including an interim constitution, the ‘Chinese People’s Political Common 
Programme’, the Trade Union Law, the Marriage Law, and the Land Reform Act. 
 
 
After experiencing three years of economic recovery and construction after 1949, 
large-scale land reform was largely completed throughout the country and the recovery 
of national economy construction had made considerable achievements, with 
improvements in people’s living standards. ‘In 1952, the total output value of 
agriculture and industry was 81 billion yuan, an increase of 77.5% over 1949’,
25  
and 
‘compared with 1949, the number of employees in the whole country increased from 
 
eight million to sixteen million in 1952, and the average wage of workers in the whole 
country increased by 70%’.
26 
The average annual consumption per capita and the 
income of farmers was greatly improved. After three years of economic recovery and 




In addition to the efforts to stabilise domestic politics and the economy, Mao made a 
remarkable decision to become involved in the Korean War (1950–1953). In response 
to Mao’s decision, a campaign called the ‘War to Resist America and Aid Korea’ was 
launched throughout the country in October 1950, which stirred up defensive and 




All in all, the CCP and its government, during the first three years of the PRC, made 
great efforts to realise an economic recovery and establish a stable political system. 




25   Hu Sheng, The Seventy years of the Communist Party of China (Beijing, Chinese Communist Party History 
Publishing House, 1991), 317–319. 
26   Ibid. 
27   According to General Xu Yan, a professor of National Defence at the University of China, a total of 180,000 
Chinese soldiers died in the Korean War. Xu Yan, a major-general, also claimed that the war to resist US 
aggression and aid Korea suffered losses but the gains were larger [online]. Available from 
http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/84385/195548/11982241.html  (accessed 8 June 2015). 
98 
Chapter 4 State Sports Policy and System from 1949 to 1952  
 
 








Figure 4.1. Constitutional Structure of the People’s Republic of China 
 








In    summary,    by    combining    nationalism    and    Communist    ideology    as 
a source of legitimacy for its rule, the CCP gained the support of the Chinese people, 
eventual success in the Chinese Revolution, and the establishment of a ‘New 
Democratic’ country. The early days of the PRC were fraught with many problems for 
the new regime. The Communists not only had to restore the national economy and 
establish a political system, but also safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
and independence of the country. In this context, the establishment of sports policies 
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4.3  Establishment  of  a  ‘Semi-Official’ Sports  Governing 
 
Body: The All-China Sports Federation (ACSF) 
 
The Party and government set about establishing a sports governing body shortly after 
the establishment of the PRC. On 26 and 27 October 1949, the central government 
authorised the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China (CYLC) 
to establish the All-China Sports Federation (ACSF), along the same lines as the 
China National Amateur Athletic Federation.
29 
Although the ACSF was initially 
designed not to be dominated by government, it was characterised by state 
involvement. First of all, the position of head of the ACSF was held by party and 
government officials. Fen Wenbin, then the General Secretary of Central Committee 
of the CCYL, was appointed as Director of the Preparatory Committee of the ACSF 
on 27 October 1949. Subsequently, Ma Xulun, then Education Minister, took over this 
position in June 1952 when the ACSF was formally established. 
 
 
Second, although the Committee’s members came from different sectors, including 
government agencies and colleges and the military, the Party and the Chinese 
government played a decisive role in setting out its rules and regulations and did not 
negotiate to any great extent with other players. According to Ian Henry, in terms of 
European political systems, a ‘bureaucratic configuration’ is characterised by the very 
active role that the public authorities take in regulating the system.
30  
According to 
Henry, it is a system characterised by rules from a public authority which, with its 
political/democratic legitimacy, does not necessarily negotiate to any great extent with 
other players.
31   
The Chinese sports policies and systems during this period, in this 





29   The National Association for the Advancement of Sports (NAAS) was founded in 1924 and released as ‘The 
NAAS Scope of Sports Work at Home and Abroad’. However, as a national-level legal authority for sports, the 
NAAS was not recognised by the International Olympic Committee until as late as early 1926. In the middle of 
June 1927, the 9th Olympic Games Organizing Committee in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, sent a letter to NAAS 
to ‘formally invite the Chinese sports delegation to join in’. See also: ‘The World Games Invited Our Country to 
Join in’, ShenBao, 25 June 1927: 11. 
30   Henry Ian and Ling-Mei Ko, eds. Routledge Handbook of Sport Policy (London: Routledge, 2014), 117. 
31   Ibid. 
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Third,  the  mission  of  the  ACSF  was  deeply  influenced  by  nationalism  and 
self-strengthening objectives. The ASCF programme specified objectives for the 
development of sports in China: the objective of the ACSF, under the leadership of the 
Central Government of the PRC and the Central Committee of the CCP, is to assist 
government in organising, leading and promoting the nation’s sports with the purpose 






The ACSF committee was the head of the Federation. The Overall management was 
overseen by the committee, consisting of an organisation department, a propaganda 
department,  an  international  liaison  department,  a  secretariat,  and  the  National 
Defence and Specialised Committee sports club (see Figure 4.2).
33   
It played an active 
role in promoting national construction, national defence and improving people’s 
health. In general, the ACSF was characterised by state involvement. In an interview 
conducted as part of this research, a Chinese scholar in the field of sports management 
explained that: 
 
From the perspective of the legal status, at that time it was a social sports 
organisation, but the ACSF could exercise part of the executive power of 
the government. […] All the expenses and utilities it needs was financed 





















32   Anon, ‘The Articles of China’s National Sports Federation’, New Sport. no.21, 1952:81. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Interviewer No. 6 (Tan Jianxiang, Professor in Sport Management System, South China Normal University), in 
discussion with the author, 20 August 2012. 
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Figure 4.2. The Organisational Structure of the ACSF in 1952 
 






In addition to representing state involvement, the main aim of the ACSF was to 
promote  mass  sports  and  to  serve  the  newly-created  Communist  state.  At  the 
inaugural meeting of the ACSF, Zhu De, Vice-Chairman of the central government, 
presented  an  inscription  as  a  token  of  congratulation  to  the  general  assembly: 
‘Popularising sports among the people and enhancing people’s physiques to serve 
national  production  and  national  defence’.
36   
Mao  also  contributed  an  inscription: 
‘Developing sport and promoting people’s health’. The reference to the importance of 
a healthy physique in 1952 directed sport and physical education in China and was 
even included as an ideology and principle for the development of sport policy 
throughout the entire Mao era. In short, in the early years of the PRC, the ACSF acted 
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Although Mao did not directly mention new democratic physical culture, he signalled 
the direction that physical culture and sports would take through an elaboration of 
new democratic culture. On 9 January 1940, when the First Congress of the Cultural 
Association in the Shanxi–Gansu–Ningxia border region was held in Yan’an, Mao 
delivered a speech entitled ‘Politics and Culture of the New Democracy’, emphasising 
the significance of the Cultural Revolution. He stated: ‘We Communists, for many 
years, have not only fought for China’s political and economic revolution, but 







The principles and policies of physical culture and sports during the New Democracy 
period emanated from another essay written by Mao in 1940 entitled ‘On New 
Democracy’, in which Mao detailed what was meant by new democratic culture: 
 
 
New democratic culture is national. It opposes imperialist oppression; it 
stands for the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to 
our own nation and bears our own national characteristics. […] New 
democratic culture is scientific. […] New democratic culture belongs to the 
broad masses and is therefore democratic. […] A national, scientific and 
mass culture – such is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the 
people, the culture of New Democracy, the new culture of the Chinese 
nation. The so-called new-democratic culture, in a word, is the proletarian 











37   Mao Zedong, ‘Theory of New Democracy’, in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 2, 1991, 662–709. 
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Physical Culture and Sports Serve National Construction and National Defence 
In line with Mao’s view on New Democratic culture, physical culture and sports were 
closely linked with politics and the fate of the Chinese state. Feng Wenbing delineated 
the task of physical culture at the 1949 meeting of the All-China Sport and Physical 
Education Federation. He stated that the motto of New Democratic physical culture 
was  ‘to  develop  sports  for  the  people’s  health  and  [for]  national  defence  and 
construction’.
39   
In a speech at the National Conference of Representatives of Sport 
 




In order to promote production, protect the homeland, strengthen national 
defence, we must make sure our people have healthy and strong physiques, 
which requires us to develop sports, enhance labour ability, cultivate 
people’s acute wisdom, favour creativity, [and a] brave and tough will. 
Only if our country possesses those people with strong bodies, energetic 
physical strength and fearless spirits can national security and construction 






In Feng’s description, the New Democratic physical culture was one of the core 
themes of Mao’s New Democracy. One of these principles focuses on the assertion 
that ‘physical culture and sports serves national construction and defence’. After the 
eight-year Sino–Japanese War and the three-year civil war between the CCP and the 
KMT, Chinese society, including its politics, economy and culture, had been almost 
destroyed. To build a new state and stabilise the new regime, the Communists had to 
re-establish the political structure, economy and legislature, as well as the cultural 
system. 
 
Politically, to attract more support for the new regime, the Communists developed a 
new state under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes. The system of 
 
39   Feng Wenbin, ‘The National Sports of the New Democracy’, New Sport 1 (July 1950): 8–9. 
40   Editorial, ‘Vice Chairman Zhu De’s Speech at the Preparatory Meeting of the Organizing Committee of the 
All-China Sports Federation’, New Sport, special volume (1950): 7. 
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the People’s Congress as an organisational form for state power was adopted by the 
Party as the fundamental political system in China. Economically, Mao and the CCP 
acknowledged  Sun  Yat-sen’s  viewpoint  that  the  ‘state  will  be  in  charge  of 
livelihood-related industries, such as the banking industry, the railroad industry and 
the aircraft industry’, in consideration of the interests of the majority of people. In 
particular, as mentioned earlier, the Communists implemented a land reform that 
redistributed about 700 million mu of land to 300 million peasants, mainly poor 
peasants. In so doing, the CCP gained much support from the peasants, who were 
effectively  the  majority  of  the  population. 
41   
Central  government  also  stabilised 
 
market prices, curbed inflation and tackled the economic crisis, easing the concerns of 
the masses. The Communists did not ignore the development of the culture of ‘New 
China’. The CCP’s aim in the cultural sphere was to build a new Chinese national 
culture. As Mao Zedong explained, the new democratic culture was ‘to [be] shared by 
the common people’, a ‘national, scientific and mass culture’, and should never serve 




To match their political and economic aspirations, the Communists made efforts to 
build  cultural  institutions  for  the  broad  masses  so  as  to  gain  support  from the 
great mass of the people. Sport, as a part of the Chinese cultural system, followed this 
principle  and  was  required  to  adapt  to  other  systems  of  Chinese  society  and  to 
promote the proper functioning of the entire ‘New China’ society. Consequently, the 
principle of physical culture and sport policy in the early years of the PRC, from 1949 
to 1952, was characterised by the dictum that ‘sport serves the National Construction 
and National Defence’. 
 
 
To serve national construction, mass sports activities were widely carried out in the 
industrial sectors, as in the railway sector, for example, in which the Ministry of 
Railways  and  the  All-China  Federation  of  Railway  Workers’ Union  (ACFRWU) 
jointly  issued  a  document  in  1952  entitled  ‘Resolution  on  Carrying  out  Sport 
 
41   HsüImmanuel  C.Y, The Rise of Modern China (Oxford University Press ,2000), 653. 
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Activities  in  the  Railway  Sector’. 
42   
In  addition,  the  Second  Machine  Building 
Ministry and the ACFRWU jointly issued the ‘Resolution on Further Carrying out 
Employee Sports’.
43   
As  a result,  the number of employees  in  the railway sector 






State sports policies during this period targeted the extensive development of mass 
sport. In a document issued by the Central Committee of the CYLC in 1951, CYLC 
branches at all levels were required to widely carry out a variety of no- or low-cost 
familiar sports activities for the general public (e.g. morning gymnastics, basketball, 
cross-country running, martial arts and mountain climbing).
45  
The establishment of 
grassroots mass sport was emphasised. A document issued by the Central Committee 
of CYLC stated: ‘Youth League Organisations at all levels must pay more attention to 
mass sport, and endeavour to cultivate experienced military sport instructors with the 





In addition to establishing grassroots sports organisations and cultivating full-time 
sports staff, the Party and government promoted mass sports nationwide through 
several major sports, among which was broadcast gymnastics. On 24 December 1951, 
nine departments, including the ACSF, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of 
Health, the General Political Department of the Central People’s Revolutionary 
Military Commission and the CNDYL, jointly released an announcement regarding 








42   ‘A Joint Decision on Carrying out Sports in the Railway System Was Issued’. New Sport. no.16 (1952):6. 
43   The Second Ministry of the Machinery Industry and the National Committee of the Second Ministry of the 
Machinery Industry Union issued ‘Joint Instructions on Further Carrying out Sports among Staff and Workers’, 
in The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949–1981), 40. 
44   He Long, ‘Under the General Line, Strive to Develop Mass Sports’ (excerpts). New Sport. no.4, 1954:18. 
45   The Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, ‘Instructions on the Youth League Participating the 
1951 Winter Sports Activities (1951), in The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education 
Documents of the PRC (1949–1981). (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1982), 34. 
46   Editorial Board, ‘Widely Establishing Mass Sports Organizations’. New Sport. no.16 (1952):3. 
47   ‘Announcement that Sports Branches at All Levels Should Hold All Kinds of Worker Sports Learning and 
Amateur Training Courses during the Summer Holidays’ was issued in July 1951. 
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Figure 4. 3. Students at Shanghai Nan Yang Model High School practising 





Sports policy was charged with defending the country during this period. After the 
PRC became involved in the Korean War, the Preparatory Committee of the ACSF 
released an announcement on 11 April 1951 entitled ‘Widely Popularising the Resist 
America and Aid Korea Movement’. In June 1951, the General Committee called 
upon the Chinese people to donate cash and valuables to help buy fighter planes and 
cannons. 
48    
On   13   June   1951,   the   Preparatory   Committee   released   another 
 
announcement, ‘Donating an Aircraft Named “Sport”’, which was intended to support 
the Resist America and Aid Korea Movement.
49   
The Preparatory Committee of the 
ACSF at all levels responded by organising charity donation events to support the 
campaign. The Shanghai Branch of the Preparatory Committee organised a donation 
party in September 1951. One interviewee, then a primary school student in the 








48   On 1 June 1951, the General Committee for Resisting America and Assisting Korea issued a notice calling on 
people from all walks of life to donate towards the purchase of aircraft and artillery. 
49   On 11 April 1951, the Preparatory Committee of China’s National Sports Federation issued a notice regarding 
the expansion of the campaign to resist US aggression and aid Korea. 
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Korea’, Shanghai wushu [Chinese martial arts] circles organised a wushu 
charity performance at the Shanghai Stadium [later Jiangwan Sports Centre] 
aiming to collect donations to support the ‘Resist America and Aid Korea’ 
movement. Some Grand Kung Fu masters attended this function, including 
Dong Zhongyi,  Li  Longbiao, Tian Zhaolin and Shengshou,
50   
and were 
invited to demonstrate Kung Fu, which was widely covered by newspapers, 
such  as  Shanghai  News,  Da  Gongbao,  Wen  Hui  News  and  Yibao.  In 
particular, the Taichi pushing hands demonstrated by Master Tian Zhaolin 
and his disciples was brilliant and awesome, and caused a great reaction. I 
 






Theoretically, when a nation is in danger, all obligations due to citizens are set aside 
and the population is mobilised to defend the nation. Gellner regards this as 
nationalism, which is primarily a political principle contending that political and 
national units should be congruent.
52  
As Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang have observed, 
sport and physical education in the early PRC played an important role in the 
restoration  of  China  and  contributed  significantly  to  the  building  of  a  strong 
nation-state by physically strengthening its people.
53   
Hence, the principle that ‘sport 
serves national defence’ in reality functioned to spread nationalist sentiment in order 




Some scholars have argued that the policy ‘sport serve state construction or national 
defence’ at the time was only a means of expressing the combination of sports and 
nationalist sentiment or nationalism. In an interview conducted as part of this research, 
 
 
50   In September 1951, Shen Shou and other martial arts masters were invited to participate in a grand charity 
performance in Shanghai that aimed to raise funds in order to donate a plane named ‘Sports’ for use in the 
Korean War. See: Guo Dajun. Sport History of Modern China (Beijing: Beijing University of Sports Press, 
1989), 296. 
51   Changsheng F. (Director of the Shanghai Jingwu Sports Training Centre) in discussion with the author, 10 July 
2013. 
52   Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Second Edition.(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 15. 
53   Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang. ‘Representing the New China and the Sovietisation of Chinese Sport 
(1949–1962)’, The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no.1 (2012):11–29. 
54   For a detailed explanation about sport and nationalism in the early PRC, see Lu Zhouxiang and Fan Hong, 
Sport and Nationalism in China. New York: Routledge, 2013. 
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a Chinese scholar of sports history explained to this researcher that ‘this kind of sports 
nationalism was not a state-led nationalism, different from the slogan “(the Chinese 
athletes) to rush out of Asia toward the world” in the 1980s [in China].’





China is a unified multi-ethnic country, and adopted a single party system, 
which was different from that of a single nation, like Korea or Ireland. 
Therefore, Chinese officials rarely propose nationalism, and their words 
related to nationalism were always obscure. During the early years of the 
PRC, sport indeed played the role of supporting national construction, but 










Physical Culture and Sports Serve the Broad Masses 
 
Sports policy and practice during this period also attached great importance to the 
idea  that  ‘physical  culture  and  sports  serve  the  broad  masses’. 
57  
As  discussed 
previously, sports and physical education during the early communist years, from the 
Jiangxi era (1931–1934) through the Yan’an era (1936–1948), aimed to train people’s 
physiques and implement revolutionary political education for soldiers and the people 
in the ‘Red regime’. Consistent with this general philosophical approach, the 
Communists viewed physical culture as having a class nature and historically as 
having been a tool of the ruling people.
58   
According to this view, physical culture and 
sports in ancient China were used by the feudal nobility to train soldiers and oppress 
serfs. Under capitalism and imperialism, the monopoly by the privileged class of the 
wealth and leisure needed for sports participation had prevented the masses from 
engaging in any type of physical culture activity. 
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At the first meeting of the All-China Sport and Physical Education Federation in 
October 1949, Zhu De, Vice-Chairman of the central government, pointed out that 
physical culture and sports in China should serve the broad masses. He stated that: 
 
 
In the past, sport was alienated from the masses. At present, our sport must 
serve the people, serve national defence and serve people’s health. [. . .] In 
order to undertake the hard work of constructing our new country, sport 
should promote people’s physical and mental health. Students, workers, 







Zhu’s view was echoed by Rong Gaotang, then the head of the ASCF. He stated that: 
 
‘the “physical culture and sports serve the broad mass” principle is to make sport 
popular  among  the  masses  and  become  a  part  of  people’s  daily  lives.’
60   
In  an 




At the beginning of the PRC, since the Chinese had just been liberated, 
mass sport was highlighted in the sports business. Sport was required to 
serve the masses. The ASCF even modified and adjusted the general rules 
of sport competitions and matches so that they would better enable a wider 
range of people to participate in sport activities. For instance, in track and 
field competitions, some interesting elements were added, like recognising 
characters: after running for a while, competitors were required to write 
down several characters on a board, and then resume the race. Then stop 
and write down words and continue the race. When doing cycling races, 
those  competing were  those who  could  cycle the slowest.  During this 
 
59   Zhu De, ‘Speech at the Meeting of Representatives Conference of Sport Staff of the PRC’, in Wu Shaozu, The 
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period, those who advocated elite sport and emphasised improvement of 





What is the logic underlying the sports policy and practice serving the masses? As 
Franz Schurmann has asserted, ‘Communist China is like a vast building made of 
different kinds of brick and stone. However it was put together, it stands. What holds 
it together is ideology and organisation’.
62  
Schurmann’s view is echoed by Zheng 
Yongnian, an expert in international politics and Chinese issues, who has stated that: 
. 
 
For any party, organisation and ideology are two indispensable pillars. In 
modern terms, organisation represents hard power, while ideology 
represents soft power. For the CCP, its survival and development depend 






The rise of the CCP and its victory in the Chinese Civil War can be regarded as an 
exception. Up until then, there was no such entity as the Communist Party of China, 
which was highly organised and strongly motivated to fight. As Zheng Yongnian 
observed, the CCP was the only actor in charge of nation-state building and 
socioeconomic transformation in the history of the PRC.
64   
That is to say, the Party 
overwhelmingly dominated the PRC and its political system, although this type of 
domination was based on ‘nominal’ negotiation with other parties and the public, 
particularly during the early days of the PRC. The party-state system successfully 
effected economic recovery, established a stable political system and issued the New 
Democracy Culture guideline. All of this activity demonstrates the powerful 
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In addition to its strong organisational capacity, the emphasis on ideology was 
undoubtedly a solid and powerful guarantee for the victory of the CCP in the Civil 
War and the establishment of a new political legitimacy. In the early years of the PRC, 
securing the stability of the regime could have been more appropriate and effective 
than a socialist transformation of society after the Communists seized power. The 
significance of ideology for the CCP is explicit. After the establishment of the PRC in 
1949, Mao and the CCP enthusiastically marshalled New Democracy culture 
campaigns nationwide, instilling the Party’s ideologies among the masses by forming 
a  New  Democracy  culture  –  a  ‘national,  scientific  and  mass  culture’  –  which 
contrasted with American-style capitalist and religious culture as well as with cultural 
traditions of the Republic of China, conceptualising a socialist road in China. 
 
 
Without ruling experience, the Communist Party at the beginning of the PRC could 
only rely on the ideology of communism and its revolutionary experience before 1949. 
Marxism–Leninism had served as a guiding ideology for the CCP since its 
establishment in 1921. Mao Zedong Thought, as the new ideology of the CCP, was 
launched in 1945, when the new party constitution was drafted. Building a ‘mass 
culture’ can be seen as a reflection of the ‘mass line’ method, a key part of Maoist 
thought. The mass line is primarily a Marxist method of revolutionary leadership of 
the  people,  or  the  ‘masses’.  Mao  viewed  the  mass  line  as  the  basic  method  of 
leadership of the masses. Mao once argued, ‘What is the truly impregnable fortress 
and revolutionary force the Party can rely on? It is the masses, and the millions of 





According to Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony, a ruling party dominates the 
society not only through repressive violence and political coercion, but also through 
ideological domination and shaping the public’s view of the world. Kang Liu depicts 
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Mao’s revolutionary hegemony during the pre-1949 period as a moment of ‘gaining 
broad mass consent by means of a nationalist, popular language of insurgency and 
liberation, and coercing the diverse social groups through wartime disciplines and 
injunctions of national salvation’.
66   
In agreement with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, 
Jessop contends that consent can limit conflicts within and among social groups and 
provide  an  ideological  and  material  base  from  which  to  maintain  the  system  of 
political domination at minimum cost.
67   
The CCP leaders extended the principle of 
‘gaining broad mass consent’ into the post-1949 revolution. Mao and the CCP were 
 




In response to this Maoist ideology, sports in Communist China were required to 
serve the people (i.e. the masses). The pre-PRC Chinese Communists created a policy 
and a formal system of physical exercise for workers and peasants during the Red 
Sports Movement (1929–1934), in which exercise was viewed as the basis of physical, 
cultural  and  military  training. 
68   
Mao  extended  the  mass  line,  which  helped  the 
Communists succeed in the Civil War, into protecting the Communist regime and the 
construction of a new culture in the PRC. Prior to 1949, sports were only available to 
the wealthy and the bourgeoisie. Developing and promoting mass sport under the 
principle that ‘sport serves the people’ in the early days of the PRC embodied the 
Marxist ideal of ‘equality’ and Mao’s ‘mass line’ in the field of culture or 
superstructure.
69   
In contrast to mass sports, elite sports were not advocated in the 
early years of the PRC because they were deemed to be serving only a few people and 
in particular the wealthy and the bourgeoisie. Some elite sports were modified to be 
more  suited  to  mass  sport  development.  In  brief,  the  ‘sport  serves  the  people’ 
principle was not only a Marxist–Leninist cornerstone of the CCP’s ideology, but also 
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Learning from Soviet Sports 
 
Political and ideological orientation overwhelmingly affected the cultural field. Both 
Marx and Lenin saw physical culture as an integral part of the socialist system. 
Despite scant direct reference to sports in his works, Marx made many insightful 




First, mental education; second, bodily education, such as is given in school 
gymnastics and by military exercises; and third, technological training, which 
acquaints the pupil with the basic principles of all processes of production 






According to Marx, physical education was of equal footing with intellectual 
education,   productive   labour   and   polytechnic   education.   His   view   was   that 
‘productive labour must be joined with education and physical education. [For] this is 
not only a means of increasing production, but is the one and only means for bringing 
forth man’s all-round development’.
71   
In his English Factory Acts, he asserted that 
although education provision is trifling in the whole Factory Acts, elementary 
education was announced as a mandatory condition of labour, and these provisions for 
the first time made possible a combination of physical education and productive 
labour.
72 
Marx considered that the intelligence, physical strength and production 
capacity  of  the  working  class  would  surpass  that  of  the  aristocracy  and  the 
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73   Marx K & Engels F., Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, vol. 16, 1st ed. (Beijing: People’s Press, 1972), 218. 
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Like Marx, Lenin’s educational philosophy favoured a combination of mind and body 
training. His position on the character-building effects of physical education and sport 
argued that ‘healthful sport: gymnastics, swimming, excursions, physical exercise of 
every sort, and a variety of intellectual interests, study, analysis, and research should 
be combined as much as possible … [for] a healthy body houses a healthy spirit’.
74
 
At the Third All-Russia Congress of the Russian Communist Youth League in October 
 




The physical culture of the younger generation is an essential element in the 
overall system of communist upbringing of young people, aimed at creating 






Marx and Engels viewed physical education as extremely important. They felt 
that combining school physical education and military training would greatly help 
in preparing for the impending revolutionary struggle. Lenin corresponded 
regularly with Marx and Engels and concurred with their viewpoint. At the Third 
All-Russia Congress of the Russian Communist Youth League, Lenin stated that: 
‘Today, physical culture also has direct practical aims: (1) preparing young people 





It is not surprising, then, that Communist China considered itself to be an orthodox 
socialist state and drew on the statements of the early Communist theorists to justify 
its efforts in terms of physical culture.
77   
As mentioned earlier, in addition to dealing 
with the appalling shape of the country, the CCP had to face significant international 
 
 
74   Morton HW, Soviet Sport. (New York: Collier Books, 1963), 111–112, citing Babaeva EA, Fizicheskaia 
Kultura I povyshenie Proizvoditelnosti Truda. (Moscow: Goskultproveizdat, 1952), 7. 
75   Lenin VI, Polnoye sobrainie sochinenii [Collected Works], vols. 3 and 4. Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1963, 34–35. 
76   Ibid. 
77   Jonathan Kolatch, Sport Politics and Ideology in China (Middle Village, N.Y.: Jonathan David Publishers, 
1972), 87. 
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reaction. In June 1949, Mao stated: ‘Internationally, we belong to the side of the 
anti-imperialist front led by the Soviet Union, and so can turn only to this side for 
genuine and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist camp’.
78   
Faced with the 
economic restrictions inflicted on the PRC by Western countries, led by the USA, 
coupled with the dominant status of the Soviet Union in the socialist campaign, the 






As early as 1945, Mao stressed that ‘the new culture created by the Soviet Union 
should be an example for us to build a new culture of our own’.
80   
Zhu De supported 
Mao’s instruction on the development of culture, education and sport in the New 
China. He spoke at the ACSF preparatory meeting in October 1949 and noted that ‘we 
should learn good sports experience from the Soviet Union’.
81 
Fen Wenbin also 
emphasised that ‘we must learn advanced sports and physical education from other 
countries, especially the Soviet Union’.
82   
The Soviet Union sports experience began 




entitled ‘Sport Today of the Soviet Union’ described the history of sport and the 






Drawing on this knowledge and experience, the Party and Chinese government 
promoted Soviet sports throughout the country. One of the promoted sports was radio 
broadcast calisthenics. On 28 August 1950, the Preparatory Committee of ACSF sent 





78  Mao Zedong, ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’. Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 4, (Beijing: 
People's Publishing House, 1991), 1480. 
79   Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), 1476. 
80   Mao Zedong, ‘On Coalition Government’, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 3, Beijing: People's Publishing 
House, 1991, 996. 
81   Foreword to a periodical, New Sport, no.1(1950): 7–8. 
82   Ibid. 
83   New Sport, a magazine under the control of the ACSF, launched its first issue in July 1950. 
84   Mu Zuoyun, ‘The Sports in Today’s Soviet Union’, New Sport. no.1(1950):17–18. 
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Labour and Defence System (LDS),
85 
which aimed to expand the scope of sports 
participation. One of the key parts of the Soviet LDS was a set of broadcast 
calisthenics.
86   
Soon after returning to Beijing, and in light of the policies of ‘learn 
experience from the Soviet Union’ and ‘shrinking the scale of sports competitions and 
games’( reducing the size or quantity of    sports    competitions    and    games)    the 
preparatory committee of the ACSF authorised a group of professional gymnastics 
teachers to design a set of calisthenics suitable for Chinese. On 24 December 1951, 
the first set of radio broadcast calisthenics was pr oduced. 
 
 
Broadcast gymnastics received positive responses from the media and local 
governments. The gymnastics were broadcast by about 40 radio stations scattered 
across the different provinces, including the Central Broadcasting Station in Beijing 
and Tianjin and Shanghai broadcast stations. It used 52 wave bands per day, for a total 
of 1,205 minutes. The broadcast equipment factories had to work overtime to supply 
devices and equipment to those areas where broadcasting apparatus was in short 
supply. 
87   
According  to  a  survey  conducted  in  13  key  cities,  including  Beijing, 
 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chongqing, the number of participants in radio broadcast 





The  principle  ‘learn  from   Soviet   sports’  was   adopted  in   the  battle  against 
 
American-style ‘bourgeois’ sports (professional and commercial sport). Initially, the 
 
 
85   The ‘system of labour and defence’ is short for ‘system of being ready to work and defend the motherland’. As 
early as 14 March 1931, in line with a proposal by the Communist Youth League, the sports committee of the 
Soviet Union issued the first ‘system of labour and defence’ (LDS) to promote engagement by the country’s 
youth in a variety of sports to enhance their physical strength, endurance, speed and flexibility, etc., by rating 
the level of sport according to age group. In addition, it was the duty of every person under 30 to engage in the 
LDS. For an extensive account of the LDS, see Riordan, Sport under Communism, 25. 
86      At that time, routine gymnastic practice in the Soviet Union was gaining popularity and consisted of 3 
categories: gymnastics for health, auxiliary gymnastics and gymnastics on apparatus. Gymnastics for health 
was usually practised in the morning, so it was also called ‘morning gymnastics’. It consisted of 8 to 12 
sections, lasted about 10 to 15 minutes and comprised two styles, one for women and one for the elderly. The 
gymnastics of the LDS were quite similar to health gymnastics and did not require special fields, equipment or 
apparatus, and no practical or theoretical knowledge or training background were required. The gymnastics 
promoted in the LDS were therefore suitable for people of all ages, males and females, of all health conditions, 
and were welcomed as a suitable regime for the masses of the Soviet Union. See also: Tang Honggui. ‘Russia: 
The Historical Development of the System of Labour and Defence and the Challenges’, China School Sports, 
2002, 4–66. 
87   ‘How Was the First Set of Broadcast Gymnastics in New China Born?’, Beijing Daily, 16 August 2009. 
88   Ibid. 
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PRC’s physical education principle was defined at the first National Education 
Working Meeting in December 1949. It advocated that the development of physical 
education in China should be based on the experience and practice of the pre-1949 
Red Sports Movement, the Republic of China (ROC) and the Soviet Union.
89   
The 
 
CCP’s diplomatic orientation and Chinese involvement in the Korean War triggered 
such  strong  anti-American  sentiment  that  the  American  education  system 
90   
was 
almost entirely rejected. The pre-1949 physical education system was viewed as a 
backward ‘capitalist product’, since it had been influenced by the educational 
philosophy and practice of the United States. This was reflected in comments 
published in New Sports, the CCP organ in the field of sport and physical education. It 
stated: ‘We should fully recognise American imperialism, eliminate the erroneous 
ideas of blind worship of American physical education, and clean up the remnant 
influences of reactionary and degrading American physical education from our 
physical education.’
91   
An article explained that: 
 
 
In America, although physical education was seen as a way of education, it 
does not aim to educate the majority of people on how to exercise their 
bodies, but to educate athletes and sports businessmen on how to earn 
money and run businesses. The capitalists utilise sport to narcotise people, 
to attempt to make people break away from the political struggle against 







In contrast, the Soviet sports system was held in high esteem. Following the policy 
 
that advised ‘learn good sports experience from the Soviet Union’, China’s policy on 
 
 
89   The Ministry of Education of the PRC. Collection of Educational Literature: 1949–1952 (Beijing: General 
Office of the Ministry of Education, 1958), 6. 
90   In 1922, the Ministry of Education of the Chinese (Beiyang) Government promulgated the School System 
Reform Bill, also known as the Renxu School System. The Renxu School System was formulated in general 
with reference to the American educational system. This reform marked the start of American education and 
was called the Americanization of Chinese bourgeois education. see Cai Keyong, A Brief History of Higher 
Education. (Wuhan: Central China Institute of Technology Press, 1982), 28. 
91   Anonymous, ‘Strengthen Current Physical Education’. New Sport, no.6 (1950):3. 
92   Ma Qiwei, ‘My Understanding of American Sports’. New Sport, no.6 (1950):10. 
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physical education and sport emphasised a combination of training of the mind and 
the body, as well as the combination of productive labour, intellectual and physical 
education. This is illustrated by an article entitled ‘Our Experience of Physical 
Education in the Soviet Union’, published in New Sports in 1952, which stated: ‘The 
teaching material of physical education in the Soviet Union is based on the principle 
of the all-round development of children and students. It not only ensures the normal 







The Chinese government adopted the Soviet sports and physical education system, 
with the aim of strengthening students’ physiques and cultivating communist ethics 
and ideology, in order to serve national construction and national defence.
94   
School 
students were asked to participate in sports activities to build up their bodies to serve 
national construction and defence. Soon after Mao Zedong issued the famous edict 
‘Develop Sport and Strengthen People’s Physiques’ in June 1952, the Ministry of 
Education and the ACSF jointly issued the ‘Temporary Regulations for School 
Physical  Education’.  This  stated  that: ‘To  promote students’ physical  and  mental 
health and to enhance their physical fitness, it is required that communist moral 
education should be applied to ensure that they perform academic study well and 






According to Jarvie, Hwang and Brennan, at least five facets of Maoist thinking on 
physical culture and sport are consistent with Soviet socialist ideologies relating to 
sports (these were not in effect in the early days of the New China).
96   




93   Jiang Yiqiang, ‘My Experience of Learning from the Soviet Union’s Physical Education Curriculum for 
Elementary Schools’. New Sport, no, 37 (1952):13. 
94   Gu Yahui, ‘Research on the Evolution and Development of Physical Education Thought in Modern China’ 
(Master’s dissertion, Northwest China Normal University, 2006), 14. 
95   The Ministry of Education and the National Sport Commission, ‘The Temporary Regulation of Physical 
Education in Schools’, in The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC, 
volume 1 (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1957), 76–77. 
96   Grant Jarvie, Dong-Jhy Hwang and Mel Brennan, Sport, Revolution and the Beijing Olympics, op.cit.,69-70. 
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 to raise physical and social health standards; 
 
 to socialise the population into the new establishment’s system of values; 
 
 to   link   sports   ideologically   and   even   organisationally   with   military 
preparedness; 
 to facilitate an all-pervasive presence throughout society of forces of control 
such as the military and security forces, providing control from above in the 
event of faltering in the construction of the New Democracy; 
 to cultivate popular attitudes toward physical exercise through military efforts 
and organization, efficiently deploying the country’s scarce resources in the 





In the 1950s, after the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese Communists’ policy was 
to ‘lean to one side towards the socialist–communist camp’. The Cold War and the 
bipolar confrontation between the socialist camp and capitalist camp strengthened the 
ideological  colour  of  that  time.  Communist  China  eventually  copied  the  Soviet 
Union’s physical education policy and practice and condemned American philosophy 
and practice, which had been adopted by the Nationalist party and government in the 
1920s and 1940s. In accordance with Marxist–Leninist values, the one-party-state 
elaborated a policy of ‘lean to the side of the Soviet Union’, which greatly impacted – 
even dominated – sports policy in the early PRC. In other words, the principle of 
‘learn from Soviet sports’ was, in essence, a result of the CCP’s ideology dominating 
 





Sports and related policies in the early period of Communist China were incubated in 




97   Ibid. 
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building the nation. Shortly after the establishment of the new regime, the Chinese 
government set about creating the All-China Sports Federation, which was eventually 
established in 1952. It was designed as a semi-state sports organisation, characterised 
by significant government involvement that developed numerous self-strengthening 
objectives focusing on mass sports. 
 
 
In order to build a ‘New China’ from the ashes of the Civil War and the legacy of 
feudalism  and  colonialism,  as  well  as  defend  the  new  regime,  the  Chinese 
Communists needed stronger and better educated workers to serve in national 
construction and economic recovery. To this end, state sports policy in the early years 
of the PRC worked under the principle that ‘physical culture and sports serve national 
construction and national defence’. The state policy of ‘sports serve construction’ 
contributed to the proper functioning and stability of the new state, while the policy of 
‘sport serves national defence’ functioned to increase nationalism to resist external 
threats to the Chinese nation-state. 
 
 
The Party and government supported the principle that ‘physical culture and sports 
serve the people’, which, when put into practice, was intended to make sports and 
physical education available to the masses rather than to just a privileged minority. As 
a result, mass sports were emphasised under the new regime, while elite sport, viewed 
as a product of capitalism that served only the few, was suppressed. Following the 
CCP policy to ‘lean to one side towards the socialist–communist camp’, state sports 
policy in the early years of the PRC was influenced by the Soviet model. To gain mass 
consent and stabilise their regime, Mao and the CCP leaders expanded the principle of 
‘gaining broad mass consent’, i.e. the ‘mass line’ (which had previously helped 
communists succeed in the pre-1949 revolution), into the practice of post-1949 new 
nation building. The principle of ‘sport serves the people’ embodied Maoism and 
helped the CCP realise ideological hegemony in its superstructure and consolidate 
political power in the ‘New China’. 
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In the context of the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War, the dictum to ‘lean to the 
side of the Soviet Union’ was strongly coloured by political ideology. This actuality 
was reflected in sports policy in the widespread promotion of Soviet-style sports 
among  the  masses  during  this  period,  which  buttressed  the  socialist  agenda  and 
anti-capitalist position of the CCP and strengthened its national construction project. 
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Chapter 5: State Sports Policies and Systems 
during the Period of Socialist Construction from 







Sino-Soviet relations during the Cold War influenced the direction of the evolution of 
China’s sports policies after 1949, which was largely determined by ideology. After 
the CCP’s establishment of socialist China in 1949, followed by the intensification of 
the Cold War, the new regime was effectively isolated by the deadlock between the 
socialist and capitalist camps; an isolation that was reinforced by the Western powers, 
led by the USA. Communist China was established under a geo-political situation in 
which the only option was to rely on the Soviets for international aid. During the first 
10 years after the founding of the PRC, the Soviet Union was of huge help to China, 
helping China build a complete industrial, educational system and military systems.
1
 
China’s adoption of Soviet patterns of sports throughout the 1950s has been widely 
viewed  as  the  Sovietisation  of  sports  in  China.  However,  China’s  Sovietisation 
faltered after Khrushchev’s assumption of power in 1953. Sino-Soviet relations 
worsened over the next few years, until China eventually espoused de-Sovietisation 
from 1960 onwards. The changing ideological contexts shaped the nature of China’s 
international relationships, as well as the development of sports and sports policies 
during the period of large-scale Socialist construction. 
 
 
At the end of 1952, Mao and the topmost leaders in the CCP redesigned China’s 
 
economic, social development blueprint, officially designating the period between 
 
 
1  Soviet Union’s aid to China included three parts: one was to transfer industrial technology by aiding the 
construction of industrial projects. For example, the Soviet government helped to build 50 key projects in the coal, 
electricity, steel, non-ferrous metals, chemical, mechanical and military sectors, which are badly needed to restore 
the economy. The second part was to develop Chinese capacity in science and technology through various forms 
of cooperation. The third was educational and involved helping China adjust and construct technology colleges, as 
well as recruiting a large number of Chinese students to study in the Soviet Union. 
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1953 and 1956 as the ‘transition to socialism’, which was immediately followed by 
the period of socialist construction. In 1958, the CCP launched the ‘Great Leap 
Forward (GLF) ’ campaign (1958–1960)
2
, which was intended to accelerate economic 
and technical development of the country. However, the GLF proved to be a huge 
failure that was followed by a period of readjustment and recovery from 1960 through 
1965. This Chapter will examine changes in dominant international and national 
ideology in China from 1953 to 1965, and how these influenced the construction of 





5.2 The Sovietisation of Chinese Sports: Policy and Practice 
from 1953 to 1960 
5.2.1 Socialist Transition and Radical Socialist Construction 
In regard to the transition from a New Democratic Society towards a socialist society, 
Mao and the party leaders originally thought that 3 years of economic recovery would 
be followed by 20 years or more of a New Democracy Society, after which time 
China would ‘cautiously’ advance to socialism.
3   
However, on 24 September 1952 at 
a secretariat meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP, Mao argued that: ‘We 
should complete the transition towards a socialist society within 10 years to 15 years, 
 
 
2   The Great Leap Forward was an economic and social campaign by the CCP from 1958 to 1962. The campaign 
was led by Chairman Mao Zedong and aimed to rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy into 
a socialist society through rapid industrialization and collectivization. 
3   In July 1949, in a speech  at the graduation ceremony of the China Central College for Youth League Mao 
Zedong claimed that: ‘20 years later, when our [China’s] industry develops to a certain extent, and then we 
[China] will consider entering into socialist stage according to the situation at that time.’ See Mao Zedong’s 
Speech at the Graduation Ceremony of the First Cadets of the China Central College for Youth Leagues (4 July 
1949), Beijing: The Party’s Literature, no. 5, 2009: 9. In June 1950, at the Second Session of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Mao pointed out that: ‘It will be a very long time in the 
future to carry out socialist transformation nationwide, namely the nationalisation of private industries and the 
socialisation of agriculture…after new democratic reforms, and national economic and cultural undertakings 
become flourishing, and various conditions are permitted, and only when the people of the whole country agree 
after consideration, and then can we calmly and properly enter the period of socialism.’ See ‘Mao    Zedong’s 
Speech at the Second Session of the CPPCC National Committee (June 14, 1950)’, Selected Works of Mao 
Zedong, sixth volume, (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1999), 81; In February 1951, Mao Zedong put 
forward the idea ‘Three years of Preparation, Ten year Plan for Economic Construction’ (ibid., 143). ‘Three years’ 
refers to the three years of economic recovery period, while ‘10 years’ refers to the implementation of the new 
democracy. In other words, until 1951, Mao believed that it would take 10 or 20 years to develop a new 
democratic  economy.  See  the  Selected  Works  Regarding  Economy  of  Zhou  Enlai  (Beijing:  Central  Party 
Literature Press, 1993), 122. 
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rather than starting the transition period 10 years later.’
4   
This speech illustrated the 
change in steps and methods concerning the transition from New Democracy to 
Socialism, which clearly differed from his original idea. Mao’s decision soon 
led to Party action. In December 1953, the Central Committee of CCP declared the 




Why did Mao Zedong change the idea of long -term implementation of the New 
Democracy in the autumn of 1952 and put forward the general line for socialist 
transition? In addition to the accelerated pace of industrial nationalisation in the 
new democratic construction period, a key concept that promoted this change in 
Mao’s  ideas  is  that  the  Communist  Party  was  ready  to  implement  the  first 
Five-Year Plan in 1953, to carry out large-scale economic construction centring 
on heavy industry. According to the experience of the Soviet Union's 
industrialisation and the situation at home and abroad, China’s Communist Party 
decided to begin the development strategy centred on the development of heavy 
industry in  economic construction.    China was  a country with  a shortage of 
funds,  and  therefore  giving  priority  to  the  development  of  capital -intensive 
heavy industry under those conditions, China was bound to use the authority of 
the  state  to  accumulate  funds,  human  resources  and  material  resources  into 






In 1953, China officially began the first Five-Year Plan and commenced a systematic 
socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft, capitalist industry and commerce. 
In  September  1956,  the  8
th   




4   According to the literature records, it was at this meeting that Mao Zedong first proposed the idea ‘Transition to 
Socialism’  in  the  1950s..  For  a  more  detailed  explanation,  see  Bo  Yibo,  Recollections  of  Several  Major 
Historical Decisions and Events (Beijing: Party School of the CCP Central Committee Press, 1997), 220. 
5   Sun Daiyao, An Analysis of the Industrialisation Background of China's Rapid Transition to Socialism in 1950s. 
Leading Journal of Ideological & Theoretical Education, no.2 (2004) :45–49. 
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completion  of  the  socialist  transition, 
6    
marking  its  entrance  into  a  phase  of 
comprehensive and large-scale socialist construction in China. In 1957, China’s 
national economy maintained rapid growth, which was balanced by fiscal revenue and 
expenditure. Nevertheless, Mao argued that the industrial growth rate of 1957 (10%) 
was far less than 1956 (31%), and that agriculture failed to reach the planned growth 
rate of 4.9%, which meant that the party’s adopted position in 1956 to resist 
advancement was totally wrong, and was most likely responsible for the adverse 
economic and politic consequences.
7   
Subsequently, at the Third Plenum of Eighth 
CPC   Central   Committee   held   in   October   1957,   Mao   publicly   criticised 
anti-venturesome advance
8 
and emphasised that: ‘We must be promoters for the 
revolution’. In March 1958 at the Politburo meeting held in Chengdu, the ‘Great Leap 
Forward (GLF) ’ was formally unveiled and was fully upgraded after the second 
session of the 8
th  
National Congress of the CCP, held in May 1958. A slogan ‘Take 
steel as the key link, leap forward in all fields’ was put forward. 
 
 
In order to support the GLF, a large amount of labour was transferred from rural areas 
to cities, while the People's Commune Movement was extensively carried out in rural 
areas, resulting in extensive conflict between increasing food demands of the urban 
 
6   A Resolution issued by the CCP Central committee of the 8th  National Congress of the CCP, held from 15–27 
September 1956, stated that: ‘So far, the socialist translation has won decisive victory, which shows that the 
contradiction between proletariat and the bourgeoisie has been largely solved in China, and system of class 
exploitation with thousands of years comes to an end and the socialist society system in China has basically 
established.’ This indicates the end of the socialist transition in September 1956. For more detailed explanation 
on the completion of the socialist transition in 1956, see the Resolution in the political Report of the 8th National 
Congress of the CCP (27 September 1956), (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1956), and also the ‘Resolution 
on a Number of Historical Issues in the History of Our Party [CCP] since the Founding of the People's Republic 
of China’ (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1983). 
7   Ibid. 
8   From the fourth quarter of 1955 to the first half of 1956, some targets of Chinese economic development were 
set too high and they even ignored economic law. According to a report by the State Planning Commission in 
January 1956, the total investment by local provinces had reached 15.3 billion RMB, and later was updated to 
20 billion RMB, doubling the original one. However, the annual revenue only increased by 9.29%. As a result, 
the increase of investment of infrastructure resulted in tensions between revenue and expenditure, shrinking 
investment  in  other  aspects  of  the  national  economy.  Considering  the  adverse  effects  resulting  from 
unrealistically high targets, Liu Shaoqi (Vice Chairman of the PRC) and Premier Zhou Enlai embarked upon 
new economic measures at the end of January 1956 designed to correct these effects. At the Second Plenum of 
the Eighth CPC Central Committee held in November 1956, some dissidents attacked this venturesome advance 
in the economic plan, and even argued that communism was incapable of leading the development of China’s 
economy. This made Mao feel that anti-venturesome advances promoted right-wing forces. He therefore 
repeatedly criticised  anti-venturesome  advances  and  even  claimed  that  they equated  to  anti-socialism and 
anti-Marxism. See Guo Dajun, The History of the People's Republic of China (1949–2007), (Beijing: Beijing 
Normal University Press, 2011), 88; Bo Yibo, Recollections of Several Major Historical Decisions and Events, 
(Beijing: Party School of the CCP Central Committee Press, 1997), 531–532. 
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population and the reduction of agricultural production. Exaggerated production 
reports, resulting from the anxiety of failure to meet production targets, were accepted 
as reality.
9   
For example, in regard to agriculture, the 1958 growth rate target of 6.1% 
was set in February and was increased to 16.2% at the ‘Chendu Conference’ in March 
of the same year.
10   
In order to accomplish and even exceed the unattainable target, 






In 1959, things started to go wrong. Speedily-manufactured farm machinery fell to 
pieces when used. Tens of thousands of workers were injured after working long 
hours and falling asleep at their jobs. Steel produced by the backyard furnaces was too 
weak to be of any use. Buildings constructed by this substandard steel did not last 
long. Moreover, the backyard production method had taken many workers away from 
their fields, so desperately needed food was not being harvested. The harvest for 1959 
was 170 million tons of grain – far below what China needed at the most basic level. 
In many parts of China, starvation occurred. As a result, the GLF ended in catastrophe, 
resulting in tens of millions of deaths, as well as a serious imbalance between the 
proportions of the national economy,
12   








At the Ninth Plenary Session of the Eighth National Congress of the CCP held in 
January 1961, officials admitted to the adverse impact of the GLF. The Party and 
government  proposed  a  strategy  of  ‘readjustment,  consolidation,  enrichment  and 
 
9   Roderick MacFarquhar, John K. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1992), 385. 
10   The Conference of the CCP Central Committee was held in Chendu in March 1958. 
11   For example, on 23 June, the People’s Daily stated that: ‘a wheat experimental field in Gucheng County, Hubei, 
created a “high-yield” record, with 4,689 Jin [catty] of wheat per mu [1/15 acres ] field.’ Another example 
comes from a report in the Biography of Chen Yun, which states: ‘On June 30, in Anguo county, Hebei, a test 
land reached 5,100 catty per mu yield.’ See Jin Chong, Chen Qun, Biography of Chen Yun (Beijing: Central 
Literature Press, 2005), 412. 
12   As a result of the one-sided development of heavy industry, the imbalance of the national economy was 
aggravated still further. There was an obvious decline in light industry, while agriculture was seriously 
damaged. In 1959, China's grain output was only 340 billion jin, 60 billion jin less than the output of 400 
billion jin in 1958. In 1960, the national grain output dropped to 287 billion jin, less than 287.4 billion Jin in 
1951. See Wu Li, ed. The economic history of People's Republic of China (Beijing: Chinese Economy Press, 
1999), 457. 
13   Yang, Dennis Tao.‘China's Agricultural Crisis and Famine of 1959–1961: A Survey and Comparison to Soviet 
Famines’. Comparative Economic Studies 50, no.1(2008):1–29. 
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focusing on increasing quality’ to adjust the proportion of the various departments of 
the national economy. Overall, the adjustment included two aspects: the first was the 
adjustment of the relationship between supply and demand. It not only involved 
adjustments to the amount of demand in total, but also to the supply and demand 
structure. The second aspect was the adjustment of production relations, that is, the 
adjustment of the economic system, which was not conducive to economic 
development during the GLF period. After a three-year adjustment, the serious 
imbalance of the economic structure caused by the GLF and the serious shortage of 






5.2.2 Soviet Model and Establishment of a Centralised Sport 
 
Governing Body (SPCSC) 
 
The Chinese elite sports system is known as ‘whole country support for the elite 
sports  system’ or  ‘Ju  guo  Ti  zhi’ in  Chinese.  According  to  Wu  Shaozu,  former 
Director of the SCSPE between 1988 and 1998, the system was officially established 
in the 1950s, developed in the 1960s and 1970s and gradually developed its own 
character from the 1980s.
15  
It is widely argued that the establishment of the State 
Physical Culture and Sport Commission (SPCSC) in 1952 was a watershed in the 
history  of  sport  in  modern  China,
16   
marking  the  establishment  of  a  centralised 
 
 
14   The economic adjustment focused on three aspects: The first aim was to reduce the industrial production plan 
index. For example, in 1962, the industrial production and construction plan, especially the major industrial 
products, such as raw coal, steel, iron and wood, was adjusted repeatedly. The second aim was to reduce the 
scale of industrial infrastructure. Capital construction investment in early 1962 was 6.7 billion yuan, reduced to 
the level of simple maintenance of production. By the end of 1962, the investment in capital construction 
actually completed was 7,126 billion yuan; a decline of 5,614 billion yuan compared with that in 1961. The third 
aim was to streamline staff and reduce populations in cities and towns. In 1961, the Central Committee of the 
CCP issued a document titled ‘Notifications of a Number of Issues on Reducing Staff and Workers’ and 
vigorously encouraged those workers who had arrived from rural areas after January 1958 to return to their 
hometowns and participate in agricultural production. As a result, by the end of 1961, the number of workers in 
the state decreased by 8,730 million, while the number of workers in the industrial sector fell by 547 million. 
The urban population had decreased by 10 million people and grain sales had dropped by 4 billion jin. See China 
Statistics Bureau (eds.), Statistical Yearbook of China (1984) (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1984), 110,114. 
15   Wu Shaozu, et al., eds., Sports History of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1999 (Beijing: China Book 
Publishing House, 1999), 92. 
16   For a detailed discussion on the importance of the establishment of the SPCSC in the history of sport of the 
PRC, see Xiong Xiaozheng, ed.,‘A Historical Survey of the Reform of China's Sports System’, The Current 
Situation and Future Development of Sports Science, (Beijing: Beijing Sport University press, 2002), p: 6; 
Yang Hua, ‘The Successful Experience and Existing Problems in the Development of Competitive Sports in 
China since the 1980s’, Journal of Chengdu Sport University 28, no. 1, (2002):1–7; Hu Xiaoming, ‘Reform of 
the whole nation system’, Journal of Physical Education 9, no.1( 2002):1–3; Ling Ping, ‘The Developing 
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In fact, its establishment may be traced back to the PRC’s first Olympic Journey. 
While the ACSF was making efforts to mobilise the masses to participate in sports 
activities nationwide, it was informed on 28 February 1951 that Finland would like to 
invite China to participate in the 15
th  
Olympic Games in May 1952 in Helsinki. 
Beijing had not intended to participate in the Games, but it changed its thinking when 
the Soviet Union’s Ambassador to China informed the Chinese government that the 
Soviet Union planned to participate in the 15
th 
summer Olympics for the first time.
17
 
The Soviet Union at that time had already built robust sports teams and was ready to 
 
compete against the U.S.A. As part of the socialist camp, the Kremlin hoped that 
 






In the meantime, Taiwan, ruled by the KMT, was also invited by the IOC and had 
already decided to participate in the Games. In consideration of Taiwan’s involvement, 
the Soviet Union encouraged the PRC to participate, and reminded the PRC to declare 
its IOC membership if China wished to participate in the 1952 summer Games. 
Consequently, while Beijing was making efforts to negotiate with the IOC with regard 
to Olympic membership, the ACSF began to prepare for the Games. A notification 
titled ‘Selecting and Training Elite Athletes’ was jointly issued by the Organisation 




Models and the Changing Modes – Research on the Reform of Sport Management System and its Mechanism’, 
Journal of Physical Education 8, no.1(2001):1–4. 
17On 15 February 1951, Finland's First Minister visited the office of Zhang Hanfu, Deputy Minister of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. Before he left, he received instructions: seek new possibilities for Beijing to 
attend the Finland Olympic Games. However, Finland proposed that the ACSF was not to participate in the 
Olympic sports games, but only to send a delegation to participate in the Olympic Art Exhibition, to promote 
Chinese civilisation and expand the influence of the new Chinese regime. In January 1952, Luo Shen, the 
Soviet ambassador to China, told the Chinese side that the Soviet Union would organise a delegation to 
participate in the Finland Olympic Games, and suggested that China should also send players to participate. 
The views of the Soviet Union played a key role and the ACSF began to actively prepare to participate in the 
Olympic Games. For a detailed discussion, see Tang Jun, ‘The Chronicle for New China’s first Time to 
Participate in the Olympic Games’, Memories and Archives, no. 5 (2010): 4-9. 
18   The Soviet Union attached much importance to participating in the Helsinki 1952 Summer Olympics, and 
regarded it as a means to compete with the U.S.A. They were very careful in their preparations and intended to 
achieve their purpose: ‘It never rains but it pours’. For detailed information, see Zhang Xiaoyi, Zhang Hui, The 
Whole Story about New China's Participation in the Olympic Games in Helsinki – Interview with Mr. Xiong 
Douyin, Journal of Physical Education 15, no.11( 2008):1–3. 
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Beijing’s  motivation  to  participate  in  the  Olympic  Games  was  closely  linked  to 
China’s ideological and political ambitions, as can be seen in a policy document 




International sport competitions are flourishing worldwide. International 
friends wish China to participate in these events. Recently, we have 
announced that China will send an Olympic team to the Helsinki Olympics. 
However, sport in China has been poorly developed in the past. After 
participating in some international competitions in recent years, we are 
well aware of the low performance of China's competitive sports teams, 
which is incompatible with China’s international status. We must change 
this situation! Sport must be promoted and the performance in competitive 





Following tough negotiations, the IOC eventually proposed a compromise, inviting 
both Beijing and Taipei to participate in the Games.
20   





19   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ed., The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical 
Education Documents of PRC (1949–1981) (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1982), 40. 
20   On 12 February 1952, the Chinese government appointed Shen Zhibai, a second secretary in the Chinese 
Embassy to Sweden, as the representative of the ACSF to attend the IOC General Assembly held in Oslo. 
However, when he contacted the Secretary General of the conference, he was told that the PRC could not attend 
the meeting because the PRC was not yet a member of the IOC. Under this condition, the representatives of the 
Soviet Union and Bulgaria proposed the issue of PRC’s Olympic qualification, and terminated Taiwan’s 
representative in the meeting agendas for 13 and 14 June. The discussion regarding this issue failed to reach a 
consensus. On 16 June, Ades Thrun, the IOC Chairman, clarified the IOC’s position, stating that the IOC hoped 
to solve the problem of China in the coming year and that henceforth, two Chinese organisations, one from 
Taiwan and one from mainland China, would not be allowed to participate in the Helsinki Olympic Games. 
Following negotiations with the PRC government, the IOC decided to continue its discussion on the 
membership issue of the Chinese IOC at the Forty-seventh Executive Council meeting of the IOC, which was 
held in Helsinki on 17 July. On 18 July, the day before the opening of the Olympic Games, the Finland 
Olympic Organising Committee invited the ACSF to participate in the Olympic Games. Considering that the 
IOC’s invitation only invited the PRC to the Games, without mentioning Taiwan, the PRC decided to accept it. 
On 19 July, Zhou Enlai, then the Premier of the Chinese Government, approved his country’s participation. For 
a more detailed explanation on the competition between Beijing and Taipei in participating in the Helsinki 
Olympics, see Tang Jun, ‘The Chronicle for New China’s first Time to Participate in the Olympic Games’, 
Memories and Archives, no. 5(2010): 4–9. 
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any medals in the 1952 Olympic Games.
21   
In contrast, the Soviet delegation achieved 
dramatic success, impressing the world. The Soviet success in Helsinki convinced 
Communist China that socialist countries could beat capitalist countries on the 
international stage. On the way home, the Chinese delegation paid a visit to the Soviet 
Union,  where  they  were  surprised  by  the  self-contained  sports  facilities  and 
well-established sports administration system. Shortly after returning to Beijing, in 
August 1952, Rong Gaotang, the head of the delegation and the Secretary-General of 
CYLC, reported to the Central Committee of the CCP and Central Government of the 
PRC. He proposed that China should adopt the Soviet Union’s model and develop a 
centralised  administrative  system to  ensure  the  selection  of  elite  athletes,  to  win 
medals in international sport arenas and satisfy the country’s political and diplomatic 
requirements.
22   
According  to  Wu  Shaozu’s  The  History  of  Sport  in  the  People’s 
 
Republic of China, Rong stated that: 
 
 
The ACSF is a non-governmental [or Semi-State] organisation, which does 
not fit the current development of sports in China. In order to strengthen 
the [Party’s] leadership, we propose to set up the State Physical Education 
and Sport Commission – a governmental organisation. The State Physical 







At  the 19
th   
session  of  the  Central  Committee  of the Central  Government  on  15 
November 1952, the ‘Resolution on Establishing Central Committee of Sport and 
Physical Culture (CCSPC)’ was approved. In September 1954, the resolution was 




21   The Helsinki Olympics started on 18 July 1952, but Beijing did not receive the official invitation from the IOC 
until the previous day. When the PRC’s delegation arrived in Helsinki, all games had nearly finished. Only one 
athlete participated in the men's 100-metre backstroke race. See Wu Shaozu, ed., Sport History of People's 
Republic Of China (1949–1998) (Beijing: China Book Publishing House, 1999), 49. 
22   Deng Liqun, Ma Hong, The Biography of He Long (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1993), 
56-57 
23   Wu Shaozu. op. cit., 49. 
24   The founding of the National Sports Committee originally implemented a committee system and all committee 
members were derived from the government’s Administration Council, the army and included some sports 
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The SCSPE differed from the ACSF in terms of the structure and function of the 
sports governing body, as well as in ideological orientation. Firstly, the ACSF was a 
semi-official organisation, while the SCSPE was a centralised governmental body, on 
the same level of importance as various ministries such as the Ministry of Education, 
Finance, or Commerce.
25 
As a Chinese scholar in modern Chinese sports history 
explained to this author, ‘The Chinese political system in the Mao era and even now 
was featured with “the horizontal concentration” of state power in the party 
organisation, longitudinal concentration in the Central Committee of the Party, the 
power of the Party is concentrated in one person's character, the sports system follows 
this characteristic to a great extent’.
26  
His argument is echoed by another interviewee, 
an   anonymous   official   from   the   Policies   and   Regulations   Division   in   the 




The highly centralised sport governmental system was influenced by the 
entire political system of the Party and the historical experience of the CCP 
in revolutionary war. The centralised leadership system formed during the 
revolutionary war could effectively mobilise the masses and ensure that the 
party was able to centralise strong political forces to achieve victory in the 
revolutionary war. [. . .] The establishment of the Chinese sports system in 
the early days of the PRC did not go beyond the background of the times. 
It was also governed by the rule of the establishment and operation of the 
central administrative system of the Party-state. For example, the 
establishment of the CCSPC in 1952 was attached to the Central People's 




celebrities.  The  twenty-eighth  meeting  of  the  Central  People's  Government  Committee  was  held  on  18 
September  1953.  The first batch of members was  appointed  in  this  meeting  and  included  leaders of  the 
departments of the government and Liberation Army, as well as prominent individuals in sports circles. 
25   Fan Hong, ‘Elite Sport in China: Politics, Policy and System’ in Comparative Elite Sport Development: systems, 
structures and public policy, Barrie Houlihan and Mick Green (eds.), (Oxford Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008), 
28. 
26   Interviewer No. 4 (Professor in Chinese Sport history, Shanghai Sports University) in discussion with the author, 
8 July 2014. 
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Administration in China. The Government Council founded in 1952 was, 
in fact, the executive organ of the state administration [the CCSPC 
affiliated]. It was not until 1954 when the State Council became the highest 
organ of state power, the CCSPC was incorporated into the State Council 





Despite the different timings in formation and transformation of the Party and 
government systems, academic circles generally believe that since the founding of the 
PRC,  the  relationship  between  the  Party  and  the  government  has  experienced  a 
process  of  moving  from  separation  to  union.  Some  scholars  consider  the  First 
Five-Year Plan, launched in 1953, to be the start of the political system of party 
politics, with the Party’s emphasis on economic policy being gradually adopted by the 
government.
28   
Some scholars believe that since 1953, due to excessive emphasis on 
 
the opposition to dispersion, local administrative authority has increasingly 
concentrated on the government departments, while at the same time, according to 
Mao Zedong's instructions, all major and important problems of the government 






According to Weber, the legitimacy of the CCP is mainly due to Communist ideology 
and Mao's pragmatic Mass Line, such as the land reform. Although the early period of 
the PRC between 1949 and 1956 experienced comprehensive strengthening of the 
economic and socialist transformation and the construction of the political system, the 
Communist Party did not realise that its legitimacy based on ideology changed to a 
legal-rational position. Nevertheless, it ‘successfully, quickly established China as the 
 
 
27  Interviewer No. 9 (Deputy director of Department of Sport policy and Regulation, the GAS) in discussion with 
the author, 25 August 2011. 
28   Liu Lin, ‘Historical Investigation and Thinking of the Relationship between the Party and Government in our 
Country Since the Foundation of the People's Republic of China’, Theoretical Perspective 13, no.4 
(2005):55-57. 
29   Jiang Jinhui, ‘From the Party's Centralized Leadership to the Rule of Law - the Evolution of the Party's 
Leadership since the Founding of the People's Republic of China’, The Research and Teaching of the History of 
the Party. no.1 (2000):30–34. 
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From this point onwards, the government’s involvement in sports became a legal, 
straightforward process, with the official establishment of a bureaucratically 
configured sports policy system exhibiting high degrees of state involvement. 
Organised, centralised sport began to replace voluntary, decentralised sport from 1952 
onwards. As far as the relationship between sports and the Party during the early years 
of the PRC (and even throughout the Mao Era and into the 1980s) is concerned, Dong 
Jinxia has observed that: 
 
 
As befitted a socialist state, sport was exclusively financed by the state. 
Sport is mediated through the state, which locks in all the structures of 
society as a whole. In every aspect of transformation, the Communist Party 
played a leading role. The Party’s policies, strategies and plans determined, 
to a considerable extent, the direction of Chinese society […] in post-1949 
China. The planned reconstruction of sport was, in fact, partly a holistic 





Secondly, the ACSF focused on the development and promotion of mass sport under 
the principle ‘sports serve national construction, national defence and the people’. The 
SCSPE aimed not only to promote mass sport, but most importantly, to produce 
socialist elite athletes to win medals in international sporting arenas and to compete 
with capitalist, Western countries.
32   
As a result, the Departments of Elite Sport within 




30   Hu Angang, Historical Comments on China's Politics and Economy (1949-1976), (Beijing: Tsinghua 
University Press, 2008), 148. 
31   Dong Jinxia and Mangan, JA., ‘Football in the New China: Political Statement, Entrepreneurial Enticement and 
Patriotic Passion’. Soccer in Society 2, no.3 (2001): 79–100. 
32   Fan Hong, ‘Elite Sport in China: Politics, Policy and System’, in Comparative Elite Sport Development: 
systems, structures and public policy, p28; See Fan Hong, ‘Elite Sport in China: Politics, Policy and System’, in 
Comparative Elite Sport Development: systems, structures and public policy, p: 28; Xiao Mouwen, The 
Historical Evolution of Mass Sports Policy in New China. Sports Science. 2009;29(4):89–96; Xiong Xiaozheng, 
Cao Shouhe and Lin Dengyuan, ‘From the Combination of Popularization and Improvement to the Coordinated 
Development of All Kinds of Sports’, Sports Literature and History 15, no.5(1997):16–20. 
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Figure 5.1. Administrative Structure of State Committee Sport and Physical 
 




Source: The figure was developed by the author. 
Thirdly, the SCSPE was featured as being obvious Sovietisation. Arguably, the Soviet 
Union’s state theory and government model are among the important factors 
influencing the establishment of the central administration system in the PRC.





33   Zheng Chuankun, ‘On the Characteristics of the Administrative System in the Early Days of the Founding of 
PRC’, Administrative Law Research 3, no.3 (1995): 12–16; Suzanne Ogden, China’s Unresolved Issues: Politics, 
Development and Culture, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1992. 
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some  extent,  in  the  early  days  of  the  founding  of  the  Communist  Party,  the 
Communist International Commissioner injected the principles and methods of the 
Lenin doctrine into the body of the Chinese Communist Party, when it was still in its 
infancy.
34   




It is well recognised that at the start of the Communist regime in China, the CCP’s 
establishment  of  political  and  administrative  systems  relied  heavily  on  both  the 
current and historical traditions, such as the existence of multiple classes in society, a 
democratic coalition government. Some scholars argue that after the end of the Civil 
War, the Communist Party established a multi-party coalition government, which 
inevitably led to the establishment of a socialist society dominated by communist 
ideology. The government’s claim to legitimacy was inevitably based on communist 
ideology. 
35    
When  he  visited  Xibaipo  in  1956,  Mao  commented  to  Mikoyan: 
 
‘Although the government organisation is different from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries, its nature and purpose is still under the leadership of the 





In the early years of the PRC, the impetus for Chinese sports borrowed directly from 
the Soviet Union, as is illustrated by a speech delivered by Marshal He Long (Head of 
the SCSPE), after visiting the Soviet Union. His public lecture, entitled ‘Sport in the 
Soviet Union: the Strong Force to Construct Communist Society’, described the 
development of sports in the Soviet Union and stated: “How to develop sport in China 
is still a new area for us. We must be under the leadership of the Party and Chairman 







34   MacFarquhar R., The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949–1965, The Cambridge History of China. vol. 
14, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p: 68. 
35   Zhang Jian, ‘Legitimacy and Chinese Politics’. Strategy and Management. no. 5 (2000):1–15. 
36  Party Documents Research Office of the CPC Central Committee ed., ‘The Chronicle of Mao Zedong, 
1893–1949’, 2nd volume (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1993), 34. 
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5.2.3 Soviet Model and the Chinese Sport Policy and System 
from 1953 to 1957 
Elite sport: Producing Socialist Elite Athletes 
 
The Chinese elite sports system consists mainly of administration, training, selection 
and competition structures. It is characterised by centralised management and 
administration, with guaranteed financial and human resources throughout China, to 
ensure maximum support for the elite sports.
38 
All four structures were primarily 
developed in the 1950s. 
 
 
Selective and training system 
 
The Soviet model is credited with helping the Chinese selection and training system 
to take shape. First of all, China’s national team system was established on the basis 
of the Soviet model. Prior to 1952, the PRC lacked any well-organised national team 
system or competition system. Except for the national basketball team, the PRC had 
no national teams prior to 1953. Most teams were simply temporary training classes, 
representing the PRC to compete in international competitions. After 1952, in support 
of the policy to ‘learn from Soviet Sports’ and ‘inviting Soviet professionals to China 
and sending Chinese to the Soviet Union’,
39   
not only were national teams
40   
set up in 
China, but Soviet coaches and experts in elite sports were invited to introduce modern 
training methods, technology and their experience. In September 1953, for instance, a 





37   He Long, ‘Sports in the Soviet Union is the Power to Promote Communism Construction’. New Sport. 
no.11(1954):5. 
38   Hao Qin, ‘Lun zhongguo tiyu ‘Juguo tizhi’ de gainian,tedian yu gongneng’ [The Definition, Characteristics and 
Functions of the Chinese Elite Sports System]. Journal of Chengdu University of Sport. no.3(2004) :15–19. 
39   Wu Shaozu, op. cit., 41. 
40   National teams were established for basketball in 1951, for athletics in 1953, table tennis in 1954, swimming in 
1954, badminton in 1954, gymnastics in 1955 and for volleyball in 1956. See Fu Yannong (ed.), The History of 
Sport in China. 5th volume, op. cit., 77. 
41  Aid from the socialist camp soon generated positive results. For instance, 24 swimming athletes received 
training in Budapest in 1954 and 1955. Among them was Wu Chuanyu, who received training in Moscow in 
1953 and then in Budapest in 1954. During the 9 months of training in China, Wu only improved by 0.1 second 
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More    importantly,    Beijing    signed    agreements    with    Moscow    and    other 
Eastern-European allies to enable Chinese national teams to train in Eastern Europe. 
According to these agreements, with the exception of the swimming team which went 
to Budapest (Hungary), almost all other Chinese national squad members went to the 
Soviet Union. There was frequent exchange and interaction between sports teams 
from China, the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries during this period. 
In 1954 alone, Chinese sports delegations were sent to the Soviet Union and East 







In order to train talented athletes from a young age, China adopted the Soviet Union’s 
amateur sport school model. Prior to 1956, almost all national team members were 
selected from over 6,000 provincial and municipal games according to a player’s 
performance.
43   
Influenced by their Soviet experience in terms of elite sport training, 
the SCSPE became convinced that early specialisation was essential, especially in 
athletics,  gymnastics,  table  tennis  and  swimming,  to  produce  more  high-profile 
athletes and become successful in international competitions. In 1955, the SCSPE set 
up amateur sports schools in Beijing and Shanghai, which markedly improved the 
physical quality and performance of Chinese athletes. Subsequently, in 1956, China 
 
issued ‘The Regulation of the Youth Amateur Sports Schools’. By the end of 1957, 
159 youth amateur sport schools had been established across China in 92 cities and 20 






from 1:11.7 to 1:11.6 in the 100m backstroke event, whereas during 8 days of training in the Soviet Union he 
reduced the time to 1:6.4. At the 1st International Youth Friendship Games held in Bucharest in August 1954, 
Wu won a gold medal in the Men’s 100m backstroke event, becoming China’s first World Champion. See 
Cultural and History Research Committee of the SPCSC, Chinese Swimming Association, The history of 
Chinese swimming, (Wuhan: Wuhan Press, 1996), 74–78. 
42   Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (eds.). ‘Carry forward the People’s Sports Undertaking in China’, 
The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1949–1981), (Beijing: 
People’s Sports Press, 1982), 16. 
43   Between 1953 and 1956, China established national teams for track and field, table tennis, badminton, 
volleyball, swimming, and gymnastics, amongst others, but most competitors were amateur sports enthusiasts 
selected from more than 6,000 games or competitions at the city level or above. See Wu, The History of Sport in 
the People’s Republic of China, 52. 
44   Li Xiumei, ‘The Concise Edition of Sports History of People's Republic of China’, (Beijing: Beijing Sport 
University press, 2001), 128. 
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To improve its performance in elite sports, China set about establishing a sports 
competition system based on the Soviet model. In 1956 the SCSPE issued ‘Rules and 
Regulations of the Competitive Sport System of the PRC, in which 43 sports were 
designated  as  competitive  sports  and  the  structure  of  fulltime  sports  teams  at 
provincial and national levels. Sports regulations were specified, including 
requirements for organizing regional sports competitions. The SCSPE also decreed 







In April 1956, in order to develop a competition system and encourage athletes to 
improve their performance, the SCSPE issued the ‘Rules and Regulations of 
Classification of Athletes’ and the ‘Rules and Regulations of Classification of 
Referees’. These documents classified athletes and referees according to performance, 
with reference to the Soviet model. By the end of 1956, 39,000 people were identified 
as first-, second- or third-level athletes, while 46 outstanding athletes were awarded 
the title of the ‘Master of Sports’.
46   
At the same time, state sports associations were 
 
established, for participation in international sporting events. Apart from the National 
Basketball association, which was established before 1949, most state sports 
associations were set up during this period.
47   
Under the leadership of the SPESC, 








45  Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (eds.)., ‘Provisional Regulations on sports competition system in 
People's Republic of China (Draft)’ and ‘Grade Standards of Athletes in Various Sports’, The Collected 
Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1949–1981), 27–29. 
46   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport (ed.), Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1949–1991) (Beijing: 
People’s Sport Press, 1993), 206. 
47  State Wrestling Association in 1953, State Tennis Association in 1953, State Cycling Association in 1953, State 
Volleyball Association in 1953, State Gymnastics Association in 1954, State Athletic Association in 1954, State 
Weightlifting Association in 1954, State Football Association in 1955, State Shooting Association in 1956, State 
Badminton Association in 1957, State Skiing Association in 1957, State Ice Hockey Association in 1957, etc. 
Wu Shaozu. op.cit., 51. 
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competitions system soon led to good results. By the end of 1956,  102 national 
records had been created; 78 occurred in 1955 alone, in comparison with 18 between 







Mass Sports: Serve Socialist Construction 
 
In line with the principle of transition towards socialism, all resources and forces of 
the entire country were mobilized to serve the socialist transition. Mass sports were 
required to serve socialist construction. On 8 January 1954, the CCP’s Central 




Improving people’s health and enhancing the people’s physique is an 
important  task  of  our  Party  [CCP].  Particularly,  our  country  is  now 
a period of planned economic construction, which requires more people 
with healthy bodies. However, the people’s health fails to meet the needs of 
all kinds of works. In addition to strengthening health services and the 
gradual improvement of working, developing sport is the most active and 
effective way to remedy this situation. [. . .] Currently, our country is 







Marshal He Long delivered a speech ‘Struggling for Developing Mass Sport under the 
Leadership of the General Line’ at the 1
st  
plenary session of Central Committee of 
Physical Education and Sport of the PRC, held on 16 January 1954. He stated that 
‘sports  must  positively  serve  the  transition  toward  socialism’.
50   
In  response,  the 
 
People’s Daily released an editorial in February 1954 entitled ‘Actively Developing 
 
48   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport ed., Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1949–1962), (Beijing: 
People’s Sport Press, 1964), 54. 
49   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC ed., ‘Report on Strengthening the Work of the People's Sports 
(8 January, 1954)’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC 
(1949–1981) (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1982), p: 17. 
50  
He Long, ‘Striving for Mass Sports Under the Direction of the General Line’, People’s Daily, 25 March 1954. 
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‘The mass of the people is the most valuable capital to build socialism, and 
a healthy and strong body is an important guarantee for building socialism. 






Rong Gaotang, Vice-Director of the Central Committee of Sport, echoed Marshal’s 
directive in his speech delivered at the First National Congress of the PRC in 
September 1954, entitled ‘Developing Sport is an Indispensable Part of Building 
Socialism’.
52   
In October 1955, the First National Worker Sports Meeting of the PRC 
was held in Beijing, and included senior leaders of both the CCP and central 
government, such as Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. Liu Shaoqi, then the 
Chairman of the PRC, presented an inscription entitled ‘Developing sports and 
enhancing health to serve socialist construction’. Zhou Enlai, the premier of the PRC, 
presented another inscription, entitled ‘Developing employee sports and promoting 
socialist construction cause’. These policies were backed by the words of the Party 




To develop mass sports and physical culture, China continued to incorporate Soviet 
sports philosophy into Chinese sport. While promoting broadcast gymnastics around 
the country, the SCSPE introduced the Soviet Union’s ‘Ready for Labour and Defence 
System’ (LDS) into China. The Soviet LDS targeted the entire society; workers, 
soldiers and students. As expressed by Fan et al., although the CCP believed in 
motivating the population to participate in sport and physical activities, they also 
expected the  Labour  and  Defence programme to  serve as  an  organised,  efficient 
 
 
51   Editorial, ‘Actively Carry out Mass Sports Activities’, People's Daily, 9 February 1954. 
52   Rong Gaotang, ‘Developing Sport is an Indispensable Part of Building Socialism’( 26 September, 1954), 
Proceeding of the First National Congress of the PRC, edited by People’s Publishing House. Beijing: 
Peoples Publishing House, 1955. 
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As early as 1951, based on the Soviet Union’s LDS (Lao Wei Zhi), several selected 
schools, such as the No. 4 Middle School of Beijing and the High School affiliated 
with   Beijing Normal University were selected to carry out ‘Standard of Physical 
Exercise for Summer Time’.
54 
On 4 May 1954, China issued the ‘Regulations of 
Chinese LDS’, based on the 1946 vision of the Soviet Union’s LDS. This document 
specified that ‘the LDS is a foundation of the PRC’s physical education, the objective 
of which is to conduct all around physical education and to train people to be healthy, 
brave, optimistic defenders and builders of socialism.’
55 
Eventually, based on the 
practice of Chinese LDS and the 1955 version of the Soviet Union’s LDS (Lao Wei 
Zhi), the SPESC updated the Chinese LDS in 1956. In general, the Chinese LDS 
consisted of three categories based on age: juvenile grade, adult first grade and adult 
second grade. In each grade, participants were grouped by sex and different targets 
defined the grades: the juvenile grade aimed to comprehensively develop the physique 
of young people and to stimulate their interest in sports; the adult first grade was 
required to develop youth and adult physiques and guide their participation in sports; 





To encourage more people to pass the LDS, China’s sports authority established the 
Lao Wei Zhi badge system, which rewarded athletes when they achieved certain 
standards.
57   
This encouraged the regular participation of 100 million people in sports 
activities,  with  approximately  2.67  million  people  passing  the  LDS  and  around 
222,500  people  attaining  certain  LDS  standards  by September  1958.
58   




53   Fan Wei, Fan Hong & Lu Zhouxiang, Chinese State Sports Policy: Pre and Post-Beijing 2008. The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 27,no. 14-15(2010) : 2380–2402. 
54   Over 500 groups consisting of more than 7,000 students ranging from college to middle school took part in the 
trial workout. A total of 1,400 reached the required standard and were awarded medals. 
55   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC ed., ‘Interim Provision of Labour and Defence System’, The 
Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949–1981), (Beijing: People’s 
Sports Press, 1982), p: 218. 
56   Wu Bangwei, Basic Knowledge of Sports Theory, (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1957), pp: 60, 61, 62. 
57   Anonymous, Manual for Exercise of Labour and Defence System, (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1956), 2. 
58   He Long, ‘Opening Speech of the First National Games of PRC, New Sport. 1959;18:1. 
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involved all age groups, but focused on school students, particularly secondary school 
students. From June 1952 to the end of 1954, 12,740 students from 187 schools and 
colleges took part in the first grade LDS workout sessions; 1,159,000 students from 








Strive to train oneself 
to become an excellent 
defender of the 
Motherland            and 
builder of socialism 
















In   short,   following   the   principles   of   ‘sports   must   positively  serve   socialist 
construction’    and    ‘learn    from    the    Soviet    Sport’,    the    Soviet    model 
had profound effects upon China’s state sports system during the 1950s, in both elite 
and mass sports. 
 
As Houlihan has noted, ‘Sport is a mirror of society and consequently, it is a 
reasonably accurate reflection of the prevailing ideology found within a particular 
state  at  a  particular  time’. 
60   
Traditional  scholarship  on  the  Cold  War  assigned 
ideology to a centre of conflict between the capitalist and socialist camps, in which 
the  Soviets  were  portrayed  as  bent  on  expansion,  driven  by  a  combination  of 
traditional interests and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Conflict in ideology between the 
two blocs was also reflected in the field of sport. With the world divided into two 
 
59   Central Institute of Educational Science ed., Chronicle of education in People's Republic of China (1949–1982), 
(Educational Science Press, 1984), 100–103. 
60   Barry Houlihan, Sport and International Politics (New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf,1994), 15. 
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camps, the nuclear stalemate and an intensification of the ‘battle for men’s minds’, 
sport became an arena of considerable social significance. As Howell has observed, 
the USSR ‘was the first major country in modern times to realise the full extent of the 
political  significance  of  sport’.
61   
The  Soviet  Union  amazed  the  world  when  its 
athletes achieved second place with 71 medals at their first Olympic Games in 1952. 
 
 
During the Cold War, sport served as a propaganda weapon and arena for 
psychological and political warfare in Eastern and Western countries. In particular, 
socialist countries became obsessed with medal counts in competitive sports, because 
highly-ranking athletes served as role models in society and could potentially be used 
as political tools against the West. During the 1950s period of the Cold War, China 
sided with the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union and adopted the policy ‘learn 
good sports experience from the Soviet Union’. 
 
 
Gramsci considered hegemony to be spontaneous acceptance of the moral and cultural 
values of the  ruling  class  by the majority of the subordinate  class.  As  a Soviet 
historian has noted, ‘the growing impact of socialist sport on the condition of and 
trends in the world sports movement is one of the best and most comprehensible 
means of explaining to the masses the advantages of socialism over capitalism’.
62
 
The proletariat or subordinate class became convinced of the rightful domination of 
 
the communist regime. During the 1950s period of the PRC, sport was expected to 
improve in performance to ‘match China’s international status’, 
63   
so that Chinese 











61   Reet Howell, The USSR: Sport and Politics Intertwined. Comparative Education 11, no.2, (1975):137–145. 
62   Yu. A. Talaev, ‘Sport-Oblast’ mirnogo sorevnovaniya (editorial)’, Teoriya I praktika fizicheskoi kul’tury. 
no.1(1973):8. 
63   Li Xiumei, Concise Version of Sport History of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Beijing University of 
Sport Press, 2001), 9. 
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5.2.4 Sovietisation of Sport and the Great Leap Forward 
from 1958 to 1960 
Although the GLF was primarily focused on agriculture and heavy industry, it soon 
 
spread to every aspect of Chinese society, including sports. In early 1958, based on 
the Soviet Union’s experience, the SPCSC initiated ‘The Plan of Achievements in 
Sports in Ten Years’. Its aim was to promote Chinese sports under the ‘two legs 
walking system’, with the simultaneous development of elite and mass sports. 
 
 
At the Second Session of the CCP’s National Congress in May 1958, Mao pointed out 
that ‘our industry output should catch up with Britain within 15 years or less. Our 
agricultural output should exceed major capitalist countries in advance. Our science 
and technology should catch up with the advanced countries as soon as possible’.
64   
In 
September 1958, the State Sport Committee issued a new ‘Ten Year Plan for Sports 
Development’, in which the relevant targets were improved. For instance, one of the 
targets related to elite sport in the previous plan, ‘to cultivate 8 million active athletes 
and five thousand elite athletes in ten years’,
65   
was rewritten to ‘cultivate 50–70 
million active athletes and 10–15 thousand elite athletes’.
66   
According to the previous 
 
plan, 40 million men and women were expected to pass the Lao Wei Zhi fitness grade 
and 8 million people were expected to achieve the adult second grade or athlete 
standard of Lao Wei Zhi by 1967.
67   
This was reformulated as a target of ‘150 million 
people should meet the requirement of LDS as primary target while 50 million were 
to achieve the athlete standard Lao Wei Zhi’
68   
in the new plan. 
 
 
The ‘Ten-Year Plan for Sports Development’ acted as a guideline to promote the GLF 
 
in sports nationwide. China’s strong ambitions are vividly illustrated by a poster 
 
64   Li Maosheng, ed., History of the People's Republic of China, (Beijing: China Broadcast and Television 
Publishing House, 1991), 163. 
65   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC ed., ‘Report on the Ten Year Plan for the Development of 
Sports (September 19, 1958)’. The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the 
PRC (1949-1981), (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1982), 40. 
66   Ipid., 40. 
67   Ipid., 40. 
68   Ipid., 40. 
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issued in 1958 (see Figure 5.2), in which the Chinese national flag was hung much 
higher than that of Western countries, such as the USA, the UK, or France, with a 




During the GLF process, the competition system in elite sports was strengthened 
further. To select the best athletes to compete in the first National Games in 1959, 
qualification matches were held in provinces and cities nationwide. In 1958 alone, 
5,303 sports competitions were held, involving 920,000 participants. Intensive 
competition inspired local sports committees to improve the training and selection of 
elite sports. For example, in Hunan Province, although professional elite sport teams 
had been established in 1956, there were only three provincial sports teams, including 
a female gymnastic team, female volleyball team and a male basketball team. To 
reach the goals set in the ‘Ten-year Plan for Sports Development’ and prepare for the 
National Games, several new competitive sport teams were established, including 
athletics, gymnastics, volleyball, handball, table tennis, weightlifting, boxing and 
tennis. By February 1959, Hunan Province had 27 provincial sports teams and more 
than 300 athletes.
69   
Eventually, under the momentum of the GLF, not only were all 
national records surpassed by the end of the 1950s, but world records were broken 31 
times by 39 Chinese athletes, marking a performance peak in China’s elite sports 




















69   Yuan Weimin, ed., Sports History of People's Republic of China. local valume (Beijing: China Book Publishing 
House, 2002), 295. 
70   Ibid, 295. 
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Figure 5.3. A 1958 Poster entitled ‘Must come up with the world level’ 





In mass sports, encouraged by the GLF, sport programmes such as the ‘National 
 
Physical Education and Sports Month’ and ‘Physical Education and Sport Week’, 
 
‘Sport Movie Propaganda Week’ and ‘Sport Propaganda Day’, were organised 
throughout the country. These events deliberately involved large numbers of people. 
For instance, a ‘National Physical Education and Sport Week’ held in Shanghai in 
March 1958 incorporated an oath-taking rally that numbered 10,000 people, designed 
to encourage political consciousness and participation in the GLF of sports. During 
that  week,  more  than  3  million  people  participated  in  various  sport  activities, 
including broadcast calisthenics, calisthenics for production, field calisthenics, Tai chi 
and rope skipping.
72   
The intention to create a spectacular scene was supported by 
 
inspiring  slogans  adopted  throughout  China  to  mark  the  GLF  of  sport,  such  as 
 
‘Hundred Days Fighting’, ‘Ten Thousand People Doing Gymnastics’ and ‘All People 
in the Country Pass the Standard of Lao Wei Zhi’. 
 
 
In order to attain these extremely high targets, fraudulent practices were prevalent: 
 
 
71   Gu Bingxin, ‘Must come up with the world level’, in Editorial Board Dongfeng Pictorial (eds.), Dongfeng 
Pictorial. no.6 (1959):18. 
72   Office of Shanghai Chronicles, ed., Shanghai Sports Week, Accessed from: 
http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node4455/node13281/node13473/node60867/userobject1ai15137.ht 
ml (accessed 21 July 2013). 
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participants took shortcuts to pass the Lao Wei Zhi test and statistical data were 
universally modified so  as to achieve the higher-level tasks. Consequently, some 
‘model  units’  emerged  in  large  numbers. 
73    
Ironically, bragging  and  unrealistic 
 
behaviour   received   recognition   and   praise.   Conversely,   those   that   remained 
committed to pragmatic principles were regarded as right-wing conservatives and 
were criticised. For instance, at the 1958 National Sport Conference, Anhui province 
and Shanghai were criticised for their ‘conservative plan’. Hebei province, by contrast, 





Adverse effects of the GLF soon occurred. Due to food shortages, scarce medical 
supplies and overtraining, considerable numbers of athletes seeking to achieve those 
extremely high targets were injured during training sessions. By the end of 1961, an 
SPCSC survey of 691 athletes in national sports teams identified that 348 (50.3%) 
sustained injuries; 22.3% were seriously injured and could no longer participate in 
training, while some sports teams reported injury rates as high as 90% and even 
100%.
75   
These adverse effects of the GLF extended to mass sports, particularly in 
 
schools. Soon after the GLF was launched, the Lao Wei Zhi programme began to 
dominate sports activities and physical education in schools.
76   
Promotion of Lao Wei 
Zhi encouraged a boom in sports activities, but physical education classes were 
seriously damaged by overtraining, excessive physical exercising and over-testing. 
Food shortages and malnutrition led to the reduction of physical education classes 
from  four  times  weekly to  once-weekly and  cancellation  of  sports  events,  while 
morning and work-break exercises were retained in urban schools at minimal levels, 
 
73  Wu Shaozu et al., eds. Sports History of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1999 (Beijing: 
China Book Publishing House, 1999), 107. 
74   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC ed., ‘Report of the Sports Work Meeting of the SPCSC in 
1958’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949–1981) (Beijing: 
People’s Sports Press, 1982), 30. 
75   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ed. ‘Report of the Sports Work Meeting of the SPCSC in 
1961’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949–1981), (Beijing: 
People’s Sports Press, 1982), 54–58. 
76  According to the ‘Ten-Year Plan for Sports Development’, 40% of students in the first-class ranks of colleges 
and universities were required to reach the first level of the LDS and all graduate students had to reach LDS by 
1959; 20% of students in second-class colleges and universities were to reach the second level of the LDS and 
all graduate students had to reach the secondary standard of LDS; 10% of students in the third-class colleges and 
universities had to reach the second level of the LDS. See ‘Report on the Ten-Year Plan for the Development of 
Sports’ (19 September 1958), Op. cit., 40. 
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but nearly halted in rural schools.
77 
Consequently, students’ physique and health 
declined sharply. A report conducted in 1961 among 15 provinces revealed that fewer 
than 44% of secondary school graduates had achieved the required health standards, 
while an army medical examination report identified that only 30% of young people 
were of sufficient physical condition
78   
to qualify for recruitment into the army. 
 
 
In summary, between 1958 and 1961, under the influence of the GLF, the Chinese 
state sports policy and practice caught up with and exceeded Western powers in the 
field of sport. Although the GLF of sport ended in failure, the elite sports system, 
including training and competitions was strengthened, and the government gained 
experience in organising mass sports activities. These laid the foundation for the 
development of policies and systems of physical education and sports, which continue 






5.3 Militarism, ‘De-Sovietisation’ and Training Communist 
 
Athletes: State Sports Policy and Practice from 1961 to 1965 
 
The failure of the GLF (1958–1960) and the Great Famine in 1960 changed national 
policy. As mentioned earlier, in 1960, the CCP’s Central Committee issued a guideline 
entitled ‘Readjustment, consolidation, filling out and raising standards’, which was 
intended to adjust the interrelationships between the various sectors in the national 
economy (especially between agriculture and light/heavy industry) and to reduce the 









77   National Sport Committee, ‘Minutes of Symposium of Sport Cadre of Education Bureau (Commission)’, in The 
Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949–1981) (Beijing: People’s 
Sports Press, 1982), 396-400. 
78   National Sport Committee, ‘The Report Approved by the State Council on Mass Sport Symposium’, in The 
Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949-1981) (Beijing: People’s 
Sport Press, 1982), 277-281. 
79   Fan Wei, Fan Hong & Lu Zhouxiang, Chinese State Sports Policy: Pre- and Post-Beijing 2008, The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 27,no.14-15 (2010):2380–2402. 
80   Guo Dajun, The history of the people's Republic of China (1949–2007), (Beijing: Beijing Normal University 
Press, 2011), 117–118. 
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5.3.1 Strategic Readjustment, Sino-Soviet Split and the Rise 
of Militarism 
In addition to this strategic adjustment of the economy, China’s national defences 
 
faced significant challenges from potential military threats in the early 1960s. One 
such threat arose from the Sino-India Border Conflict, which began with a dispute 
over the sovereignty of two main sectors along the border that were claimed by both 
China and India: the Western sector – Aksai Chin, and the Eastern sector – the Indian 
state of Arunachal Pradesh, based on the Mcmahon Line presented by the British at 
the 1913 Simla conference.
81
Despite repeated warnings from Beijing, India attempted 
 
in 1961 to establish a military presence in the disputed territories and expel the 
Chinese. The war began with skirmishes in the summer of 1962. Significant fighting 
occurred in October and November 1962 along the three widely separated fronts. In 
virtually every battle, the Chinese forces either outmaneuvered or overpowered the 
unprepared Indians. In less than six weeks of bloody fighting, the Chinese army 
completely drove Indian forces back behind Chinese claim lines.
82   
However, under 
 
Mao’s instruction, Chinese troops retreated to the north of the McMahon Line and 
 





Another incident was the Sino-Soviet split, which occurred in the early 1960s. In 
general, in the context of the Cold War, the PRC adopted the diplomatic policy ‘Lean 
to one side towards the socialist-communist camp’ and maintained a close relationship 
with the USSR during the Stalin era. However, Khrushchev, Stalin’s successor, sought 
to build his country’s strength according to his understanding and adopted new 
domestic and foreign policies, favouring in particular a peaceful coexistence with the 
USA. Mao was greatly dissatisfied with the Soviet Union’s foreign policy towards the 
 
 
81  Aksai Chin lies to the east of the Kashmir valley and covers an area of about 37,250 sq .km (14,380 sq. miles) – 
currently occupied by China. China calls the eastern sector South Tibet, covering an area of 83,743 sq. km 
(32,333 sq. miles), which is currently occupied by India. In addition, there are a few small chunks of territory in 
between these two sectors, which are largely irrelevant when compared to these two major distinct territories. 
82   James Barnard Calvin, The China-India Border War (1962). Quantico: Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College, 1984, 60–64. 
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USA, the leader of the Capitalist camp. More importantly, Khrushchev initiated a 
campaign of de-Stalinisation in February 1956, accusing Stalin of causing terror, 
deportations  and  executions  in  the  latter  years  of  his  reign.  Mao,  who  enjoyed 
supreme power in the CCP as Stalin had in the CPSU, was afraid that de-Stalinisation 
could threaten his power in the CCP. 
 
The Sino-Soviet friendship was damaged further by several incidents that happened in 
 
1958 and 1959.
83   
From 1960 onwards, the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations led to 
Moscow’s decision to withdraw its expertise and support from China.
84   
Furthermore, 
after the Sino-Indian Border conflict, the Soviet Union announced neutrality, yet also 
supported India.
85
Consequently, the early 1960s witnessed an increasingly strained 
Sino-Soviet relationship. At the Party’s ‘Seven Thousand Cadres Conference’ in 
January 1962, Liu Shaoqi, then the PRC Chairman and second in command in the 
CCP, pointed out that the Soviet Union had become revisionist and advocated that the 
CCP should learn the Soviet lesson.
86   
In 1964, as Khrushchev stepped down, Mao 




The Vietnam War (1955–1975), another Cold War military conflict, was fought 
between the North Vietnam Government led by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV), supported by its communist allies, and the South Vietnam Government led by 
the Republic of South Vietnam, supported by the USA and other anti-communist 
 
83   On 21 July 1958, Pavel Yudin, the Soviet ambassador, proposed to Mao that the Soviet Union and China build 
a joint submarine fleet. Mao rejected the proposal, saying that the USSR’s real objective was to control China’s 
coastline. After the GLF was launched by Mao in 1958, the CPSU criticised China’s action, sparking another 
wave of anti-Soviet sentiment throughout China. On 23 August 1958, the Communist Army in Fujian province 
shelled Jinmen Island, which was controlled by the Republic of China (Taiwan). USSR leaders were enraged by 
this military operation, because the PRC did not inform them beforehand. See Shen Zhihua, ed., The History of 
Sino-Soviet Relations, (Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 2011), 45 ; Shen Zhihua, Causes of the 
Crumbling of the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Its Consequence, Study on the History of the Communist Party of 
China, no.2 (2007), 29–31. 
84   On 16 July 1960, the USSR withdrew 1,390 Russian experts in China and cancelled 257 science projects 
and 343 contracts, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/4162/64165/67447/67995/4590633.html 
(accessed on 12 February 2014) 
85   Shen Zhihua, ed., The History of Sino-Soviet Relations, (Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 2011), 123. 
86  Zhang Suhua, Change: the Seven Thousand People's Congress (January 11, 1962 to February 7), (Beijing: 
China Youth Press, 2006, p: 56. 
87   In October 1964, the CPSU Central Committee revoked Khrushchev's leadership and Brezhnev assumed the 
role as the first Secretary. The CCP wanted to improve relations and sent Zhou Enlai to participate in the 
October revolution celebrations. However, the leaders of the CPSU claimed that there was ‘no slight difference’ 
with Khrushchev in terms of the policy towards China. See Shen Zhihua, ed., Op. cit.,135. 
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countries. The US government believed that South Vietnam played a significant role 
in American national security, which required a world of politically diverse nations, 
rather than a bloc of Communist countries united in a hostile ideology.  
88   
The USA 
became involved in the Vietnam War when they sent troops to support the South 
Vietnamese government against the North Vietnamese communists. Needless to say, 
the  CCP leaders regarded  the Vietnam  War as  an  offensive  by the USA against 
China.
89   
Thus, when senior North Vietnamese leaders requested Chinese military aid 
in April 1965, China did not hesitate to provide support for the DRV authority.
90   
The 
 
Vietnam War, in essence, was a war between two different political camps, or 
ideologies. Furthermore, in East Asia, the Eisenhower Administration had adopted a 
policy of encouraging and supporting the GMD ’s military assaults on the coastal 




Facing a growing military threat from India, the Soviet Union and the USA, the 
 
Central Committee of the CCP declared that it was necessary ‘To train all Chinese 
citizens to be soldiers (全民皆兵)’ to prepare for war. One of their major measures 
was to develop military organizations across the country. On September 29, 1959, 
Mao stated: ‘Imperialists bully us so much, and this needs to be taken seriously. Not 
only do we need to have a strong regular army, but we need to set up the people's 
militia. In this way, if imperialists invade China, we will make them unable to move a 
 
 
88   William J. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam: American Vietnam Policy, 1960-1963, Da Capo Press, 1985, x. 
89  When meeting with North Vietnam representatives in 1964, Mao remarked: “Best turn it into a bigger war… 
I’m afraid you really ought to send more troops…Don’t be afraid of US ‘intention, at most it’s no worse than 
having another Korean War. The Chinese army is prepared, and if America takes the risk of attacking North 
Vietnam, the Chinese army will respond immediately; our troops want a war now.’ 
90   To counter overwhelming US-led air strikes in North Vietnam in 1965, Ho Chi Minh, the President of Vietnam 
Labor Party, requested Chinese Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) units. In response, PLA units began flowing into 
North Vietnam, including the 67th AAA Division, with an estimated 25,000 to 45,000 Chinese combat troops in 
total. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam War, 1950-1975, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000),134. 
91  Numerous crises have occurred over the Taiwan Strait since 1949, when the Nationalist Party moved its 
government to Taiwan. Around the time of the armistice in Korea in the spring of 1953, GMD forces launched 
increasing air and naval attacks and harassment against the Mainland from offshore islands under their control, 
with US military assistance and support. The GMD’s actions were offensive in nature and constituted another 
front opened by the US outside the Korean Peninsula. Thus, after the July 1953 armistice in Korea, the PLA’s 
strategic centre of gravity gradually shifted to the southeast, where it had strengthened its deployment along the 
southeast coast. For more detailed information about the crises in the Taiwan Straits in the 1950s, see Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, State of the Union Address (2 February 1953), in American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 
1950-1953, ed.US State Department (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1957), 61–65; Bruce A. 
Elleman, Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of U.S. (Navy, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2014), 
75–89. 
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step in our county’.
92   
Over the following three months, 5,000 militia divisions were 
set up across the county, involving more than 220 million people, forming powerful 
Armed Forces.
93   
All people in China aged between 16 and 25 were called upon to 
join the militia. As well as organizing military training, the People's Armed Forces 
Department (ren min wu zhuang bu)
94   
began to be established at grass roots levels, 









The adverse impact of the GLF in sports was not officially admitted until the National 
Sports Conference held on December 5, 1961. Subsequently, the SPCSC changed its 
policy in 1961 to be consistent with the Party’s policy ‘Readjustment, Consolidation, 
Enrichment and Focusing on Increasing Quality’. 
 
In general, the SPCSC identified a policy of ‘active rest’ in sport.
95   
In mass sport, 
sports activities in cities were enormously reduced in scale and quantity, although 
some  less  costly  sports,  such  as  broadcast  calisthenics,  table  tennis  and  chess, 
survived in part.
96 
In 1961, most rural areas in China were severely affected by 




92   Bei Xiao, ‘Review on “Three Implementation” of Militia Work in the New Period under the Guidance of the 
Scientific Outlook on Development’, Chinese Militias, no.7( 2012): 6–7. 
93   Ibid., 6–7. 
94   Since 1951, the Department of People's Armed Forces has been established in most counties and municipal 
districts throughout China. In 1954, it was renamed as the Military Service Bureau and changed back to the 
Department of People's Armed Forces in 1958. This military department is set up in the administrative regions 
at the county, township and subdistrict levels and in other large organisations such as enterprises and schools. 
95   This can be seen from the minutes of the 1962 National Sport Conference. It stated that: ‘the present injuries 
rate must take a turn for the better, while the new injury rate during the training should contain at the lowest 
level’, and ‘athletes with serious injuries should receive full treatment, and those with light injuries may 
engage in appropriate training except for receiving treatment; athletes without injuries should receive normal 
training’. See The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), ‘Report of the Sports Work Meeting of 
the SPCSC in 1962’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC 
(1949-1981). Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1982, 396. 
96   For instance, in Shanghai, Taichi was widely practised in factories, enterprises and government institutes in 
1961; the Qiyi machinery factory, Shanghai, organised a Taichi workshop for 40 employees suffering from 
chronic diseases and achieved positive outcomes. Office of Shanghai Chronicles, ed., ‘Qiyi machinery factory 
organized workers to practice Taichi Chuan in 1961’, Worker Sports, 25. 
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In competitive sport, shrinking budgets led to the shrinkage of sports teams and the 
focus shifted to key sports. In 1961, the SPCSC required sports committees at all 
levels to trim non-essential sports teams.
99   
As a result, military sports teams at the 
provincial level ceased; national sports teams, including archery and horsemanship, 
were only retained in certain areas (e.g. speed skating teams were retained in just a 
few provinces in northeastern China), while all outstanding competitive sports teams 
at and below county level were disbanded.
100  
In 1962, the SPCSC adopted a policy of 
‘focusing on 10 key sports’, whereby 10 sports were selected from the previous 43 
 
competitive sports modelled on the Soviet model in ‘The Competitive Sports System 
of the PRC’ issued in 1956. They included athletics, gymnastics, swimming, football, 
basketball, volleyball, table tennis, shooting, weightlifting and speed skating. Sports 
teams suffered further reductions. Outstanding sports teams were only retained at or 




5.3.3 State Sports Policy and the System from 1963 to 1965 
As the national economy began to recover, China adjusted its sports policy. In 
December 1962, the national sports conference decreed that sports committees at all 
levels were required to actively carry out various mass sports activities. According to 
 
 
97  Between 1957 and 1960, heavy industry increased 2.3-fold, while agriculture fell by 22.8%. Grain production 
was minimal in the first half of 1960. The Central Committee of the CCP issued ‘The Directive on Reducing the 
Rations in Rural Areas and Cities’ on 7 September 1960. Except for those working at high temperature, high 
altitude, underground, or who were engaged in heavy manual labour, everyone else in the urban population had 
to reduce their ration standard by 2 kg per person per month. See the Literature Research Centre of the CCP 
Central Committee, ed., A Selection of Important Literatures Since the Founding of the PRC (Beijing: People's 
Publishing House, 1993), Volume 13, 565–570. In rural areas, the situation was so difficult that even the 
peasants' lives were hard to maintain. In 1960, the grain occupancy of the rural population in China had fallen to 
429 kg from 589 kg in 1957, with an average daily ration of less than 1 kg per person and only a few vehicles 
per person in the worst affected area. See Zhao Fasheng, (ed), Food Work in Contemporary China, Beijing: 
Chinese Social Science Publication, 1988, p: 108. 
98   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ed., ‘Work Summary of Mass Sports in 1961 and Work Plan 
of Mass Sport in 1962’,Op. cit., 54-58. 
99  The 10 key sports refer to track and field, gymnastics, swimming, football, volleyball, table tennis, shooting, 
weightlifting, and speed skating. 
100   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ed. ‘Work Plan of the SCSPE in 1961’ (19 March 1962), Op. 
cit., 54-58. 
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the practical needs of production, work and study, mass sports had to focus on schools, 












Under this policy, mass sports began to recover in urban areas. According to a survey 
conducted in 1963 involving 51 plants and enterprises in Tianjin, the number of 
employees who regularly took part in sport activities had increased from 15% in 1961 
to 30% on average and as much as 40% in some plants and enterprises.
102   
In some 
provinces where the economy recovered faster, such as in Shandong province, 
broadcast gymnastics and work-break exercises were resumed.
103   
In schools, physical 
education and sports activities were restored in 1963. First of all, physical education 
class was increased to twice a week. Sports activities were also actively promoted in 




Chinese state policy for mass sports was characterised as militarism during this period. 
As  noted  earlier,  in  recognition  of  the  escalating  military  threat  from  foreign 
aggression in the early 1960s, the Party slogan was ‘To train all Chinese citizens to be 
soldiers’  and  the  People's  Armed  Forces  Department  was  widely  established 
below the county level. Militarism and sports, two completely different institutions, as 
one exists to protect and serve a country while the other is solely for entertainment, 
were once again interwoven throughout China. At the national sports conference in 
1965, military sports were heavily promoted, to educate the people about national 
 
defence  and  military  techniques. 
104   




101   ‘Minutes of 1963 National Sport Work Conference’, op. cit., 85-93. 
102   Wu Shaozu, op. cit, p: 139. 
103   Wu Shaozu, op. cit, p: 139. 
104   ‘Minutes of 1963 National Sport Work Conference’ (1 January 1965), op. cit., 85-93. 
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combined with military training. Communes in the countryside were staffed by 
professional military sport instructors responsible for military training and sports. In 
urban  areas,  in  addition  to  the  re-establishment  of  the  Sports  Clubs  of  National 
Defence (guo fang ti yu ju le bu),
105   
a special section or department was added to the 
local and provincial sports commission; the ‘military sports section/department’. 
Budgets and instructors were provided for the development of military sports. As a 
result,   mass   sports   associated   with   military   training,   including   swimming, 
long-distance running, hang gliding, shooting, mountain climbing, martial arts, radio 
sports (wu xian dian), aeromodelling (hang mo), marine modelling (hai mo) and 
parachute jumping were widely practised throughout China. In 1964, four military 
sport activities (swimming, shooting, communications and climbing) rose to 
prominence because of their martial arts value. In 1965, the SPCSC, the PLA General 
Staff Headquarters and the CYLC Central Committee jointly issued the ‘Notification 
on Extensively Carrying out Mass Swimming Activities’, leading to nationwide 
military water training. In Shandong province for example, the number of people 







Sports combined with militarism is a phenomenon with rich historical antecedents. 
Ancient Greece used sports to enhance the fitness and physique of their citizens for 
war. In England, the introduction of gymnastics into elementary schools after the 
passing of the 1870 Education Act sought to increase students’ fitness, strengthen 
military power and  to  save money by reducing the Poor Rates  and the costs of 
crime.
107   
Sports participation fosters a sense of unity, identification, and social bonds. 
In the first half of the 1960s, facing increasing military threats and endangerment of 
national security mainly from India, South Vietnam, the USA and the Soviet Union, 
 
105   Sports clubs practising national defence increased from 174 in 1957 to 1,408 in 1960, and were widely 
established at above the county level. In line with the new state strategy, national defence sports clubs were 
heavily cut back and were only established in cities. 
106   Fu Yannong, General History of Chinese Sports. Fifth volume (1949-1979), (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 
2008),   232. 
107   James Riordan, The Political Role of Sport in Britain and the USSR. (Salford: The Centre for Leisure Studies, 
1980), 78. 
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China initiated a nationwide campaign to promote mass military training. Mass sports 
were widely integrated into military training activities and school physical education 
classes were turned into military training courses.
108   
As a result, under the Party 
slogan ‘To train all Chinese citizens to be soldiers’, state sports policy worked to 
encourage more people to participate in sports for its martial arts value, rather than to 
build their bodies and enhance solidarity and nationalist sentiment. 
 
 
Another   significant   characteristic   of   sports   policy   during   the   1960s   was 
 
‘De-Sovietisation’, which emerged out of the Sino-Soviet Split at the end of the 1950s. 
Researchers agree that the reasons for the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations are 
complex and multifaceted, including a conflict of national interests and ideological 
differences, as well as the Soviet Union’s ‘great nation chauvinism’ and the individual 
factors of the leaders on each side.
109   




In addition to the widely-acknowledged division between socialist powers, 
some peculiarities existed in regard to the Sino-Soviet relationship. In 
particular, leadership and ideological struggles between China and the Soviet 





The Sino-Soviet split led to the Kremlin’s order for the withdrawal of Soviet experts 
from China in 1960, after which time the Soviet model began to disappear.
111   
As a 




108   Fan Hong, Lu Zhouxiang. Sport, militarism and diplomacy: training bodies for China (1960–1966). The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no.1 (2012): 30–52. 
109   Zhu Ruizhen, ‘The Root of the Split between China and the Soviet Union’ in China Russia Relations History 
Research Association ed., ‘The Trend of Sino-Soviet Relations after the War’, (Beijing: Social Science 
Literature Press, 1997), 91–101.; Wang Zhenyu, ‘An Analysis of the Reasons for the Breakup of Sino-Soviet 
relations’, Anhui Historiography, no. 3 (2004):101-103    . 
110   Shen Zhihua, Causes of the Crumbling of the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Its Consequence, Research on the 
History of the Communist Party of China, no.2 (2007): 29–31. 
111   For more detailed information, see Shen Zhihua. Soviet Experts in China: 1948–1960, (Beijing: China 
International Press, 2003). 
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between the two socialist countries, each of which claimed that they built and 
cultivated ‘comradely and brotherly’ friendship. In sports fields, Lao Wei Zhi was a 
typical event that was infused with ‘de-Sovietisation’. Inspired by a strong Soviet 
ideology, Lao Wei Zhi was a dominant sports programme in China throughout the 
1950s  and  early  1960s.  De-Sovietisation  replaced  the  Lao  Wei  Zhi  with  Youth 
Physical Training Standards in 1964. However, de-Sovietisation failed to remove all 
Soviet influence in the field of Chinese sport, as expressed by an interviewee: 
 
The Sino-Soviet split led ideologically indeed to weakening the impact of 
the Soviet model on Chinese sports: a lot of Soviet experts were withdrawn; 
some Soviet training methods [in competitive sport] were replaced; the Lao 
Wei Zhi suffered stagnation, but the centralised governmental sport system 
set up under the influence of the Soviet model was not affected by this 












After implementing a short-term austerity policy, the SPCSC began to change its 
policy in competitive sports. Athletes and coaches were required to spend more time 
on training and new training methods were encouraged. State policy began to focus on 
standardisation of the elite sports system. 
 
 
  Selective and training system 
As Fan Hong has noted, China has one of the most effective systems worldwide for 
systematically selecting and producing sports stars from a very young age.
113  
This 
system,  based  on  the  Soviet  model  and  primarily  developed  in  the  1950s,  was 
officially  implemented  in  1963  when  the  SPCSC  issued  its  ‘Regulations  of 
 
112   Interviewer No. 5 (Professor in Chinese Sport History, South China Normal University) in discussion with the 
author, 8 July 2014. 
113   Fan Hong,‘Innocence Lost: Child Athletes in China’. Sport in Society 7, no3 (2004):338–354. 
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Outstanding Athletes and Teams’.
114   
This document aimed to improve the elite sports 
system  and  management  structure,  covering  competition,  education,  coaching, 
athletes, medical support, the organisational structure, management and leadership. 
 
 
At the 1964 National Sport Conference, to further improve selection and training 
systems, the SPCSC emphasised the importance of amateur sports training and stated: 
‘It is required to make full use of various forms of amateur training and run youth 
amateur sports schools, aiming to produce reserve forces for professional sports 
teams’.
115   
At the 1965 National Mass Sport Conference, the SPCSC re-emphasised 
that the “sport committee at all levels should concentrate on sports schools, to 
continually produce and send outstanding athletes to professional sports teams”.
116
 
Furthermore, the SPCSC required local sports authorities, particularly those in rich 
provinces, to establish key amateur sport schools, in which athletes could enrol in a 
half-day of study and a half-day of training. 
 
 
By 1965, a well-organised selection and training system for competitive sports took 
shape in China, characterised by three grades: grass-roots amateur sport schools, key 
sports schools, professional sports teams and national teams (see Figure 5.4). To 
encourage athletes to train harder and attain glory for the nation, the SPCSC issued its 
‘Inspection of the National Records and the Reward System’ in May 1963. This 
document proclaimed that athletes would be awarded medals and honours according 
to their performance and achievements.
117   
The SPCSC also issued an updated ‘Rules 
and Regulations of Classification of Athletes’ and ‘Rules and Regulations of 
Classification  of  Referees’  in  October  1965,  with  the  aim  of  normalising  the 






114   Fan Hong, Ping Wu & Huan Xiong. Beijing Ambitions: An Analysis of the Chinese Elite Sports System and 
its Olympic Strategy for the 2008 Olympic Games. The International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no.4 
(2005):510–529. 
115   ‘Minutes of 1964 National Sport Work Conference (1 January 1965)’,op. cit., 94. 
116   ‘Minutes of 1964 National Mass Sport Work Conference (3 June 1965)’, op. cit., 94. 
117   ‘Inspection of the National Records and the Reward System’, op. cit. 
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Austerity policies meant that sports competitions at grass roots level (factories and 
schools) were cancelled after the failure of the GLF and China’s involvement in 
international competitions shrank dramatically. 1961 and 1962 witnessed the smallest 
amount of China’s participation in international sport competitions since 1957 (see 
Table 5.1). Furthermore, world record-breaking achievements by Chinese athletes 




















118   Wu Shaozu, op. cit., 558. 
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Nevertheless, China did not ignore the role of competitive sports in producing athletes. 
Due to escalating military threats and after withdrawing from most international 
federations  because  of  the  ‘Two  Chinas  Issue’, 
120   
the  government  focus  turned 
strategically to domestic sports competitions. China issued its policy to ‘Train the 
soldiers [athletes] at home and compete against the foreign competitors’ (guo nei lian 
bing yi zhi dui wai).
121   
Meanwhile, the SPCSC required sport commissions at all 
levels to concentrate their resources on the Party’s definition of 10 key sports (track 
and  field,  gymnastics,  swimming,  football,  basketball,  volleyball,  table-tennis, 





119   
Wu Shaozu et al. (eds.), Sports History of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1999 , Op. cit.,551. 
120   In 1949, most of the Olympic committee members fled to Taiwan with the ROC government, and managed to 
maintain contact with the IOC, claiming jurisdiction over Olympic affairs both in the mainland and in Taiwan. 
In the Melbourne Olympic Games of 1956, both the PRC and Taiwan were invited to take part, since by that 
time both were recognised by the IOC. However, PRC quite the games in protest against Taiwan’s 
participation, and continued to demand the expulsion of Taiwan after the Games. Frustrated over the 
representation issue, in 1958 the PRC withdrew its membership from the IOC and nine other international 
sporting organizations in protest against ‘two Chinas’ policy of the IOC and international word. 
121   ‘Minutes of 1965 National Mass Sport Work Conference (January 1965)’, Op. cit., p.99 
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Political and ideological education was also emphasised, aiming to cultivate athletic 
fighters with communist consciousness, to encourage them to train harder and win 
glory for the country. As early as 10 October 1960, at Beijing’s national meeting on 
competitive  sport  training,  political  and  ideological  education  of  athletes  was 
proposed. After 1963, this stance was highlighted in state policy, mainly through 
several incidents initiated by the Party. In the early 1960s, the CCP’s Central 
Committee called upon the nation to learn from the spirit of hard work as exemplified 
by several socialist models, including Lei Fen and Wang Jinxi.
123   
On 24 January 
 
1964,  an  editorial  ‘Calling  on  the  Entire  Army  to  Learn  Guo  Xingfu  Training 
 
Method’ 
124   
was  published  in  the  Liberation  Army  Daily.  Subsequently,  on  20 
 
February, an editorial entitled ‘What Can we Lean from Guo Xingfu “Teaching 
Method?” ’was published in the People’s Daily, exhorting people to learn from the 
principles of military training. At the 1963 National Sport Conference, the SPCSC 
asked that ‘all athletes who are able to engage in normal training should conduct hard 
training and struggle to improve performance and win glory for our country!’.
125   
The 
SPCSC then issued a directive in March 1964, requiring all athletes to learn from the 
PLA and socialist models (e.g. Wang Jinxi and Lei Fen), particularly the PLA’s motto 





122   At the National Sport Work Conference in January 1965, China’s government decided to strive to achieve the 
plan issued in 1958 to develop 10 major projects within a ten-year period and thus improve the performance of 
other sports. See the ‘Minutes of 1965 National Mass Sport Work Conference (January 1965)’, Op. cit., 99. 
123   Wang Jinxi was born into a poor peasant family. In 1956, he was admitted to the Chinese Communist Party. 
When Mao and the Party Central Committee decided in February 1960 ‘to fight’ a massive battle to open up 
the Daqing oilfield in North China, Wang and his famous No. 1205 drilling team rushed to the bleak grasslands. 
Undeterred by bitter cold, fatigue, injuries and difficulties, Wang and his team kept working hard and 
successfully brought Daqing’s first production well into operation in 1960. Wang was honoured by his 
colleagues as the ‘Iron Man’. The government called upon the whole nation to learn from Wang’s spirit of 
working hard and made him a role model for workers, peasants and students. 
124   Guo Xingfu, a commander in a regiment of the Nanjing military region, not only developed but innovated the 
PLA's military traditional training methods, infusing them with hatred of the class and the enemy, 
concentrating hatred of the enemy at the tip of the knife. He trained the company to be ‘red and professional’ 
(i.e. to be both socialist-minded and professionally competent). On 3 January 1964, the PLA’s Military 
Committee issued instructions to call for the entire army to learn Guo Xingfu's teaching method. 
125   ‘Minutes of 1962 National Mass Sport Work Conference (March 1963)’, op. cit., 85–93. 
126   The principles of the PLA’s tradition were required learning in the sports sector. This is illustrated by an 
editorial published in the Sport Daily on June 11, 1964. It stated that: firstly, ‘three basic rules and one 
principle’, which referred to firstly a rule of developing an understanding of the complexity, strictness and the 
mentality required in preparing for real battle, incorporating principles of heavy and intensive training. The 
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China’s ambitions to surprise the world through the achievement of competitive sport 
were reignited. In 1964, the CCP Central Committee stated that the ‘performance of 
competitive sports should be quickly improved to earn greater victory for the country 
and strengthen national prestige’.
127 
At a national training work meeting held in 
December 1964, the SPCSC required sport commissions at all levels to fight against 
conservative ideology, dogmatism and arrogance in sports training and, for the first 
time, the SPCSC announced the training principle of ‘Train hard and diligently, and 
bear a heavy load’ [san cong yi da], which has served ever since as an important 




State sports policy, which characterised the normalisation of the competitive sports 
system and training of communist elites, quickly realised positive results. In 1963 
alone, 20 world records were broken, including 4 world championships; in 1964, 
competitive sport was further strengthened, paving the foundation for its second peak 





In short, after the failure of the GLF, the Chinese government changed its state sports 
policy in mass sports. In recognition of the escalating military threat from outside the 
country, the Party endorsed the strategy ‘To train all Chinese citizens to be soldiers’, 
which led to a marked domination of sports militarism in state policy. State policy for 
elite sports focused on using limited resources to develop a few sports and to produce 








second rule embodied the ‘Three fearless’, meaning a fearlessness of hardship, fatigue and difficulties. The third 
rule consisted of ‘Five commitments’, meaning a total commitment to political loyalty, to training of the body, 
understanding technique, and to be tough and hard. See the Editorial, ‘Embarks from strict, from Difficulty and 
from the actual Combat to Train, Sport Daily, 11 June 1964. 
127   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport, ed. ‘The CPC Central Committee Approved the request of 
the SPCSC to Hold the Second National Games’ (28 January 1964), Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1964), 
(Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1965), 120–121. 
128   Ibid.,148. 
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From 1952 to 1960, Chinese physical education and sport in the areas of sports policy, 
administration structure, training system, talent recruitment, athletic ranking system 
and the organisational forms of mass sport underwent a process of Sovietisation. The 
Soviet model helped to establish the SPCSC as a powerful, centralised, hierarchical 
government  organisation  that  in  1952  displaced  the  ACSF,  China’s  semi-official 
sports organisation.  In  essence, the highly centralised sports administrative system 
was a feature of China’s political system and the Party-state system, which adopted 
Sovietisation for China’s use in terms of historical origin and internal mechanisms, 




In 1952, China was both influenced by the Soviet Union, which regarded sporting 
success as a measure of national vitality and prestige, and by the idea that in the sports 
arena could compete with the USA. Thus, the government decided to develop 
competitive sports, resulting in a ‘two legs walking system’ from 1952 to 1966: elite 
and mass sports were developed simultaneously. In competitive sports, China set up a 
well-structured sports system modelled on the Soviet Union’s system, to meet China’s 
political and diplomatic demands. China also incorporated Soviet philosophy into 
mass sports. The Soviet Union’s LDS was promoted nationwide, serving as an 




After the failure of the GLF, the CCP changed its policy to ‘readjustment, 
consolidation, filling out and raising standards’. Sports policy was adjusted, becoming 
consistent with the Party’s line. In 1961 and 1962, China witnessed a sports policy 
featuring ‘active rest’, which significantly reduced the development of sports in terms 
of scale and quantity. As the national economy began to recover, China adjusted its 
state sports policy in 1963. In competitive sports, policy focused on using limited 
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resources to provide special and intensive training for potential athletes in a particular 
sport, to enable them to compete on the international stage;
129   
this eventually resulted 
in the standardisation of elite sports systems. In mass sports, China’s state policy 
prioritised sports in schools and factories and plants in urban areas, then extended the 
sports to rural areas. Facing military threats and the endangerment of national security 
from India, South Vietnam, the USA and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, state 
sports policy encouraged people to participate in military sport activities to build 
strong bodies and enhance solidarity and nationalism for the country’s defence. The 
Sino-Soviet split weakened the ideological impact of the Soviet model in Chinese 
sports, but the centralised government’s sports system and especially its competitive 




The concept of cultural hegemony  and  perspective  of  legitimacy  assist  with  the 
understanding of the relationship between ideology and sports, as well as the 
relationship between sports and party. During this critical phase of the Cold War, the 
ideological conflict between capitalist and socialist camps was reflected in the field of 
sports. The Sovietisation of sports indicated that the CCP dominated sport as the 
ruling  class  and  its  controlling  and  prevailing  ideology  formed  part  of  the 
government’s superstructure. During the GLF, Chinese state policy was largely driven 
by the party’s radical ideology, which aimed to convince Chinese people and 
demonstrate to the world the advantages of socialism over capitalism. This ideology 
meant that the CCP secured greater support of the masses to maintain the Party’s 
dominating  position  and  gain  political  legitimacy.  This  ideology  influenced  state 
sports policy during the GLF and encouraged championships and the spirit of sporting 
heroes in competitive sport. Participation in sports was heavily emphasised, to not 
only encourage a spirit of cohesiveness amongst the masses, but also to demonstrate 
to the world how happy, healthy and strong China had become under socialism. The 
 
 
129   Fan Wei, Fan Hong & Lu Zhouxiang, ‘Chinese State Sports Policy: Pre- and Post-Beijing 2008’. The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 27,no14-15(2010):2380–2402. 
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GLF eventually had an adverse effect on sports participants, athletes and physical 
education systems in schools. Nevertheless, the Sovietisation of Chinese sports and 
the GLF laid the foundation for the policy and systems of Chinese physical education 
and sports that remain in place today. 
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It is argued that political ideology is driven by the need for all political forces to 
legitimise their strategies and programmes; they create an appropriate intellectual 
narrative that serves as a logic to justify their dominance in certain key areas of a 
society’s   political   life,   and   in   the   economy   of   power   distribution. 
1 
Chinese 
Communists  have  always  stressed  the  importance  of  ideological  dominance  as  a 
means of ensuring the Party’s control of society.
2   
In 1966, Mao launched his final 
revolutionary drama, ‘the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’, marking the start of 
one of the greatest political and social upheavals of modern history.
3   
The purpose of 
the Cultural Revolution was to prevent the restoration of capitalism and re-establish 
the purity of Communism threatened by so-called revisionists and capitalists over the 
previous 17 years. 
 
 
The subsequent 10 years of civil strife (officially dated as the period from May 1966 
to October 1976) witnessed the most serious setbacks and losses for the Party and the 
state since the founding of the PRC.
4   
However, as Fan Hong has argued, the Cultural 
Revolution was ‘not all bad’ for the development of sport.
5   




1   Kerry Brown, ‘The Communist Party of China and Ideology’, China: An International Journal 10, no.2 (2012): 
52-68. 
2   Hsi-en Chen and Sin-ming, ‘Thought Reform in Communist China’, Far Eastern Survey 24, no. 12 (1955): 
177–184. 
3   The official Chinese Party verdict on Mao and the Culture Revolution is set forth in the ‘Resolution on Certain 
Questions in the History Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China’, Sixth Plenary 
Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 27 June 1981, Beijing Review, 6 July, 
1981: 10–39. 
4   The Central Committee of the CCP, The Resolution of Several CPC's Historical Issues since the Founding of 
PRC (27–29 June 1981) at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1981. 
5   Fan Hong, Not all bad! communism, society and sport in the great proletarian cultural revolution: a revisionist 
perspective, The International Journal of the History of Sport 16, no.3 (1999): 47-71 
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turning point for the development of sport, when the SCSPE, namely the Sports 
Ministry, was re-established and ‘Ping-pong diplomacy’
6   
facilitated a new era of 
Sino-American relations. 
The themes of this chapter are divided into two sections. The first discusses the 
relationship between the dominance of anti-elitist ideology and the breakdown of the 
national elite sports system in the first stage of the Cultural Revolution from the 
perspective of Gramsci’s cultural hegemony, and offers an analysis of the ideological 
roots underlying radical mass sports in China. The second section focuses on how 
sports policies and systems adjusted to changing ideology during the second stage of 




6.2 State Sports Policies and Systems from 1966 to 1970 
 
6.2.1 Anti-Elitism, Culture Hegemony and the Breakdown of 
 
Elite Sports Systems 
 
According to the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
 
China concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ issued in August 1966, 
 
‘the unfolding of the great proletarian cultural revolution touches people to their very 
souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our 
country, a deeper and more extensive stage’.
7   
Convinced that revisionists in the party 
had changed the original meaning of Maoism and communist ideology of the CCP, 
Mao regarded his leadership as representing the name of the proletarian revolution 
and the fight against bureaucratic structures and elitists. As a result, most of the senior 
party members and leaders at every level were labelled as followers of ‘elitists and 
bureaucrats’, who had lost touch with the masses. Mao and his followers launched the 
Cultural Revolution with the intention of re-establishing the ideological purity of 
 
Communism  under  threat  from  the  revisionists  and  capitalists.  By  recreating 
 
 
6   
For detailed information about Ping-pong diplomacy, see Section 6.3 of this chapter. 
7   The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China (CCCPC) concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ (Beijing: People’s Publishing 
House, 1966), 1. 
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8   
they aimed to transform, revitalise and re-claim the leadership 
of Maoist and proletarian ideology throughout culture, education, literature, media, 
drama, film and sports. 
 
 
Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony makes it possible to re-examine the deeper 
origins of the ideological struggle-cultural leadership. According to Gramsci, political 
power is exercised not through force, but through a dominant worldview, or ideology, 
expect where hegemony breaks down. Gramsci and Mao both contend that the 
survivability of a regime in modern conditions does not simply depend on its military 
and economic power, but also on legitimacy and, in particular, whether the cultural 
leadership or ‘soft power’ (i.e. when people follow those in power without being 
forced to do so) is embedded in people’s hearts. Mao and Gramsci believe that 
superstructure is not always determined by economic ideology. This raises two points 
of apparent contradiction: firstly, under the capitalist system, the proletariat can 
surrender to bourgeois ideology as a ‘social consensus’, which helps the ‘bourgeoisie 
to rule itself’; secondly, under the conditions of socialism, where socialist 
transformation has taken place as a result of economic ideology, the superstructure 
can  be  bourgeois,  but  never  in  a  complete  and  automatic  sense,  because  of  the 
socialist transformation of the means of production.
9   
In other words, under socialist 
 
conditions, the proletariat can help bourgeois society to rule itself ‘culturally’ after 
losing its economic status and foundation, and even let the bourgeoisie destroy the 
ideological legality of the socialist system. According to Gramsci, a shake-up of 
cultural legitimacy happens before or after the separation of the capitalist system and 
the workers’ interest. In this regard, Mao’s thoughts and actions are consistent with 
Gramsci’s views. Thus, the crisis of ‘cultural and ideological legitimacy’ will be a 
sufficient condition for the proletarian – economic crisis is unnecessary. This can be 
seen from Mao’s speech in 1964, in which he claimed: 
 
 
8   Guo Dajun. et al., The History of the People’s Republic of China 1949–93 (Beijing: Beijing Normal University 
Press, 1995), 187, 205–6. 
9   Han Yuhai, ‘The Long Revolution: Mao Zedong and Cultural Leadership’. Theory and Criticism of Literature 
and Art 26, no.1 (2008): 9–21. 
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The  possible  failure  of  socialism  does  not  lie  in  that  its  economic 
foundation has been shaken first, but the loss of cultural legitimacy 





Although both Mao and Gramsci emphasise the importance of culture and ideology in 
any  superstructure, they  differ  in  their  viewpoints  concerning  cultural  revolution. 
Gramsci lived in a capitalist country under a fascist dictatorship. His political goal 
was to gradually disintegrate power held by the bourgeois state, through the process 
of ‘molecular invasion’. Gramsci emphasised the concessions of the proletariat in the 
alliance and highlighted the proletariat's cultural superiority over other classes, and he 
hoped  to  reach  an  ‘alliance'  through  coordination  and  consultation  rather  than 
violence.
11   
He therefore defined hegemony as the process by which the dominant 
 
classes or factions, through their privileged access to social institutions (such as the 
media), propagate values that reinforce their control over politics and the economy. 
His theory of hegemony contends that different classes of people can stand side by 
side in one society and that any sustained and effective political power must be 
grounded in a certain degree of consent and support from its subordinated groups.
12
 
In contrast, Mao’s revolutionary hegemony emphasises insurrection and violence as 
 
the means whereby one class overthrows another. 
 
 
Ideological purity during the Cultural Revolution was achieved not only through 
pervasive public dissemination of Maoist ideology, but also through criticism and 
destruction, as well as revolutionary action. The early part of the Cultural Revolution 
witnessed chaotic, violent political upheaval and ferocious ideological debate. Shortly 
after the resolution announcing the Cultural Revolution was passed at the Eleventh 
Plenary Session of the CCP 8
th 
Central Committee on 8 August 1966, large numbers 
 
10   Mao Zedong, Talk on Reading the Textbook of Political Economics in Soviet Union, Mao Zedong, Selected 
Works of Mao Zedong, volume 8 (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1999), 132. 
11  Perry Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, (London: Verso Books, 2017), 15-16. 
12   Han Yuhai, op.cit., 9–21 
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of young people in urban areas were mobilised to rebel against revisionism within the 
CCP. Schools were closed and students were encouraged to join Red Guard units, 
which denounced and persecuted teachers and intellectuals, engaged in widespread 
book burnings, enforced mass relocations, and upheld Mao’s cult of personality. The 
political campaign triggered widespread unrest. In January 1967, the Cultural 
Revolution entered a new stage of violence, overthrowing all those in positions of 







The turbulence of the Cultural Revolution soon extended into the field of sport. Mao 
believed that the SCSPE had broken away from the Party’s leadership and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, to become an ‘independent kingdom’.
14   
On 12 May 
1968,  under  Mao’s  instruction,  the  Cultural  Revolutionary  Communist  Centre 
 
Committee with the State Council and the Central Military Commission issued a 
Military Order (later called the ‘5.12 instruction’) to disband the SCSPE and sports 
commissions at all provincial and county levels. It stated: 
 
 
The SCSPE has been a black headquarter for capitalists and revisionists for 
 
18 years. A few powerful people, including He Long and Rong Gaotang, 
took the capitalist road and controlled it. They neglected people’s interests 
and their health. They concentrated only on small elite and on medals. They 
rejected Chairman Mao’s revolutionary guidance, and built up their own 
black empire. The work of the SCSPE in the past mainly served the purpose 
of the restoration of capitalism. The old sport administration and training 






13  Philip Bridgham, ‘Mao’s Cultural Revolution in 1967: The struggle to Seize Power’. The China Quarterly 
(Cambridge University Press), no. 34 (Apr-Jun 1968): 6–37. 
14   Wu Shaozu. et al., eds., Sport History of People's Republic of China 1949-1998 (Beijing: China Book 
Publishing House 
1999), 172. 
15   The Central Committee of the CCP, the State Council, the Central Military Commission and the Central 
Committee of Cultural Revolution, The Central Committee of Cultural Revolution jointly issued an order for 
the military takeover of the State Sports System (referred to as the ‘5.12’order), People’s Daily, 12 May 1966. 
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Wei  Jizhong,  former  Director  of  the  International  Affairs  Office  in  the  Sports 
Ministry, recalls: ‘In 1966, a campaign against “capitalists” and “revisionists” was 
launched within the SCSPE, and all leaders, regardless of rank, were denounced. The 
rebels persecuted those officials, and labelled them enemies of the people.’
16   
More 
than 1,000 employees of the SCSPE were sent to a ‘May 7’ Cadre School
17   
in Shanxi 
 






After the turbulent ‘Red Storm’ in March 1967, Mao ordered the Army to take over 
ministries and state commissions, including the SCSPE, to maintain control of 
society.
19   
Sports committees at all levels were taken over by the army, which sent 
many officials to the ‘May 7’ Cadre School for re-education. In Shanghai alone, 306 
personnel in over 1,800 sports personnel were persecuted and dismissed, while 702 
were sent away for ‘re-education’.
20   
As a result, the governing bodies of sport at all 
levels throughout the country were destroyed. 
 
 
The confrontation in the field of sports essentially concerned the relationship between 
elite  and  mass  sports. 
21    
The  cultural  revolutionists  regarded   elite  sports  as 
representing elitism that only served the bourgeoisie, while mass sports were for the 
proletariat, the masses. Since the Cultural Revolution aimed to eliminate bourgeois 
ideology and revisionism, anti-elitist ideology targeted the leaders in the field of sport 
and people in authority. 
 
 
This rejection of elitism and revisionism fuelled the launch of a nationwide campaign 
denouncing sports trophies. By 1967, the administrative system in competitive sports 
 
 
16   Wei Jizhong, My Sports Career (1958–2008), (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2008), 41. 
17  ‘May 7’ cadre schools were established during the Cultural Revolution in accordance with Mao’s 7 May 
instruction, which included a letter to Lin Biao, designed to force the party’s cadres and educated people into 
re-education and peasant labour. 
18   Wu Shaozu, op. cit., 172. 
19  By September 1969, revolutionary committees were established in 29 provinces, municipalities and 
autonomous regions; 21 of them (72%) were headed by ex-Army personnel. In addition to the SCSPE, 17 
national ministries and commissions were transferred to Army control. 
20   Fu Yannong, The Sports History of PRC, 301. 
21   Fan Hong, ‘Not all Bad! Communism, Society and Sport in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: a 
Revisionist Perspective’. The International Journal of the History of Sport 16, no.3(1999): 47–71. 
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was almost completely dysfunctional, the entire training and competition system had 
collapsed, and almost all professional sports teams at all levels were dismissed. Any 
surviving sports teams had to suspend normal training sessions.
22  
For instance, 47 
provincial football teams were  disbanded  and  1,124 outstanding players and 115 
full-time coaches had to leave the field.
23 
Nian Weisi, a member of the Chinese 
national football team at this time, recalls: 
 
 
Since  the  founding  of  the  PRC,  although  from  time  to  time,  various 
political  campaigns  were  carried  out,  the  influence  this  time  (i.e.  the 
Cultural Revolution) was different from before in terms of intensity and 
extent. The previous political campaigns like ‘the struggle against three 
evils and five evils (San fan wufan)’, or ‘the struggle against rightists’ (Fan 
you pai dou zheng) were all under the leadership of the party (CCP) and 
completed within a few months, but this campaign was extremely serious 
and  there were  not  any signs  of coming to  an  end  at  all.  In  addition, 
previous campaigns did not affect normal work, however, this campaign 
had  gradually  escalated  from  ‘engaging  in  revolution  by  suspending 
classes’, ‘making revolution by connecting each other’, to totally stopping 
work and production. In the field of sports, large number of sports teams 
stopped training. [. . .] As the campaign progressed, training sessions were 
totally abolished, and those who continued to work hard on the training 
field were denounced as ‘bai zhuan lu xian’ [being less concerned about 
politics and only focused on academic research]. In this context, working 
hard was a kind of political and social failure, so who would be willing to 










22   Wu Shaozu, op. cit., 175. 
23   Wu Shaozu, op. cit., 175. 
24   Nian Weisi, Gratification and Pathetique – This is My Football Career. (Beijing: Beijing Sport University 
Press, 1995), 120–122. 
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‘Anti-revisionism’ also played a role in paralysing the system of elite sports. Under 
this principle, some outstanding coaches and athletes, particularly any athletes who 
had experienced time living overseas, were labelled as ‘royalists’, ‘black elite’ and 
‘counter-revolutionists’, or even denounced as spies and persecuted. Xu Yingsheng, a 
world table tennis champion, recalls: ‘At the time, in the eyes of rebels, athletes were 
regarded as ‘capitalists’ while international champions were called representative of 
revisionists, and those people who continued to focus on training were criticised for 
not  paying  enough  attention  to  political  campaigns.  They  were  denounced  as 
boycotting the Cultural Revolution’.
25   
The national table tennis team had acquired 
 
the most international championship and glory, so became the main target of attack. 
Many  athletes  and  coaches  suffered  severe  persecution  and  died.  Three  famous 
world-class table tennis players, known as the ‘Pingpong sanjie’ (Pingpong Three 




The sports competition system almost vanished entirely. National and international 
competitions  were  completely  cancelled  from  1967  through  1969.
26   
Competitive 
sports went into sharp decline. As Nian Weisi states, ‘after engaging in the campaign 
for 5 years, football athletes lost their skills and gained body weight due to the lack of 
training. When the team returned to training in 1970, the average age was 28 years 
and the team had lost most of their skills. When I was reorganising the national 
football teams, I truly felt that it would be extremely difficult to make a recovery, let 














Xu Yinsheng, I and Table Tennis (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1995), 152. 
26   Wu Shaozu, op. cit., 175. 
27   Nian Weisi, Gratification and Pathetique – This is My Football Career (Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 
1995), 127. 
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6.2.2 The Cult of Mao and Radical Ideology of Mass Sports 
Soon after the launch of the Cultural Revolution, mass sports activities in factories 
and plants came to a standstill. In January 1967, as the Cultural Revolution began to 
seize power, a campaign of armed struggle was launched between factions holding 
different  views. 
28   
The  entire  country  plunged  into  chaos,  while  GDP  growth 
plummeted (see Table 6.1). 
 
 
Table 6.1. Status of the National Economy (1966-1968). Units in billions (RMB) 
 
Yearly Total Output Compared with National Revenue Compared with 
 




















Due to political disorder and the falling economy, mass sports declined in general. 
School students were ordered to suspend their schooling and conduct rebel campaigns 
against capitalists in power within the CCP, which plunged the schools into chaos. In 
May 1966, teaching activities in schools ceased completely. By the end of 1966, 
administrative leadership in the government was almost paralysed. Many school 
leaders and teachers were denounced by students and forced to undergo corporal 
punishment, while nearly all primary and secondary schools were closed nationwide. 
 
Maoist leaders placed a high value on political work and on China’s ideological 
superstructure. This emphasis on ideological reform took many forms: the 
memorisation of Mao’s writings and events associated with Mao, the reorganisation 
of China’s artists into propagandists for Maoism, and the promotion of the mass 
 
 
28  Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 15: The People's Republic, 
Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1987, 
169. 
175 
Chapter 6: State Sports Policies and Systems during the Great 




sports  movement  (Richard  Curt  Kraus,  1989). 
29   
Karl  Marx,  the  creator  of  the 
ideology on which Chinese communism is based, opposed the cult of the individual.
30
 
However, Mao’s era was marked by the cult of personality, which peaked during the 
Cultural Revolution. Large-scale mass sports programmes were regularly organised 
throughout the country to meet political and military needs. On 16 July 1966, Mao 
swam  across  the  Yangtze  River  in  Wuhan,
31   
inspiring  the  masses  to  carry  out 
large-scale swimming activities. Thereafter, 16 July was designated as an official 
anniversary of Mao’s feat. In Shandong province, the Towns and Cities Revolutionary 
Committees  at  the  town  and  city  levels 
32   
widely  responded  to  Mao’s  call  for 
organising unprecedented large-scale mass swim programmes. In Harbin, on 16 July 
1968, hundreds of thousands of people attended a swimming programme to celebrate 
the second anniversary of Mao's swim across the Yangtze River. In order to 
demonstrate their loyalty to Mao, some of the swimmers held up his portraits and the 




























29   Richard Curt Kraus, Pianos and Politics in China: Middle-Class Ambitions and the Struggle over Western 
Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 152–3. 
30   Karl Marx, Marx To Wilhelm Blos In Hamburg. Der wahre Jacob, 1908, 288. 
31   Mao’s first swim across the Yangtze River in Wuhan was on 31 May 1956. His last swim there was on 16 July 
1966. During this period of time, Mao reportedly swam across the Yangtze a total of 17 times. 
32   The term "revolutionary committee" originated in the Soviet Union, where it referred to a power structure that 
combined the military and the state. China’s revolutionary committees formed following power seizures by 
rebel and Red Guard factions that led to nationwide administrative paralysis. By September 1968, committees 
had been set up in all provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions across the country. 
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Figure 6.1. People swimming across the Songhua River in Harbin, Heilongjiang 
province, on 16 July 1968, in celebration of the second anniversary marking Mao’s 
swim in 1966 across the Yangtze River. Some of the swimmers held aloft his portrait 





The cult of Mao in mass sports is illustrated by the use of his instructions about 
calisthenics, which became a famous quotation throughout the Mao era. His words 
originated from a military arts troupe and were later introduced into the Beijing 
University of Sports (then called Beijing Workers, Peasants and Soldiers College of 
Sports), where the gymnastics were improved by professional coaches and then 
launched nationwide. Chi Zhenguo, then a junior student of Beijing University of 
Sports in 1967, recalled: 
 
 
Soon after Mao’s calisthenics quotation appeared, it was introduced into 
Beijing Sport University (BSU). In order to reach the political goal, the 
university immediately organised calisthenics teachers and students to 
revise, supplement and demonstrate it. After hundreds of thousands of 
handouts were ready, mobilisation meetings were held. Publicising Mao’s 
quotation about gymnastics was treated as an important political mission. 
Staff and students made public resolutions to accomplish this political task 
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and  then  advance  to  rural  areas,  communes,  and  factories  to  teach 





Chi Zhenguo recollects that the calisthenics set included 6 sections, each of which 
was composed of simple dance movements. The calisthenics movement was mixed 
with political slogans and Mao’s quotations: the first section of the movement stated 
that ‘the CCP is the core leading force for our cause; Marxism-Leninism functions as 
the rationale in directing our thoughts and the movement’. This movement only 
involved upper limb exercises, including raising both arms, chest forwards, head up, 
showing extreme faith and respect for the CCP and Marxism-Leninism. The second 
section was a chest-expanding exercise, which was accompanied by the text ‘we 
should  trust  masses  and  the  Party  (CCP)’;  the  third  section  was  whole-body 
movement representing labour, such as swinging a hammer or cutting wheat, 
emphasising ‘paying attention to revolution, promoting production and preparing for 
war and famine’. The fourth section comprised turning body movements, symbolising 
that ‘we support all that our enemy is opposed to’; the fifth section emphasised that 
‘rebelling is reasonable’, accompanied by a kicking movement, while the sixth section 
demonstrated that ‘nobody can compete with the integration of the army and citizenry 
as a whole’.
34   
Everyone was expected to put effort into these exercises. If they failed 





6.3 State Sports Policies and Systems from 1971 to 1976 
 








33  Chi Zhenguo, ‘An Anecdote of the Cultural Revolution – Chairman Mao's Quotation Calisthenics’. The Journal 
of Sports Culture Guide, no.8 (2003): 64. 
34   Ibid., 64. 
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under anti-elitism, anti-revisionism and Maoism ideology, fuelled by revolutionary 
zeal and violent class struggles. This situation changed in 1971, due to the urgent need 
to improve Sino-American relations. Several events that occurred in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s encouraged Beijing to reconsider its diplomatic relationships with the 
Soviet Union and USA. The clash with Soviet troops on Zhenbao Island (Damansky) 
in the Ussuri River in March 1969 aroused concern in Beijing that Moscow would 
escalate what had hitherto been a series of minor confrontations.
35   
A series of clashes 
 
on the northwestern frontier, particularly in Xinjiang, occurred in August. Rumours 
began to emanate from Eastern European sources that the Russians were sounding out 
their allies about a ‘surgical strike’ against Chinese nuclear weapons installations.
36
 
Sino-Soviet border clashes increasingly made China aware that the Soviet Union, 
 
rather than the USA, was its major threat. Chinese communists pondered how to 
maintain national security in the face of these events. 
 
 
Beijing   implemented   a   new   diplomatic   policy  seeking   closer   relations   with 
Washington as a counterweight to Moscow, although it was not easy to overcome the 
long-held distrust between China and the USA. The government faced substantial 
hurdles   in   overcoming   factional   opposition   to   dealing   with   Washington. 
37
 
Sino-American relations had remained at a stalemate since the 1950s, especially as 
 
the USA became more committed to the Vietnam War. Mao finally opted for the 
policy of rapprochement after Zhou Enlai assembled a high-level group of 
revolutionary heroes to study the issue and they declared themselves in favour of 
improving relations with the USA.
38   
On 25 December 1970, a photo of Mao and 






35   Roderick MacFarquhar, The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
263. 
36   Ibid., 263. 
37   Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 237. 
38   Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, ‘All Under Heaven Is Great Chaos’: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, 
and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–1969”, Cold War International History Project 
Bulletin (Winter 1998): 155–175. 
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Rostrum  was  published  on  the  front  page  of  the  People’s  Daily,
39   
conveying  a 
message that China was willing to improve relations with the USA. 
 
 
For America’s part, while President Nixon was known for his strident, anticommunist 
rhetoric, he became obsessed during this time with the possibility of forging better 
relations with Beijing.
40   
However, he had to consider the fact that in the mid-1960s, 
~90%  of  Americans  viewed  China  negatively  and  ~70%  regarded  China  as  the 
 
greatest threat to world peace.
41 
Nixon’s administration implemented its political 
intention  through  ingenious  means.  At  the  end  of  1969,  Henry  Kissinger,  then 
National Security Adviser to the Nixon administration, asked Walt Stoessel, then the 
US ambassador to Poland, to convey a message to make contact with the Chinese 
ambassador in Warsaw.
42   
Nixon also attempted to deliver some information to Mao 
through  Pakistan’s  President  Yahya  Khan  and  the  Romanian  leader  Nicolae 





‘Ping-Pong Diplomacy’ and ‘Friendship First, Competition Second’ 
The 31
st 
World Table Tennis Championships in 1971 provided the leaders of China 
and the USA with a good opportunity to open up dialogue. Although the PRC had 
withdrawn from almost all international sports federation memberships, in response to 
the ‘Two China Issue’ and the PRC had refused to be involved in any international 
sports events that recognised two Chinas, Beijing maintained its membership in the 
World Table Tennis Federation. The Cultural Revolution meant that the PRC missed 
 
 
39   On 1 October 1970, the 21st anniversary celebration of the founding of the PRC was held in Tian'anmen Square. 
At the invitation of Zhou Enlai, Edgar Snow attended the National Day ceremony. Returning to his residence, 
Mao explained to his surrounding staff why Snow was given such a high courtesy: ‘The drinker’s heart is not in 
the cup. I put a balloon first and touched the nerves of the United States’. Wu Xujun, ‘Mao Zedong's five step 
chess: opening the door of Sino-US relations’. See Lin Kexu Tao, Wu Xujun, The Truth of History, 
(Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishing House, 1998, 1st Edition, 231). In order to attract attention from the 
United States, the People’s Daily ran a front-page story on Christmas Day 1970 accompanied by a photograph 
of Chairman Mao Tsetung and American journalist Edgar Snow standing side by side atop the Tian'anmen 
rostrum; at the top of the page, the Mao quote for the day was: ‘All the peoples of the world, including the 
American people, are our friends’. 
40   Xu Guoqxi, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895–2008, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008), 119. 
41   Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945–1996 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 237. 
42   Ibid., 237. 
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World Table Tennis championship was scheduled for March 1971 in Japan. 
To promote this event and ensure that it was truly a world class competition, Japan 
invited China, who formerly dominated this event worldwide. The PLA officers in the 
SCSPE   did   not   dare   to   accept,   fearing   that   ‘Western foes’   might   sabotage 
the Chinese team’s performance. Zhou Enlai was aware that China should make an 
appearance during this championship as part of China’s return to the international 
community.
43   
He therefore petitioned Mao in writing, asking for instructions: ‘This 
competition has become a serious international struggle, so we should go to Japan to 
participate in the tournament; we propose ‘Friendship First, Competition Second’, 
even if we lose, it does not matter’.
44   
Mao responded accordingly: ‘Our team should 





During the championship, the American and Chinese players became friends.
46   
When 
the  Americans  knew  that  the  Chinese  delegation  had  invited  Britain,  Australia, 
Canada, Colombia and Nigeria to visit China after the championship, the Chairman of 
the American Table Tennis Association expressed his team’s desire to visit China as 
well. The gesture was overt and clear. When the Chinese delegates asked Mao for 
 
 
43  Zhou firstly accepted a visit of Koji Goto in early 1971 and then granted an article published in the People’s 
Daily on 2 February 1971, claiming that Beijing expected to take part in the 31st World Table Tennis 
Championship. He then arranged a meeting with relevant persons, including high-ranking officials of the 
SCSPE, coaches and athletes of the table tennis team, to explain why new China should take part in this 
competition. See details in Xu GuoQi, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports,1895–2008 (Harvard University 
Press, 2008), 172. 
44   Feng Xianzhi, Jin Chong, ed., Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), (Part II) (Beijing: Central Literature 
Publishing House, 2004), 128. 
45  For Mao Zedong's manuscript of instruction for Zhou Enlai's report on the Chinese table tennis delegation's 
participation in the 31st World Table Tennis Championships, see Feng Xianzhi, Jin Chong, ed., Biography of 
Mao Zedong (1949–1976), (Part II). (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House, 2004), 128. 
46   In a TV programme, Zhuang Zedong recalled that: “On the bus trip to the competition venue, an American table 
tennis player got on the Chinese team bus. The trip took 15 minutes, but nobody dared to contact him because 
we all grew up with the slogan 'Down with the American imperialism!' And, particularly, the string of class 
struggle was tightened unprecedentedly during the Cultural Revolution. Zhuang hesitated for 10 minutes, but he 
suddenly  recalled  the  instruction  “friendship  first  and  competition  second”  by  Premier  Zhou  before  our 
departure. He believed that the American player was just an athlete and not a policy maker, so we should show 
Chinese friendship to him. Finally, Zhuang came up from his back seat to greet him through an interpreter and 
presented him with a silkscreen portrait of Huangshan Mountains. After this incident was reported to Mao, he 
was aware that this might be an opportunity to build a relationship with America, so decided to invite America’s 
ping pong team to visit Beijing. See Zhuang Zedong, interview by Dong Lu in the Programme ‘'Zhuang 
Zedong’s Whimsical Ping-Pong Affection’, BTV, China, 26 August 2011. 
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instruction, he decided to extend the invitation to the American team. Nixon was 
surprised, saying: ‘I never expected that the initiative toward China would be realized 
by means of a table tennis team’s visit.’
47   
He immediately approved acceptance of 
the invitation. In return, the Americans invited the Chinese team to the USA in 1972. 
The exchange of visits between the Chinese and American ping-pong teams not only 
coined the term ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’, but led to Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 
1972 and a thaw in US-China relations.
48   
Sport played a significant role in bringing 
 




In 1971, China secured more than just ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’. The United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 on 25 October 1971, recognising the 
PRC as being the only lawful representative of China and thus ending the ‘Two China’ 
issue. The Sino-American rapprochement and China’s return to the UN in the early 






Following in the footsteps of China’s table tennis teams, teams from basketball, 
volleyball, and other sports including swimming, track and field, weightlifting, 
badminton and tennis joined in the diplomatic campaign in 1973 and 1974.
50  
The 
principle ‘Friendship First, Competition Second’ and ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’ helped 
China to improve its friendships with other Western countries, as well as strengthen 
political   unions   with   Third   World   countries.   In   August   1973,   the   first 
Asian-African-Latin American Table Tennis Friendship Invitational Tournament was 
 
 
47   For more detailed information about the Sino-American 'ping-pong diplomacy', see George Santel. Nixon's 
Autobiography (Chengdu: Chengdu Press, 1996), 86; Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New 
York: Grosset & Dunlap,1978) First Edition, 457. 
48   Zhuang Zedong, Chinese 'ping-pong diplomacy' player, available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21400699, (accessed 10 February 2013). 
49   Wu Shaozu, ‘Passionate Care, Kind Instruction – Written in Memory of the 100th Anniversary of the Premier's 
Birthday’, Sports Culture Guide 16, no.1 (1998): 4-8. 
50   On 14 April 1971, the Chinese Women’s Basketball Team paid a visit to Cuba, the first visit to a foreign 
country since the launch of the Culture Revolution. The Chinese Track and Field Team visited Albania in July, 
1971;  the  Beijing  Women’s  and  Men’s  Basketball  Teams  visited  Guinea  in  September  1971,  while  the 
Women’s Volleyball and Men’s Basketball Teams visited North Korea in December 1971. See ‘Cuban football 
team visited China on 21 May 1972’, China Sports Yearbook 1966–1975, (Beijing: People Sports Publishing 
House, 1983), 12–13. 
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held  in  Beijing,  involving  more  than  1,100  athletes  and  representatives  from  86 
countries.
51   
The notice to this meeting stated that: 
 
 
Asian, African and Latin American peoples have similar historical 
experience and are now facing the same struggle for survival. We are all 
overwhelmingly aware of the importance of solidarity and co-operation. 
Sport exchange may help to achieve a common aspiration, the solidarity 
between the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Therefore, athletes 
from three continents should take a variety of forms of exchanges to 







‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’ and the restoration of China’s lawful seat in the UN provided 
 
China with a favourable external environment to return to the international arena. On 
 
17 December 1973, the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) approved the PRC as the 
only lawful representative of China. Two days later, China agreed to take part in the 
7
th  
Asian Games to be held in Teheran.
53   
This change in foreign policy marked 
 
China’s participation from 1973 onwards in international sports organisations, such as 









‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’ changed not only the status of the country, but also Peking’s 
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52   Editor, ‘Press Release of the Asian-African-Latin American Table Tennis Friendship Invitational Tournament’. 
In Yearbook of Chinese Sport 1973–1974, Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport,ed., 37–38. 
Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1982. 
53   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport (eds.), China Sports Yearbook (1949–1991), First volume 
(Beijing: People's Sports Press, 1993), 65. 
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stage, the Communist Party decided to restore its Sport Ministry, the SCSPE. In 
February 1972, the ‘Military Order’ was abolished.
54 
Army officers and soldiers 
returned to their regiments. Those employees who used to serve in the Sport Ministry 
were  called  back  from  the  countryside  to  Beijing. 
55   
The  following  two  years 
witnessed the gradual recovery of sports governing bodies at the provincial and city 
levels across the country.
56   
For example, the Li Jing County Sport Committee was 
established in 1954 in County Li Jin
57
, Shandong Province (see Figure 6.4). From 
1967 to 1969, the County Sport Committee was controlled by the military, while the 
sports administration was in charge of the Sport Section of Political Department, 
County  Revolution  Committee. 
58 
In   1974,  the  County  Sport  Committee  was 






















54  In 1972, Mao Zedong proposed that the Central Committee of CCP earnestly study the issue of the ‘Decision on 
Concentrating Our Forces on Carrying out the Tasks of Supporting Leftists, Agriculture, Workers, Military 
Administration and Military Training’ (abbreviated as ‘Three Support and Two Military’). To this end, the 
General Political Department of the PLA and the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the 
CCP carried out investigation and research, and drafted the ‘Decision on Several Issues of Three Support and 
Two Military (Draft)’. According to this document, in order to strengthen the unified leadership of the Party, 
military control could be abolished after the establishment of the Party Committee in all places and units. 
55   According to Li Menghua, the former Director of the SCSPE, in the face of the new situation and tasks, the 
Military Control Commission (MCC) was aware that only those cadres with professional skills or a background 
in sport could carry out these tasks correctly. For more information, see the Editorial group, Li Menghua’s 
Sports Road, (People Sports Publishing House, 2011), 56. 
56  For example, in early 1973, in Wuhu, a city in southeastern China, a Sports Commission was re-established; the 
Shanghai Sports Committee was re-established in 1973; in Yue Yang, a city in the centre of China, the Sports 
Committee was re-established in 1973; in Pan Zhihua, a city in western China, the County Miyi Sports 
Commission was established in 1973. 
57   County Lijing was taken over by the Communist Party in 1944. From 1944 to 1955, the Department of 
Education, County Government and County Communist Youth League commonly were responsible for sports. 
58  The Revolutionary Committee was the organisational form of local governments at all levels and of some 
departments in the central government during the Cultural Revolution. On 1 July 1979, the Second Session of 
the Fifth National People's Congress approved the proposal of the amendment of several provisions of the 
constitution of the People's Republic of China, to reorganise the Revolutionary Committee in the government at 
all levels. The organisational form of the Revolutionary Committee was not revoked until the 1980s. 
59   Office of Local Chronicles Compilation of Shandong Province, Sports Chronicles of Shandong Province 
Chronicles (Shandong People’s Press, 1993), 85. 
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Figure 6.2. Evolution of the Sport Administrative Structure of Country Lijing 




Besides this re-establishment of the administrative system, training and selection 
systems were also restored after 1971. At the State Meeting of Youth Amateur Sport 
Schools held in September 1972, it was resolved that a national amateur sport training 
network would be established. Sports committees at all levels were required to restore 
sports schools.
60   
By the end of 1974, 1,459 such schools had been reopened.
61   
Sports 
competitions  were  frequent  in  every  county,  region  and  province.  Professional 
training was also gradually resumed. By the end of 1973, most provincial and national 
teams started training schedules for national and international competitions.
62   
Based 
on the restoration of training and the selection system, the competition system began 








60  According to the Minutes of Meeting of the National Work Meeting of Amateur Sports School in 1961, the 
Amateur Sports School should be run by the local, municipal and county sports committees, and then in practice 
become a sports training network. See The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC ed., ‘Minutes of 
Meeting of the National Work Meeting of Amateur Sports School in 1961’, The Collected Compilation of Sport 
and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949–1981), (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1982), 85. 
61   General Administration of Sport of China, ‘A Review of the Youth Amateur Sports Training in China: Review, 
Current Situation and Reform Strategies’, available from 
http://www.sport.gov.cn/n16/n1152/n2463/127237.html2003-07-24(accessed 5 July 2013) 
62   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), ‘Minutes of National Work Meeting of the Sport 
Training in 1973’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949–1981) 
(Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1982), 511. 
63   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport (eds.), Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1975) (Beijing: People’s 
Sport Press, 1982), 13–14. 
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However, anti-elitist and anti-revisionist ideology still dominated the country in all 
aspects. Any action had to have a ‘legitimate’ political banner. Policies and measures 
aiming to restore and promote the elite sports system and improvements in elite sports 
performance had to be consistent with anti-elitism, anti-revisionism and defending 
Maoism. This is illustrated by the theme of a 1972 conference entitled ‘Rigorous 
Training, Strict Requirements, and Make Effort to Climb the World Peak for Cultural 
Revolution’, 
64   
in  which  improving  athletic  performance  related  directly  to  the 
 
ideological revolution. Furthermore, on 27 November 1973, the People’s Daily 
published news regarding athletics, gymnastics and weightlifting competitions, under 
the banner of ‘Encouraged by the spirit of the 10
th  
National Congress of the CCP, 
striving to improve athletic skills’. The text stated: ‘All elite sport teams should 
pursue a goal of catching up with the world advanced level, summon revolutionary 
enthusiasm, and promote drastic change’. It added that the improvement in athletic 
performance must be guided under the principle ‘Class Struggle as the Key Link, 
Linking Practice of Sports, and Relentlessly Criticizing those Revisionists, Headed by 








Occasionally,  politics  or  political  ideology  can  confront  and  replace  sporting 
outcomes, such as nationalism, individualism and aggression.
66   
Ping-Pong diplomacy 
is a case in point. The slogan ‘Friendship first competition second’ served a serious 
political  and  diplomatic  purpose.  Sport  deserves  credit  for  helping  the  PRC 
reconstruct and transform both its internal and external images for the better. The 
change in sports policies was aimed at restoring elite sports in the early 1970s and 
was a result of the political struggle and conflict between the two great world powers, 
the USA and the Soviet Union, in the context of the Cold War. Fraternalism in sports 
 
64   The National Sport Training Work Meeting in 1972 put forward the goal of "Rigorous Training, Strict 
Requirements, and Strive to Climb the World Sports Peak for the Revolution". See ‘Minutes of National 
Training Work Meeting in 1972’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of 
PRC (1949–1981) (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1982), 67. 
65   Editorial, People’s Daily, November 27, 1973. 
66  Fan Hong and Xiong Xiaozheng, ‘Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy’. The International Journal 
of the History of Sport 19, no. 2-3, (2002): 319–342. 
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played a central role in international relations and represented a sentimental 
pragmatism  concealing  calculated  national  interest. 
67    
When  Communist  China 
encountered an ideological, economic and military threat from Western capitalists led 
by the USA in the 1950s, Mao adopted the policy of ‘lean to one side towards the 
socialist-communist camp’, leading to Sovietisation of Chinese sport throughout the 
1950s and the 1960s. The Sino-Soviet split that arose from a divergence in national 
interest and ideological dogma triggered changes. The key for the PRC leadership was 
to achieve national security and fulfil its national interests in these new circumstances. 
Mao therefore moved from a Pro-Soviet to a Pro-America diplomatic strategy. Sport 
was once again required to assist with the implementation of political and diplomatic 
goals. Ping-pong diplomacy enabled China to make approaches to those Western 
imperialists that it had formerly opposed. Ironically, under the slogan of ‘Friendship 
first competition second’, so-called ‘apolitical’ sport helped Communist China to 
open the door to the Western world for the first time after 22 years of isolation.68 
 
 
During  the  Cultural  Revolution,  Maoism,  anti-revisionism  and  anti-elitism  were 
widely upheld and dominated the entire superstructure and even the whole of Chinese 
society. Sport as a part of culture in the superstructure had to draw a clear ideological 
distinction between elitism and revisionism. As a result, competitive sports policies 
represented a unique scenario: on the one hand, sport had to maintain consistency 
with anti-elitist and anti-revisionist ideology advocated by Maoism and proletariat 
hegemony, while conversely, elite sport was required to serve international diplomatic 
purposes, which encouraged a policy of restoration and promotion of elite sport. Sport 











67   Ibid., 319–342. 
68   Ibid., 319–342. 
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6.3.2 Maoism, Revolution and Sports for the People 
 
Mao’s theory about the Cultural Revolution was a natural response to the Soviet 
threat and the political and social changes in the Soviet Union, and ‘sinicisation of 
Marxism’.
69 
Generally speaking, at least two general tendencies have endured in 
orthodox socialist countries since their inception. Firstly, as Alfred Mayer has noted, 
the Communist regime has a tendency that isolates ‘society away from any alternative 
idea  and  ideology,  and  places  all  organizations  and  community  life  under  the 
leadership of the Party’.
70   
Meyer termed this a ‘primitive accumulation of legitimacy’. 
Secondly, since the victory of the Chinese revolution was achieved independently by 
the Chinese Communists, the CCP has naturally developed a set of revolutionary and 
construction theories embodying its own characteristics, as have other socialist 
countries such as Yugoslavia, Albania, Cuba and Vietnam, according to their own 
experiences. As expressed by the Yugoslavian dissident Milovandeje Lars: ‘Where 
the Communist revolution independently wins victory, a unique developmental path is 
produced inevitably’.
71 
Mao’s agenda of revolutionary hegemony highlighted the 
construction  of  national  form  as  its  central  task,  which  is  close  to  Gramsci’s 
‘national-popular’ theory. As Mao stated, ‘Chinese culture should have its own form, 
its own national form. National in form and new-democratic in content – such is our 
new culture today’.
72   
Differing from classical Marxism that encompasses ‘an urban, 
cosmopolitan and foreign thought’, Mao’s view of classic Marxism is that it is ‘a form 
that in its rural, nativist, national-popular incarnations is accessible and acceptable by 






69   The sinicisation of Marxism is the process of combining the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete 
reality of China and constantly informing the theoretical achievements of Marxism with Chinese characteristics. 
To be specific, this process combines the basic principles of Marxism with the practice of Chinese revolution, 
construction and reform, incorporating China's excellent historical traditions and culture, and seeks to adhere to 
Marxism while developing Marxism. See Gao Ying, Mao Zedong thought and the Outline of theoretical 
system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2014. 
70   Alfred G. Meyer, Legitimacy of Power in East Central Europe. In Eastern Europe in the 1970s, edited by Sylva 
Sinanian, Istvan Deak, Peter Ludz, (New York: Praeger Publishers,1974), 56–57. 
71   Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jo-vanovich, Publishers, 1957), 89. 
72  Mao Zedong, ‘The Theory of New Democracy (January 1940)’, in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, volume 2, 
(Beijing: People’s Press, 1991), 698. 
73   See Arif Dirlik. ‘The Predicament of Marxist Revolutionary Consciousness: Mao Zedong, Antonio Gramsci, 
and the Reformulation of Marxist Revolutionary Theory’, Modern China (9 April 1983): 182–211. 
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Mao legalised the hegemony of the mass or peasant movements in the Chinese 
revolution.   In   Mao’s   view,   China   was   a   third-world,   agrarian   country;   the 
mobilisation of the peasant class should be the first and foremost task of the 
Communist revolution. As Mao often emphasised in his earlier revolutionary works 
and  socialist  practice  during  the  1950s,  the  issue  of  the  peasant  class  and 
the masses remained  central  to  the  national  revolution.  By 1966,  Mao’s  sense  of 
direction and energy were consumed by power struggles in the party and by his 
obsession with ideological concerns, which in his view far outweighed the economic 
problems. Besides the direction exemplified by the Cultural Revolution, Maoist 
ideology  became  a  means  of  control  and  spiritual  guidance  of  the  masses.  The 
people’s fanatic worship of Mao (at least in the early days of the Cultural Revolution) 
became the best form of support for Mao’s deified rule. At the Ninth Party Congress 
in 1969, Mao’s guideline ‘continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat’ was written into the Party constitution and the steady, rational economic 
development  plans  issued  by  the  Eight  Party  Congress  in  1958  was  lost  in  the 






In essence, Mao did not aim to establish equal standing between intellectuals, officials 
and the masses. Rather, he sought subordination of the intellectuals to the proletarian 
hegemony. In May 1960, British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomerie met Mao in 
China. After returning to England, he wrote: ‘The fundamental Mao Zedong’s 
philosophy is very simple. People play a decisive role, whereby every year the cadres 
are required to stay at the grassroots level for a month and maintain contact with the 
masses, in order to win the trust of the people’.
75   




74   Mao's theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat was written into the political 
report of the 9th and 10th National Congress of the CCP, and the Constitution of the Communist Party, adopted at 
the 4th NPC, had become the fundamental guiding ideology of China's national political activities during the 
Cultural Revolution. The fundamental concept of this ideology was that, to secure the proletariat's acquisition of 
political power and the establishment of a socialist system, a political revolution would necessitate a class 
overthrow of another class and this ‘continuing revolution’ would be achieved by adopting the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’. See The History of the Communist Party of China (1949–1978), volume 2 (Beijing: Party History 
Press,2011), 167. 
75   Montgomerie, ‘My Talk with Mao’, Reference News (in Chinese), 12 June 1961 (originally published in The 
Sunday Times, 12 June 1961). 
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officials in China are a class, and one whose interests are antagonistic to those of the 
workers and peasants’.
76   
He encouraged vigorous rebellion:  ‘Let those, who will 






Mao   defined   national   form   as   ‘rural,   nativist,   national-popular   incarnations’ 
accessible and acceptable for the peasants and the masses, as opposed to urban, 
cosmopolitan and elitist cultures. As with literature and arts of the masses (qun zhong 
wen yi), Mao Zedong attached great importance to the development of the masses 
from the time of the Yanan Era (1935–1948). On 8 July 1971, the People’s Daily 
published a report entitled ‘Hold high the Great Red Banner of Mao Zedong Thought, 
Carry out Revolutionary Mass Criticism’ that included three articles: one by the 
Beijing Sport Committee titled ‘Sport Must Serve Workers, Peasants and Soldiers’ 
and two written   by the Sport Bureau of the Shandong Revolutionary Committee 
entitled ‘Stick to the Principle of Sport Serving Workers, Peasants and Soldiers’ and 
‘Our Poor and Lower-middle Peasants (Pin xia zhong nong) Need Sport’.
78   
These 
 
reports attempted to underscore the importance of mass sport and justify sport for the 
proletariat, including worker, peasants and soldiers. In this context, at the state sport 
conference held in 1972, mass sport was highlighted. In August 1974, Deng Xiaoping, 
then Vice Premier in charge of education and sports, pointed out: ‘Chairman Mao has 
always advocated that mass sport should be prioritised, and the “Developing sports 
and promoting people’s health” is in essence for the masses. Thus, the SCSPE should 





76  According to the ‘Decision on a Number of Current Problems of Work in Rural Areas (Draft)’ adopted by the 
Central Committee of CCP, Mao asserted that there was a serious and sharp class struggle in Chinese society at 
that time. Mao and his supports therefore insisted that if the socialist education movement was not engaged in 
rural areas, China would inevitably face counter-revolutionary restoration. On 15 January 1965, Mao Zedong 
commented on the situation of the socialist education by Chen Zhengren, then Minister of agricultural 
machinery. He wrote: ‘The bureaucratic class is sharply antagonistic with the working class and the poor and 
low-middle-class peasants’. See Chen Yang, Mu Jianchun, Mao Zedong and Chen Zhengren, Extensive 
Collection of the Party History, no. (2017), 14–20. 
77  See Mao Zedong's speech at the Hangzhou Conference, (December 21, 1965), Red Flag, no.9 (1967): 1–5. 
78   Editorial, ‘Hold high the great red flag of Mao Zedong Thought, and carry out the great revolutionary criticism 
in depth’, People's Daily, 8 July 1971. 
79  On 8 August 1974, when Deng Xiaoping met China's national team about to participate in the Asian Games, he 
stressed: "Chairman Mao has always advocated that sports is mainly of mass issue, which is called ‘Developing 
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During  the  Cultural  Revolution,  actions  and  policies  had  to  be  consistent  with 
Maoism. Sport was no exception. New Sports, an official organ of the SCSPE, 
published an editorial article in 1973 entitled ‘Take vigorous action to promote 
physical exercise and sport in the countryside’. It stressed: ‘We must understand that 
promotion of sport and physical exercise in the countryside is to implement Chairman 
Mao’s revolutionary sports line’.
80   
Another article, entitled ‘Booming Development 
 






Carrying out socialist culture and sporting activities is not only related to 
people’s health, but to attack the bourgeoisie ideology, to occupy the 





Maoist leaders went to extreme lengths to satisfy their political goals during the 
Cultural Revolution, and the mass sports movement was at its peak during this time, 
particularly  in   the   countryside. 
82 
A   typical   case   is   illustrated   by   events   in 
XiaoJinzhuang, a village in Baodi County, Taijing. Between 1974 and 1976, Jiang 
Qing, Mao’s wife, visited XiaoJinzhuang three times. From June 1976 to August 1976, 
she arranged a writing group to ‘sum up the experience’ and published 69 articles, 
news  reports  and  poems  relating  to  XiaoJinzhuang  in  the  People’s  Daily.
83   
The 
‘Learn from the XiaoJinzhuan’ campaign was widely disseminated throughout culture, 
 





Sports and Enhancing the People's Physique’. This is in essence a mass issue (qun zhong xing wen ti). Thus, the 
State Sports Committee must do well." See Wu Shaozu, Deng Xiaoping's sports complex, China Sports Daily, 2 
February 1997. 
80  Editor, ‘Take Vigorous Action to Promote Physical Exercise and Sport in the Countryside’, New Sport 24, no. 1 
(1973), 2. 
81   Editor, National Mass Sports Activities are Vigorously Developing, Sports Daily, 1 February 1975. 
82   Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, Sport in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The International 
Journal of the History of Sport 29, no.1( 2012): 53–73. 
83  XiaoJinzhuang was portrayed as a typical model of Cultural Revolution or revolution in the ideological field. 
Jiang qing challenged the ‘pure production’ standpoint of Deng Xiaoping, and emphasised the importance and 
benefits for consciousness and culture that the Cultural Revolution had brought to the rural areas. 
Jing qing promoted XiaoJinzhuang by taking the form of praising the ‘ten new things’, including ‘running a 
political evening school’, ‘writing poems by peasants’ and ‘singing model operas by peasants’. Being a model, 
XiaoJinzhuang's experience has swept the country. 
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Developing sports in the countryside became an important political mission for 
provincial and county sports commissions. In February 1975, the Sports Daily stated 
that the underlying aim and principle of socialist sports was to serve the peasants, who 
accounted for 90% of the population. It wrote: 
 
 
If we do not pay attention to the peasants, the principle ‘sport serves 
proletarian masses (the peasants, workers and soldiers)’ will become empty 
words. If we do not occupy the countryside with our revolutionary healthy 
sport, then the ‘Four Olds (Si jiu)’
84   
will fight back. Sport is not only a 






To promote sports of the masses in the countryside, sports leadership groups and 
sports teams were widely established at village and county levels. For instance, in 
Wen Jiang County, Sichuan province, sports leadership groups were set up in 14 
communes, with more than 200 stadiums, 158 brigades and 80 ball teams.
86   
In Qinhe 
County, Hebei province, all 215 production brigades had sports leadership groups, 
totalling   319   sports   teams.   The   sports   administrative   structure   was   greatly 
strengthened  throughout  rural  areas  (see  Figure  6.5)  and  farmers  were  strongly 





















84   The ‘Four Olds’ referred to old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits. 
85   Editorial, Must Serving Gong Nong Bing (the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers) and Strive to Do Well in Rural 
Sport. Sports Daily, 28 February 1975. 
86   County Committee of Chronicles of Wenjiang, eds. Wenjiang County Annals, (Chengdu: Sichuan People's 
Publishing House, 1990), 24. 
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The mass sports movement grew in response to an escalating revolutionary campaign. 
In 1975, Jiang Qing announced the ‘Ten Pieces of Experience of Xiao Jinzhuang’ and 
issued a slogan ‘600 million farmers 600 million athletes’ (liu yi nong min liu yi yun 
dong yuan), in which mass sports in rural areas related directly to the mass movement. 
In some counties, Sport Commissions required every commune to establish sports 
teams and organise travel for farmers to go to the city for performances and 
competitions; some counties launched programmes such as the “thousand people 
broadcast  calisthenics”,  in  which  people  who  did  not  attend  would  have  ‘work 
points’
87   
deducted. Consequently, many farmers were released from regular work to 
 







87  The work-points system is a labour reward system that takes labour work as the measure of labour and the 
distribution of personal consumption goods. It originated from the Soviet collective farm and was widely 
adopted by the rural collective economic organisations in China. According to the work-points system, peasants 
were to receive points reflecting the quantity and quality of output and set in terms of a staple, such as rice. The 
awarding of work-points was usually made every day on the basis of the total points allotted for each division of 
the day (where chores varied over the working day). Before the 1980s, China’s peasants were paid according to 
their work-points, calculated by an individual’s working hours and output. See Charles Hoffmann. Work 
Incentive Practices and Polices in the People’s Republic of China 1953–1965 (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1967), 44. 
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The mass sports movement effectively united the proletariat, workers, peasants and 
soldiers into one body that could conduct an ideological class struggle against 
revisionists, class enemies and political opponents. Thus, the proletariat cultural 
hegemony achieved absolute domination in the superstructure of Chinese society. 
This large-scale mass movement required extensive, complex social organisations that 
enabled revolutionary campaigns to permeate every part of Chinese society. Mass 
sports systems and organisations were particularly well developed in the countryside, 
where revolutionary campaigns were extreme. Thus, the meteoric rise in mass sports 
during the Cultural Revolution was not only a result of proletarian revolution in the 
socialist construction period, but also a reflection of proletarian cultural hegemony in 






The Cultural Revolution highlighted ideological struggles, with the aim of realising 
Maoism and proletariat leadership in the superstructure. Changes in ideological 
preferences meant that competitive and mass sports experienced different fates during 
the Cultural Revolution. Anti-elitism and anti-revisionism led to a breakdown of sport 
elitism  as  well  as the entire competitive sports  system  in  the early  years  of the 
Cultural Revolution (1967–1970). In contrast, mass sports, especially large-scale mass 
sports programmes, became extraordinarily successful under Maoism, based on the 
charismatic personality and proletarian ideology of Chairman Mao. 
 
 
In the early 1970s, the situation changed for military and diplomatic reasons. After the 
Sino-Soviet border disputes escalated into substantial military conflict at the end of 
the 1960s, China altered its diplomatic dealings with the USA. ‘Ping-Pong 
Diplomacy’, under the principle of ‘Friendship First, Competition Second’, played a 
positive role in helping China surmount the legacy of distrust between the USA and 
China, and contributed to China’s political union with Third World countries. In 
support of sports diplomacy, China restored and developed the elite sports system. 
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However, anti-elitism and anti-revisionism struggles continued to dominate every 
aspect of China during the Cultural Revolution. Competitive sports policies had to 
remain consistent with the dominant ideology in order to survive. While these policies 
had to agree with anti-elitist and anti-revisionist ideology advocated by Maoism and 
proletariat hegemony, competitive sport was required to serve a diplomatic purpose 
internationally, resulting in a policy of restoration and promotion of elite sports. 
Simultaneously, mass sports were subjected to political and ideological needs, in 
order to serve the broad masses and keep them happy. 
 
 
Gramscian  hegemony  provides  a  significant  frame  of  reference  from  which  to 
re-examine the relationship between sport and ideology during the Cultural 
Revolution. From the perspective of cultural hegemony, a main feature of the Chinese 
revolution is the construction and consolidation of a revolutionary hegemony through 
the Cultural Revolution. Maoists have always stressed the importance of the 
ideological homogeneity of the proletariat as a means of societal control. For Maoist 
leaders, the Cultural Revolution was aimed at regaining the power of the state, 
restoring Maoism and the proletariat’s dominance in the superstructure, legalising 
hegemony among the mass movements in Chinese revolution. 
 
 
During  the  Cultural  Revolution,  Maoism,  anti-revisionism  and  anti-elitism  were 
widely upheld as a hegemonic ideology that dominated the entire superstructure and 
all of Chinese society. Sport, as a part of the superstructure culture, had to draw a 
clear ideological distinction between elitism and revisionism. Under this condition, 
competitive sports collapsed because of anti-elitist ideology. Sport was required to 
serve the broad masses, enabling Maoism and the proletariat cultural hegemony to 
maintain homogeneity, purity and leadership over the superstructure of Chinese 
society. It led to the policy ‘Sport for the people’, which peaked during the Cultural 
Revolution and the entire Mao Era. Mass sport was emphasised as an appropriate way 
to serve the proletariat, leading to the dominating policy of “sport for the people”. 
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Mao’s revolutionary hegemony highlighted insurrection and violence and enabled one 
class to overthrow and rule another. Thus, ideological purity during the Cultural 
Revolution was achieved through not only pervasive public dissemination of Maoist 
ideology to gain the support of the masses, but also by criticism, destruction and 
revolutionary means. The depth of social mobilisation promoted under Mao’s 
revolutionary ideological struggle developed mass sports to the extreme, leading to 
the establishment of mass sports nationwide. 
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Mao’s Cultural Revolution and theory on ‘Continuing the Revolution under the 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat’ did not prevent socialism from changing its color, but 
it did stimulate general reflections about ideological struggles in the superstructure 
and about the future of Communist China in the post-Mao era. The Party’s economic 
reforms, led by Deng Xiaoping, replaced class struggle as the central task of the Party 
with more pragmatically measured economic ones. Arguably, China's reformist 
ambition played a crucial role in every aspect of the transformation experienced by 
Chinese society. However, developing a market economy was not as straightforward 
as the socialist reformers had imagined. The student-led pro-democracy movement 
from 1986 to 1989 made the Communist leaders re-think the relationship between 
economic construction and socialist ideological leadership. These events provided the 
context for the development of sports in modern China. This chapter is organized into 
three sections: the first explains ideological change and the shift of state policy 
priorities for sports at the end of the 1970s. Sections Two and Three analyze the 
transformation     of     the     elite     and     mass     sports     policies     and     systems 






7.2 Changing State Policy Priorities for Sport from 1977 to 1980 
 
Mao's death in September 1976 removed a towering figure from Chinese politics, but 
did not terminate Mao thought and its influence on Communist China. After the defeat 
of the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng, Mao’s selected successor, was confirmed as Party 
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Chairman  and  Premier.  Hua  clung  to  the  ‘Two  Whatevers’
1   
and  adhered  to  the 
principle of ‘class struggle’ as a key link in China's economic and social development. 
The 11
th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held on 18 August 




The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, lasting 11 years, has been ended 
by smashing the ‘Gang of Four’ as a symbol. However, this is by no means 
the end of the class struggle, and the end of the continuing revolution under 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must follow Chairman Mao's 
teachings, and carry the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat 






In this context, the national sports conference was held in January 1978. This 
conference identified the strategy of promoting mass sports and elite sports 
simultaneously, detailing a phased approach to their realization: within the 
following 3 years, it is required to create a new situation of mass sport, while the 
performance of one-third of competitive sports should approximate or reach the 
international  advanced  level.
3   
within  the  next  8  years,  while  promoting  the 
 
popularity of mass sport, the performance of most competitive sports should 
approach or attain world advanced level. 
 
 
To achieve these strategies, a series of measures was identified that aimed to: 
 




1   ‘Two Whatevers (liang ge fan shi)’ refers to the statement that ‘We will resolutely uphold whatever decisions 
Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave’. The ‘Two Whatevers’ 
did not originate from Hua Guofeng, but from the editorials published simultaneously in the People's Daily, Red 
Flag and The People's Liberation Army Daily on 7 February 1977. The editorial was written by Wang Dongxing 
and agreed upon by the Political Bureau of the CCP’s Central Committee. For a detailed explanation of ‘Two 
Whatevers’, see Luo Pinghan, The Details of the Party History - Tracing to its Source of Some Important Events 
of the Communist Party of China in the Past 90 years (People's Publishing House, 2011), 60. 
2  Editorial, The Press Communique of the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the People’s 
Daily, 18 August 1977. 
3   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC(ed), ‘Minutes of Meeting of the National Work Meeting in 
1978’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949-1981) (Beijing: 
People’s Sports Press, 1982), 122-126. 
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2) vigorously strengthen ideological and political work, adjust and improve the 
political work, facilitate the function and role of political institutions, learn 
from the People’s Liberation Army, summarize this experience, and establish a 
set of political work systems and methods suitable for sports systems [text 
bolded by the Author] 
3) widely develop mass sports and establish a new era of socialist sports competitions 
 
4) establish reasonable rules and regulations 
 
5) establish a cohesive training network 
 
6) develop sound technological innovation and improve the quality of training 
 
7) improve sports science research and technology 
 
8) enthusiastically foster sporting talent 
 
9) effectively guarantee logistics support 
 






Clearly, these measures indicated a strong ideology and a politically-oriented nature 
(as exemplified by the second clause). Maoist class struggle and revolutionary 




7.2.1 Deng's Pragmatic Approach to Economic Reforms 
 
By the end of the 1970s China had lost economic vitality
5   
and the masses were eager 
to  embrace  a  new  social  reform  to  free  them  from  endless  class  struggles  and 




4   Ibid., 125. 
5   Before the 1978 reform, although China's GDP maintained its growth (11.7% in 1978), its proportion of GDP in 
relation to the world's GDP was basically unchanged (i.e. in 1952, China's total GDP accounted for 5.2% of GDP 
of the world, but had fallen to 5% in 1978). An even larger problem was that China's economic structure in 1978 
was unsound, with a sluggish economy. This was reflected by several aspects: First, the proportion of industry 
and agriculture was unbalanced. Although the total industrial economy of China ranked 10th worldwide in 1978, 
its value of agricultural output had dropped to 24.12% of the total product of the country’s social output. The 
average total of grain possessed by farmers had not increased from the level recorded in 1957. Second, urban 
wages were very low. In 1965, the annual salary of employees of both state-owned and collective enterprises was 
652 yuan, which had fallen to 605 yuan in 1976. Third, China’s employment rate had become its largest social 
issue. About 20 million people in the country were unemployed, including 1.5 million ex-servicemen, college 
graduates, students who had completed secondary vocational and technical schools, 7 million young intellectuals 
residing in rural areas, and about 2.3 million people in urban areas. See Su Xiaohe, Notes on the Centennial 
Economic History, (Beijing: Oriental publishing house, 2016), 45. 
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supreme sovereignty over China, he emphasised the significance of economic success 
for political stability and legitimacy. He stated: 
 
 
If socialism is always poor, it will not stand. […] Economic work is the 
biggest political issue at present, and the economic problem is the 
overriding political issue. . . Political work should be carried out through 
the economy, and political problems should be solved from the economic 
point of view. […] The aim of our revolution is to liberate and develop 
productive  forces.  […]  The  revolution  in  productivity  is  the  most 
fundamental revolution.’





However, shaking Mao’s ideological legacy – ‘take class struggle as the key link’ – 
 
was not easy at that time. Reformists had to make ideological breakthroughs. Between 
 
1977 and 1980, China arranged for several study tours consisting of senior officials to 
investigate major countries in Europe and North America. Upon their return to China, 
the delegations reported to the Politburo. The Party leaders were surprised to learn 
about the enormous gap between China and the outside world. At the Third Plenum of 
the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping summarized the 
effect of the trips: ‘The basic point is that we would acknowledge that we are 
backward, that many of our ways of doing things are inappropriate, and that we need 
to change’.
7   
Deng delivered a crucial speech at this meeting, entitled ‘Emancipate the 
mind, seek truth from facts and be united as one looking to the future”, which 
essentially cleared the way for the reform and open-up policy.
8   
The Third Session of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP was held on November 18, 1978. Its 






6   Deng Xiaoping, ng Xiaoping Anthology, second edition (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1994), 91, 195, 
231, 311. 
7   Ezra F. Vogel,‘Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China’ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 
135. 
8   Jiang Zemin,‘Speech delivered at the 20th anniversary of the third Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of 
the CCP’, People’s Daily, 19 December 1998. 
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Deng’s pragmatic economic reforms responded to this theme. After the Cultural 
Revolution, the most urgent question for the CCP was how to reform China and 
provide the people with a much-needed increase in living standards, without 
relinquishing past principles that were so deeply ingrained in Chinese society, and 
without losing the legitimacy for the CCP as China’s ruling party. Oksenberg and 
Bush argue that although there was no “clear-cut ideological alternative to Mao’s 
thought’,
10   
the CCP, in essence, turned to a more flexible and pragmatic policy of 
 
‘seeking truth from facts’.
11   
Deng officially introduced four fundamental principles 
into CCP’s ideology: (1) uphold the socialist path; (2) uphold the people's democratic 
dictatorship; (3) uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC); and 
(4) uphold Mao Zedong thought and Marxism-Leninism. Chen has argued that these 
fundamental principles tend to resist any significant change, as such change would 






7.2.2 Development of Elite Sports as a Key 
 
 
The Party’s strategic decision to endorse a pragmatic ideology impacted greatly on 
Chinese society in every aspect, including sports. In his broadcast Spring Festival 
Speech in January 1979, Wang Meng, head of the SCSPE, alluded to the shift in focus 
in the field of sports.
13   
When the state sport conference was held in February 1979, 
the conference formulated four main missions for the years 1979 and 1980. Three of 
those missions were directly related to elite sports: 
 
9   Ibid. 
10  Michael Oksenberg & Richard Bush, ‘China’s Political Evolution, 1972-1982’, in The China Reader, ed. 
Orville Schell & David Shambaugh (New York: Random House, 1999), 17. 
11   Deng Xiaoping,‘Hold High the Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Adhere to the Principle of Seeking Truth 
from Facts’ (September 16, 1978), Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. II, (Beijing: People's Publishing 
House ,1994), 127. 
12   Feng Chen, conomic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China: Ideology and Reform (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995), 13. 
13   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport, China Sports Yearbook 1979 (Beijing: People Sports 
Publishing House, 1980), 22. 
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1) successfully hold the 4
th 
National Games in 1979 and actively prepare for the 1980 
and 1984 Olympic Games, and strive to create good results; 
 
2) widely develop mass sports and emphasise youth school physical education; 
 
 
3) actively strengthen amateur training and accelerate the training reserve force of 
outstanding athletes, to establish and improve the training networks at all levels 
throughout China’s larger cities; 
 





The SCSPE asked sport commissions at all levels to actively prepare for the 1980 and 
 
1984  Olympic  Games,  and  exhorted  them  to  strive  for  rankings  in  the  top  10 
aggregate scores in the 1980 Olympic Games. The SCSPE’s goal was for 15 medals, 
with one or more in each of the following fields: gymnastics; weightlifting; diving; 
shooting; and archery. Moreover, the teams were expected to win a gold medal. 
Obviously,  elite  sport  was  highlighted  at  this  conference.  Why  China  suddenly 
changed its previous strategy into one that prioritised elite sport in 1979 is revealed in 
the conference minutes: 
 
In view of the fact that the performance of China’s competitive sports lags 
far lower than that of advanced countries in the world and that a number of 
sports failing to qualify for the Olympic Games, it is imperative that we 
prepare well for the 1980 Olympic Games. The SCSPE and provincial 
sport committees must focus on increasing competitive sport in 1979 and 
1980. […] Domestic and international sport competitions should be carried 
out in favour of China’s performance in the Olympic Games and World 







14   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC(eds.), Minutes of National Sport Work Meeting in 1979 
(Summary)’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of PRC (1949-1981) 
(Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1982), 132-139. 
15   Ibid. 
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As Sport Minister Wang indicates, China renewed its membership in the IOC and 
subsequently other international sports organisations in the late 1970s. In early 1979, 
the SCSPE submitted a ‘Report on Accelerating Performance and  Improving the 
Level of Competitive Sports’ to the Central Committee of the CCP. According to this 
document, the SCSPE suggested that ‘increasing the overall level of competitive sport 
should  be  the  main  task  of  sport  in  the  coming  years.’
16   
At  the  National  Sport 
 
Conference in January 1980, the priority of competitive sport policy was further 
emphasised. Wang Meng explains: 
 
 
Our country is now still poor and it is impossible to put more money into 
sport. On the one hand, therefore, the sport development plan must proceed 
from reality; on the other hand, including sport in the national plan, could 
give play to the superiority of socialism by implementing centralised and 
unified  leadership,  and  mobilising  the  initiative  of  various  parts  and 
aspects of the country and focusing on allocation of financial and material 







Wang’s statement illustrated the government’s desire to use sport to enhance national 
self-esteem, self-confidence and dignity. Tan Hua, a Chinese sports historian, argues 
that the SCSPE decided upon this strategic direction after the Party and central 
government shifted their focus to economic construction at the end of 1978. It is also 




The three years from 1977 to 1980 witnessed a change in priority from state sport 
policy  determined  to  develop  mass  and  elite  sports  in  combination,  to  one  that 
 
16   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), ‘Request for Instructions by the about Accelerating the 
Improvement of Athletic Performance’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents 
of PRC (1949–1981) (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1982), 140-144. 
17  The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), ‘Wang Meng's Work Report at the 1980 National Sports 
Work Meeting’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1949–
1981) (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1982), 151. 
18   Quoted from an interview conducted in Shanghai, November 2014. 
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prioritised elite sports. This was the result of an ideological breakthrough and Deng’s 
pragmatic approach to the economy and social policy. Elite sport was expected to play 





7.3 State Elite Sports Policy and System in the 1980s 
 
7.3.1 Nationalism, Legitimacy and Olympic Strategy: The 
 
Rise of Elite Sports Ambitions 
 
Taking part in the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow would have been a 
wonderful opportunity for China to demonstrate her new image following the 
implementation of the reform and opening-up policy. However, two months before the 
Games, Beijing announced that it would boycott the Moscow Olympic Games, in 
unison with the American-led boycott of the Games protesting against the Soviet 




Elite Sports Successes and Nationalism in the early 1980s 
 
Despite missing the 1980 Olympics, Chinese athletes continued to demonstrate their 
sporting excellence. In the domestic arena, the 5
th 
National Games of China was held 
in Shanghai in 1983, where 66 players and 39 teams broke 60 national records, while 
3 world records were broken.
19   
The most notable event was the men’s high jump, 
 
where Zhu Jianhua, an athlete from Shanghai, broke world records twice during the 
qualification contest for the Games. Zhu went on to break the world’s high jump 
record in the finals of the National Games and in 1983 was universally deemed to be 
one of the world’s best athletes. 
 
In  the  international  arena,  sports  competitions  became  places  where  the  Chinese 
people could witness the glory of China, feel proud of being Chinese and sense unity 
 
19   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC(ed.), Yearbook of Chinese Sport 1949-1991 (Beijing: People’s 
Sports Press, 1993), 492. 
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as part of a great nation.
20   
In the 1979 World University Games, held in Mexico, the 
 
17-year-old Chinese diver Chen Xiaoxia defeated a well-known Soviet athlete and 
won a gold medal. Soon after, a slogan ‘Go beyond Asia and join the advanced world 
rank’ 
21   
was  adopted  for  encouraging  Chinese  elite  sports.  Another  far-reaching 
slogan ‘Band together, Revitalize the Chinese Nation’ emerged in March 1981, when 
the Chinese men’s volleyball team defeated the South Korean men’s volleyball team 
and qualified to compete in the Men’s Volleyball World Championship. In response, 
~4,000 Beijing University students celebrated in the streets, singing the National 
 






Figure 7.1. A member of the Chinese Men’s Volleyball Team lifted up 
 






A similar sense of patriotism and nationalism was evident when the Chinese women’s 
volleyball team won the world championship for the first time, when they defeated 
Japan on 16 November 1981. Tens of thousands of students and citizens in Beijing 
gathered in Tiananmen Square to celebrate all night long. They shouted ‘Long live 
China! Long live China’s Women’s Volleyball Team!’
22   




20   Fan Hong, Ducan Mackay and Karen Cristensen, China Gold China’s Quest for Global Power and Olympic 
Glory (Great Barrington: Berkshire Publishing Group, 2008), 67. 
21   This slogan originally was put forward in China Sport Daily on 10 September 1979, aiming to inspire Chinese 
athletes to earn more honour in Asian and international competitions. 
22   Editorial, ‘1981: China Women’s Volleyball Team Brought Glory to the Chinese Nation’, Nandu Weekly, 18 
July 2008. 
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team’s victory was headlined in almost every Chinese newspaper. The China Daily 
published  an  article  titled  ‘Learning  from  the  Spirit  of  the  Chinese  Women’s 
Volleyball Team (CWVT) revitalises the Chinese Nation’. It stated: ‘By using the 
spirit of the CWVT to develop modernisation, do we need to worry about how to 
achieve the modernisation?’
23  
That same day, the Sports Daily published an article 
entitled ‘All Walks of Life Should Learn the Spirit of CWVT’, in which the Chairman 
of the Chinese Women’s Federation stated: ‘To push forward the great cause of 
socialism, all walks of life should learn from spirit of CWVT, establish long-range 
ambitions, maintain a down-to-earth and hardworking spirit and do their own job 
well’. 
24    
An  editorial  published  in  January  1982  in  the  Sports  Daily  entitled 
‘Contribute to the Development of Socialist Culture and Ethics’ concluded that ‘Sport 
and patriotism have never been so close. The influence of sport on people’s minds and 





Zhao Yu has argued that after winning three championships in succession, the Chinese 
women’s volleyball team was no longer only a volleyball team, but a hero and model 
for the entire nation to emulate.
26 
These athletic heroes became an inspiration for 
people from all walks of life to put their maximum effort into their work. They also 
became   a   political   slogan   spurring   on   millions   of   Chinese   to   strive   for 
modernisation.
27   
An interviewee in this research, Xie Qionghuan, the former Director 
of the Department of Policies, Laws and Regulations in the SCSPE, explains: 
 
 
It was a period when full-scale modernization construction was carried out 
across the whole country, as people were eager for change. The sporting 




23   Commentary, Learning Women's Volleyball Team, Revitalizing China – China Won, People's Daily, 16 
November 1981. 
24   Deng Yingchao, All Walks of Life Come to Learn the Spirit of Women Volleyball, Sports Daily, 16 November 
1981. 
25   ‘Contribute to the Development of Socialist Culture and Ethics’. China Sports Daily, 1 January 1982. 
26   Zhao Yu, Defeat in Seoul in the Three Sport Reports, (Wuhan: Changjiang Literature Art Publishing House, 
1998), p: 10. 
27   The ‘Four modernisations’ encompass industry, agriculture, national defence, and science and technology. 
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pent-up passion, having been depressed during the Cultural Revolution, 







Knowing that  China’s  absence from  the  Moscow  Olympic  Games  had  upset  the 
 
IOC,
29   
Beijing was determined to attend the 1984 Los Angeles Games. In March 
 
1982, Deng Xiaoping told the visiting IOC president Juan Samaranch that although 
 
Sino-American relations were not especially close, China would participate in the 
 
1984  Los  Angles  Games. 
30   
Despite  the  abrupt  cessation  of  sport  and  cultural 
exchanges between China and the USA in 1983 following the Hu Na incident,
31
 
Beijing decided against boycotting the 1984 Olympics because China did not want to 
forfeit the opportunity to return to the international arena. Thus, in 1984, China won 
its first Olympic gold medal and ranked fourth in the gold medal count. 
 
As Lu Zhouxiang has noted, continued sporting successes throughout the 1980s 
energized the Chinese people and forged links between sports and nationalism, 
patriotism,  collectivism  and  heroism. 
32   
Enormous  achievements  in  Chinese  elite 
sports proved the validity and necessity of the priority policy for elite sports 
established  in  the  early  1980s.  Chinese  officials  openly  acknowledged  that  they 




28   Interviewer No. 1 (Xie, Qionghuan, Formal Director of Department of Sport policy and Regulation, the General 
Administration of Sport of China) in a discussion with the Author, 10 October 2010. 
29   China’s failure to appear at the Olympics incurred criticism from the IOC. Its President, Lord Killanin, 
complained to the Chinese Olympic Committee: ‘Having worked for so long for the recognition of the Chinese 
Olympic Committee, I must admit, from a personal point of view, I would have considerable reservation in 
proceeding with the candidature of a new member of the IOC, if the Chinese Olympic Committee does not 
participate in the [Moscow] Olympic Games.’ Killanin to Zhong Shitong, 28 March 1980, IOC Archives, 
Republic People of China, correspondence, 1980. Quoted from Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 
1895–2008 (Cambridge (MA) and London: Harvard University Press, 2008), 198. 
30  Wu Shaozu (Author) Yu Wei (ed.), Deng Xiaoping's Sports Complex, Accessed on 3 August 2013 from 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85038/7183986.html. 
31   Hu Na, in the Chinese women’s tennis team, was National Champion in 1978. On 20 July 1982, she competed 
in the USA for Federation Cup tennis tournaments in Santa Clara, California. Hu slipped out of her hotel room 
on the eve of a key competition and applied for political asylum. Despite warnings from Beijing, the USA 
granted her asylum in April 1983. China promptly labelled Hu Na as a “defector” and ceased all bilateral sports 
exchanges with the USA in 1983, including China’s participation in pre-Olympic cycling, rowing and canoeing 
events that were held in Los Angeles. 
32   Lu Zhouxiang, Sport and Nationalism: A Comparative Study between China and Ireland, PhD thesis, 
University College Cork, 2010, 381. 
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Meng, then the head of the SCSPE, stated: ‘A gold medal is a sign of success. 
Flag-raising   and   the   playing   of   the   national   anthem   in   major   international 
competitions meet the common interests of millions of Chinese people, and are the 











Modern Chinese nationalism arose in the late 19
th  
century in fervent response to the 
country’s decline from a ‘Middle Kingdom’ to one that was weak, poor and backward 
in comparison with the West. As Wu Guoguang has observed, the first wave of 
modern Chinese nationalism took place in the early 20
th 
century and reached its zenith 
in the May Fourth movement.
34 
This wave of nationalism laid the foundation of 
China’s  modern  national  identity,  and  of  the  Chinese  nationalist  and  communist 
revolutions  that  were  to  follow. 
35   
In  the  last  two  decades  of  the  20
th   
century, 
 
nationalism as a powerful ideology re-emerged in Chinese politics.
36   
This time, the 
Chinese reformists and Chinese people shared an identical goal; to engage in domestic 
reform and open the door to the outside world. 
 
 
Chinese sporting excellence in the 1980s remained tightly bound to nationalism and 
the Communist Party’s political outlook. Xu Guoqi has observed: ‘China’s 
participation and even interest in modern sports has been largely motivated by 
nationalism. But by importing modern sports from the West and taking part in world 
competitions, China has simultaneously used sports to express its worldview, promote 
its status in the world, and declare its national identity’.
37   
Zhao Suisheng considers 
 




33   ‘Wang Meng's Work Report at the 1980 National Sports Work Meeting’, op. cit, 151. 
34   Wu Guoguang, From Post-Imperial to Late Communist Nationalism: Historical Change in Chinese Nationalism 
from May Fourth to the 1990s, Third World Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2008), 467–482. 
35   Ibid. 
36   Ibid. 
37   Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895–2008, op. cit., 3. 
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1980s in its pursuit of modernisation of the country and legitimacy of authority. Zhao 
Suisheng argues that the Communist state adopted nationalism because the notion 
elicits a sense of unity and encourages loyalty to the state.
38   
In his view, pragmatism 
characterizes the attitude of leading Chinese politicians towards nationalism in the 
PRC.
39   
According to Zhao, the most important feature of this pragmatism is the 
state’s emphasis on the instrumentality of nationalism for rallying support in the name 





At the end of the Maoist era, since the planned economy model was unable to provide 
effective incentives for people to work hard, the government initiated social 
movements, in particular the GLF and the Cultural Revolution, which brought the 
economy to the verge of collapse. After Mao’s death, the CCP under Deng Xiaoping 
attempted to progress from a command economy to market socialism. Deng and the 
CCP reformists had to introduce two important changes in direction: first, they needed 
to  campaign  for  the  eradication  of  ideological  and  psychological  obstacles  to 
market-oriented economic reform; second, performance, especially economic 
performance, was required to consolidate the fundamental basis for the legitimacy of 
the CCP and the party-state.
41  
Since Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong was no longer 
 
the official ideology, there was no longer a convincing argument for preserving the 





For pragmatic leaders under Deng, performance-based legitimacy was more important 
and effective than Mao’s revolutionary ideology for transforming society in post-Mao 
China. The communist leaders were eager to consolidate legitimacy and domination 




38  Zhao Suisheng, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism, (California: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), p: 209. 
39   Ibid, 209. 
40   Ibid, 209. 
41   Zhao Dingxin, The Power of Tiananmen: State–Society Relations and the 1989 Movement (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001), 42. 
42   Zhao Suisheng, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism, (Stanford 
University Press, 2004), p: 211. 
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formulation did not include performance legitimacy. However, Weberians such as 
Lipset
43   
and many other scholars
44   
in contemporary Chinese politics emphasized the 
importance of state performance for the stability of a regime. Based on Weber’s 
classification of legitimacy, this research identifies the legal electoral, ideological and 
performance frameworks as representing state legitimacy. Arguably, scant evidence 
shows that the party-state constructed its legal legitimacy in the 1980s, at least before 
1989. However, we note that among the top officials, while most believed that 
economic reform and development was the only future for China, they (especially the 
leftists) had also inherited a sense of belonging to the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist era. 
More  importantly,  these  officials  maintained  their  faith  in  communism  and  still 
viewed ideology as a part of the foundation of state legitimacy. During the 1980s, 




How best to understand the relationship between nationalism in sports and legitimacy 
of the Party? As Xiao Gongqi has argued: ‘The previous ideology has gone into 
decline. A large country such as China needs something to keep the country together. 
So nationalism is taking the place of the previous ideology as the coalescing force.’
45
 
It is difficult to judge whether nationalism can completely replace communism as the 
 
basis  of  a  new  ideological  legitimacy.  In  reality,  nationalism  assumes  a  partial 
function, just as Maoism did in the Maoist era, to unite people. As Roskin has noted: 
‘China’s regime retains authority by means of patriotism and performance-based 
legitimacy.’
46   
Besides  nationalism,  the  pragmatic  leaders  attempted  to  secure  the 
consent  of  the  common  people  through  performance-based  legitimacy  and  thus 
 
 
43   Seymour Martin Lipset,    Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp: 
64-69. 
44  For the most recent debates on state legitimacy in contemporary China, see Hongxing Yang & Dingxin Zhao 
(2015). Performance Legitimacy, State Autonomy and China's Economic Miracle, Journal of Contemporary 
China, 24:91, pp: 64-82. Florian Schneider and Yih-Jye Hwang, ‘The Sichuan earthquake and the heavenly 
mandate: legitimising Chinese rule through disaster discourse’, Journal of Contemporary China 23(88), (2014); 
Jinghan Zeng, ‘The debate on regime legitimacy in China: bridging the wide gulf between Western and Chinese 
scholarship’, Journal of Contemporary China, no 23(2014):88. 
45   Quoted in Steven Mufson, “China’s New Nationalism.” Washington Post National Weekly Ed., April 1-7, 1996. 
46, Michael Roskin, Countries and Concepts: Politics, Geography, Culture. 10th ed. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 
2009) , 426. 
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achieve hegemony. After Deng Xiaoping came into power in 1978, he immediately 
shifted   attention   from   political   campaigns   and   economic   collectivism   to   a 
market-based economy. The prioritisation of economic development by Deng and the 
CCP was overwhelmingly supported by the masses and his economic reform was 
highly successful.
47   
As Rawski has observed, ‘a national consensus’ favoured rapid 
economic development and continued market-oriented reform. Su Xiaobo argues that, 
in this sense, Deng’s reform was successful in creating a consensus among the masses 





Performance-based  legitimacy  was  also  seen  in  the  field  of  sport.  In  the  1980s, 
sporting success was interwoven with nationalism and used to secure the goodwill of 
the  masses  as  a  means  of  proving  that  Deng’s  pragmatic  ideology  was  correct. 
Inspired by Chinese athletic achievements in the 1984 Summer Olympics, Deng 
Xiaoping stated: “Now it is evident that the impact and influence of sports are so great 
that they reflected a country’s economy and civilization. Sport attracts and inspires so 
many people. We need to promote elite sport more”.
49   
This view was reflected by 
 
official policy. The central government published “The Further Promotion of Sport” 
in  October  1984.  This  document  highlights  the  relationship  between  sports  and 
politics, as well as the government’s ambition to be a great sporting power: 
 
 
Sport has a close relationship with people’s health, the power of the 
nation and the honour of the country. It plays an important role in 
promoting ideological awareness of the broad masses, modernisation 
targets, establishing foreign relations and strengthening national 
defence. Therefore, the Party and society have recognised the 
importance of sport in our society and will further develop sport in 
China. [. . .] The remarkable achievement in sport, especially the 
 
47   Su Xiaobo, ‘Revolution and Reform: The Role of Ideology and Hegemony in Chinese Politics’, Journal of 
Contemporary China, no. 20(2011): 69, 307-326. 
48   Ibid. 
49   Wu Shaozu ,Yu Wei (ed.), ‘Deng Xiaoping's Sports Complex’, Accessed on 3 August 2013 from: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85038/7183986.html. 
211 
Chapter 7: Sports Policies and Systems in the Early Years 




success at the 1984 Olympics, has restored our self-confidence and 
national pride. It has stimulated a patriotic feeling among all the 
Chinese both at home and  abroad,  and enhanced China’s 
international   influence.   […]   Comparing   with   the   advanced 
world-level, our sports still have a long way to go. To shorten the 
gap with advanced world-level as soon as possible, our policy is 
to develop mass sport and elite sport, and gradually improve 
China’s elite sports performance and increase the popularity of 
mass sports. [text bolded by the Author] […] We should build our 







It is worth noting that ‘great power in sports (ti yu qiang guo)’ in this document is 
defined in terms of both mass sports and elite sports. This is also observed in another 
document ‘Further Create a New Situation in Sports’ issued by the SCSPE in 1983. 
This document was the first to promote the target of building China into a great 
sporting power within the 20
th 
century and listed key indicators: 
 
 
1) Half of the country’s population should participate regularly in sports activities; 
 
2) The performance of most elite sports should be near worldwide levels; 
 
3) Completion of venue construction to hold the Asia Games and Olympic Games; 
 
4) Improve the structure of the sports cadre team, strengthen sports research and 




Elite sport was increasingly prioritised at the level of state policy in the pursuit of a 
dream of “Great Power in Sport” in the 1980s. In August 1985, the First Symposium 
 
 
50  The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ed. Notification of the Central Committee of CCP about 
Further Promotion of Sport (October 5, 1984), The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education 
Documents of the PRC (1982–1986), (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 14-17. 
51   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), ‘Notification of the State Council's approval of the 
SCSPE’s Request for Further Creation of a New Sports Situation’(1983), The Collected Compilation of Sport 
and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982–1986) (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 9. 
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of National Sport Development Strategy was held in Xi Ning, where the Society of 
 
Strategic Research for the Development of Physical Education and Sport produced the 
 
‘Olympic Strategy’ for the SCSPE in 1985. The new strategy aimed to develop elite 
sports, despite the nation’s limited resources.
52   
The quest to become a great power in 
sports  was  highlighted  in  the  ‘China  Sport  Development  Plan  for  the  years 
(1985-2000)’.
53   
According to the minutes of the 1987 Symposium of National Sport 
Development Strategy, elite sports performance was the most emphasised item in the 
‘Great Power in Sports’ agenda,
54   
which was acknowledged as being a phenomenon 
that was increasingly adopted by the common people. In 1988, Li Menghua, head of 
the SCSPE, spoke about strengthening the Olympic strategy: 
 
 
Ranking among the best in the Olympic Games is the leading indicator 
for the great sport powers. [text bolded by the Author] By 2000, we 
expect to achieve this target by taking 3 steps, respectively in the 1992, 
1996 and 2000 Olympic Games. Specific requirements should be met at 
each step. In the 1992 Olympic Games, we plan to win 8-12 gold medals 
and a number of silver and bronze medals. In 1996 and the 2000 Olympic 
Games, could we set 15-20 golden medals as a target? Wining 20 gold 
medals or so and ranking in the top 6 in aggregate score can be called 






52  Fan Hong, Ping Wu and Huan Xiong, ‘Beijing Ambitions: An Analysis of the Chinese Elite Sport System and 
its Olympic Strategy for the 2008 Olympic Games.’ The International Journal for the History of Sport, vol. 22 
No.4, 2005, pp: 510-529. 
53   At that symposium, some scholars argued that great sports powers should refer to those countries with 
advanced mass sports and leading elite sports, namely those that had sports funding, sophisticated plans for 
achieving mass and elite sports, sufficient sports facilities and equipment for large-scale competitions and mass 
sports, and a sports population that exceeded 50% of the general population. Others argued that great sports 
powers did not equate to sports contributions from developed countries, as ‘greatness’ was reserved for those 
countries that achieved outstanding results in major international competitions. Those countries with 
outstanding sports equipment and large-scale sports populations, such as Finland, Sweden, Demark and 
Switzerland, could only fall into the category of sports in developed countries, because they had not ranked 
amongst the best in global tournaments. Thus, as China won first place in the gold medals and surpassed Japan 
in aggregate scores in the Asian Games, could be termed a great sports power globally. See Cao Shouhe, Zhao 
Yumei, “Evolution of the Origin and Meaning of ‘Sports Power’ and ‘Sports Power’”, China Sports Science 
and Technology 46, no.1(2010), 15-18. 
54   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport, ed. ‘The Summary of the National Sports Development 
Strategy Seminar in 1987, Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1988) (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1991), 76. 
55   Compile Group of ‘Li Menghua's Sports Road’, Li Menghua's Sports Road (Beijing: People's Sport Press, 
2011), 305-307. 
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This plan spelt out the government’s commitment to elite sports and its determination 




Reform and Making Strides Towards Elite Sports as a Priority 
 
In addition to nationalism, elite sports policy in the 1980s was largely driven by the 
reform itself. 1978 marked a turning point in the history of the PRC, with a shift of its 
work emphasis from politics, or ‘class struggle’ to economic construction, or ‘socialist 
modernisation’.
56   
However, Chinese economic reform began in 1980, with the first 
three years devoted to reform in the countryside.
57   
Prior to 1984, changes to the 
 
economic  system  had  resulted  in  changes  in  urban  areas,  such  as  increased 
decision-making  powers  amongst  the  state-owned  enterprises,  the  emergence  of 
self-employed  workers 
58   
and  different  employment  systems  in  enterprises  with 
foreign investment, particularly in the special economic zones along the coasts. By the 
end   of   1983,   urban   self-employed   workers   numbered   380,000 
59    
and   190 
Chinese-Foreign joint ventures had been established.
60   
These reforms contributed to 
 






56   Tan Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reform: A Historical Perspective (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986), 144. 
57   Deng Xiaoping, ‘Key Points of Talks in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai (January 18-February 21),’ 
in Deng Xiaoping's Anthology ( Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993), 370-383. 
58   Gao Shangquan, Chi Fulin (eds.), The Development of China's Non-governmentally and Privately Operated 
Economy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1996), 58. 
59  At the time of the founding of the PRC, the proportion of the collective economy was very low, while the 
proportions of the urban and rural individual economies were large. After 1956, with the completion of the 
socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, capitalist industry and commerce, the output value of the 
individual economy in urban and rural areas gradually decreased, while the state economy and the collective 
economy was strengthened. Vigorous implementation of the people's commune in the 1960s fostered the rural 
collective economy, which rapidly gained ever-increasing shares. After the launch of the Open Door Policy in 
1978, the proportion of the total output value of the publicly-owned economy, such as the state economy and 
the  collective  economy,  gradually  decreased,  while  the  private  and  individual  economy,  the  joint-stock 
economy, and the foreign investment economy gradually secured larger proportions. For example, between 
1978 and 1987, the proportion of China’s industrial output value fell from 77.6% to 59.7%, the collective 
economy rose to 34.5%, and the individual economy, the private economy, the ‘three capital’ enterprises 
(referring to ‘three kinds of foreign-invested enterprises or ventures: Sino-foreign joint ventures, cooperative 
businesses and exclusively foreign-owned enterprises in China) and the non-public sector of the economy rose 
from almost zero to 5.6%. There was a corresponding increase in the proportion of self-employed workers. 
60   Editorial Team of the China Economic Yearbook (ed.), China Economic Yearbook 1984, (Beijing: Economic 
Management Press, 1985), IV-52; Editorial Team of the China Statistical Yearbook ed., China Statistical 
Yearbook 1985, (Beijing: China Statistical Press, 1985), 214. 
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Average (1981–1985) 11.0 11.0 9.7 
1981 4.6 4.6 4.9 
1982 9.5 8.8 8.3 
1983 10.3 10.2 9.8 
1984 14.7 15.2 13.5 









Total Product of Society 
 
 
Increase rate (%) 
Total Value of Output 
(industry and agriculture) 





















The remarkable growth of the economy and the resulting socio-political benefits of 
the rural reforms greatly encouraged the reformists under Deng and led to the 
determination of an all-round economic reform.
62 
At the national conference on 
ideological work held in January 1983, Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CCP, issued the general policy of ‘Comprehensive, 
Systematic, Firm and Orderly’ reform.
63   
At the national conference of transportation 
and industry in April 1983, Zhao Ziyang, then Vice President of the CCP’s Central 
Committee, decreed that ‘the pace of reform should speed up’.
64   
In January 1984, 
Deng inspected four special economic zones and spoke about further enhancements 
for economic reform. At the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee of the 
CCP in October 1984, the Party transferred the emphasis of economic reform from the 







61   Sun Jian (ed.), Economic history of the People's Republic of China (1949-1990) (Beijing: China Renmin 
University Press, 1994), 7. 
62   Orville Shell & David Shambaugh (eds.), The China Reader: The Reform Era (New York: Random House, 
1999), 65. 
63   Xu Dashen, The Memoir of People's Republic of China, Fourth volume (Changchun: Jilin People's Publishing 
House, 1994), p: 608. 
64  The Editorial Department of Economic Management of the PRC (ed.), A Memorabilia of Economic 
Management in People's Republic of China (Beijing: China Economic Publishing House, 1986), p: 505. 
65   Chen Sheying, ‘Economic Reform and Social Change in China: Past, Present, and Future of the Economic 
State’. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 15,no.4(2002): 569-589. 
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The resolution on economic system reform in late 1984 triggered a wide range of 
systematic reforms. In March and May 1985, the Party and Central Government made 
decisions on science and technology system reforms, as well as educational system 
reforms. In September 1986, the Party issued another decision on the reform of the 
cultural system. System  reforms at that time became a significant issue associated 







In line with economic and political reforms, China’s sports policies and systems were 
transformed in the 1980s. Reform of the economic system triggered a wide range of 
reforms. The SCSPE released its ‘Resolution on the Reform of the Sports System 
(draft)’ on 15 April 1986, launching the reform of the sports systems. In regard to the 
background of this policy, Zhang Caizhen, former Director of the Department of 
Policy in the SCSPE, stated: 
 
 
The primary motivation for sports system reform arose from the strategic 
decision issued by the second generation of central leadership in the CCP, 
led by Deng Xiaoping at the third Plenum of the 11
th 
CCP Congress in 
December 1978. […] The overall environment of state reform played a 
decisive role in decisions regarding sports system reforms. If the state did 
not implement reform and shift its emphasis from work to sports, how 




The change in sports policies was necessary to bring the sports system into line with 







66   Fu Yannong, General History of Chinese Sports (1980-1992). The Sixth volume (Beijing: People's Sports 
Publishing House, 2008), 100. 
67   Fu Yannong, Gu Bai and Li Yan, A Review of Several Issues in Sports Reform in the 1980s. Interview of 
Zhang Caizhen, Vice Director of the National Sports Commission. Journal of Physical Education. 
2008;15(7):1-4. 
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The major objective in this document was to raise the standard of elite sports, as can 
be seen in the various clauses.
69   
These included 10 aspects of China’s sport, six of 
which (bolded by the Author) related directly to elite sport and aimed to: 
 
 
1)  strengthen the role of the SCSPE in leadership, coordination and supervision; 
 
2)  establish a scientific training system to form a multipurpose, multichannel 
and multilevel reserve of athletic talent; 
3)  improve the system of sports competitions, gradually realising socialisation, 
diversification and institutionalisation; 
4)  promote mass sports towards a higher level; 
 
5)  promote traditional Chinese sports and pastimes; 
 
6)  promote sports science research; 
 
7)  reform the sports and physical education systems; 
 
8)  emphasise the ideological and political significance of sports; 
 
9)  improve the system of rewards for competition; 
 






7.3.2 The Development of the Elite Sports System: Policy 
and Practice 
Administrative System 
The administrative system in Chinese sports experienced two major adjustments in 
the 1980s. The first was in 1982 when the Department of Elite Sport was divided into 






68  The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC(ed.), ‘Resolution on the Reform of the Sports System (Draft)’, 
The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986) (Beijing: 
People’s Sport Press, 1989), 67. 
69  
Ibid., 67-79. 
70   Ibid., 67-79. 
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Military Sport was disbanded.
71 
The second occurred in 1986 after the launch of 
reforms to the sports system. 
 
 
In 1988, the State Council launched the second round of institutional reform,
72 
intended to gradually establish a modern management system with Chinese 
characteristics, namely, a functional, well-structured, well-coordinated, flexible and 
efficient administrative system.
73   
According to the ‘Revolution on the Reform of the 
Sports System’, sports administrative system reform mainly involved the 
transformation of the State-led sports system into one that was run jointly by the State 
and various social organisations (e.g. sporting associations, private sports clubs), and 
strengthening of the leadership of sports committees at all levels.
74   
Wang Lanming, 
then the Deputy Director of the State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform, 
has argued that the key to institutional reform in 1988 was to transform the functions 
of  government,  first  promulgated  in  1949. 
75    
On  10  August  1988,  the  State 
Commission of Public Sectors Reform identified principles in the institutional reform 




71  In the 1950s, learning from the experience of the Soviet Union, China established the ‘Central National Defence 
Club’, ‘All-China Sports Federation’ and set up the Departments of Military Sports in the SCSPE, in order to 
train the reserve forces of the national armed forces with military knowledge and skills. Throughout the 1950s 
and 1970s, the significance of national defence was greater than that of sports, and it is also a means of 
educating people about patriotism and the concept of national defence. In the 1980s, economic development was 
the main focus of the government and China gradually abolished the military sports in government agencies. 
72   Due to the restrictions imposed by the highly centralized power of the economic management system, 
government institutional reform in 1982 failed to realize the transformation of functions. The State Council 
therefore relaunched this reform of the system in 1988. It focused on vigorous transformation of government 
functions. See Institutional Reform of the State in 1988, accessed on 23 August 2012 from: 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-01/16/content_1206984.htm 
73  The lack of implementation of planned changes to economic management by the 1980s meant that more and 
more government institutions were being established and numbers of personnel were constantly increasing, in 
the name of reform. By the end of 1986, State Council had 72 departments; 11 more than in 1982, with over 
5,000 staff members. After the theory of planned commodity economy was put into practice, it became urgent to 
carry out institutional reform. In April 1988, the first session of the Seventh National People's Congress 
approved the State Council’s reform plan. The reform process reduced the numbers in the Ministry and State 
Council Committee from 45 to 41, and its directly affiliated institutions from 22 to 19. Non-permanent 
organisations were reduced from 75 to 44. The Department's Bureau was reduced by 20%. After these 
institutional reforms, State Council staff members were reduced by more than 9,700 people. For the first time, 
the Transforming Government Functions was set up as a key to reform of government institutions. 
Unfortunately, the reform of local institutions originally scheduled for 1989 was postponed. See Nan Xiang 
Hong, Southern Urban Daily, ‘1988 reform Point out Non-separation of government administration and 
enterprise management’, 3 April 2008. 
74   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC(ed.), ‘Resolution on the Reform of the Sports System’, op. cit, 
68. 
75   Wang Lanming, Review and Reflection on the China's Six Reform of Centralised Administrative System since 
the Reform and Opening-up. Chinese Administration Management 25, no.10 (2009):7-16. 
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1)  research, formulate and implement state sports policy; 
 
2)  direct and inspect sports committees at all levels; 
 
3)  lead and cooperate with other industry trade associations to actively carry out 
sports activities; 
4)  cooperate with other sectors to develop sports, i.e., the sectors of education, health, 
culture, the Communist Youth League and the armed forces; 
5)  lead and cooperate with all relevant departments to organise sports programs and 
facilities, construct and supply sports equipment; 
6)  devise sports laws and regulations, research and promote systematic reform of the 
sports sector; 
7)  issue a plan for national sports competitions, organise state sports competitions, 
examine and approve competition rules and national records; 
8)  issue overall arrangements for national sports events and direct the training of 
professional and amateur sports teams; 
9)  develop an arena for international sports exchange and organise international 
sports competitions; 
10) lead and organise sports propaganda and cultivate professional talent and ability; 
 
11) cooperate with local government and local Party committees to strengthen the 
political aspect of sports; 
12) lead the All-China Sports Federation and support activities of the Chinese 
 
Olympic Committee.76 
In line with the seventh clause, the SCSPE set up the General Administration of Elite 
Sport Training and Competition Department in 1988 (see Figure 7.2). According to 
the eighth clause, another department for elite sports was added. By the end of 1988, 




76   The Office of the State Council(ed.), Resolution on Institutional Restructuring of the State Council at the First 
Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress (NPC, 9 April 1988), the People’s Daily, 10 April 1998. 
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Department of Mass Sports 
 
 


































Department of Sports Policy and Law Research 
 
 





Selection and training system 
In its bid to secure more medals, China’s government focused on Olympic sports. At 
the 1980 National Sport Conference, Wang Meng noted that ‘only if the key sports 





77  The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC(ed.), ‘Wang Meng's Work Report at the 1980 National Sports 
Work Meeting’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1949–
1981), (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1982), 152. 
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His instructions were soon turned into policy. On March 28
th 
1980, the SCSPE issued 
both the document ‘Views on Establishing Outstanding Sport Teams’
78   
and ‘Views 
on Layout of Key Competitive Sports’.
79   
In March 1980, the State Council issued its 




That instruction explained that almost half of China’s 203 gold medals won at the 
 
1980 Olympic Games belonged to the four major sports of athletics, gymnastics, 
swimming and weightlifting. However, fewer than 25% of elite Chinese athletes 
trained for these sports,
80   
whereas over 35% of elite Chinese athletes were trained in 
team sports, including basketball, volleyball and football, which achieved only five 
gold medals.
81   







In response, the Chinese government adopted the policy ‘Focus On Olympic Sports 
While Giving Due Consideration to Ordinary Sports’ (yi ao yu hui wei zhong dian, 
jian gu yi ban). The 1980 State Sports Conference issued a decision to focus on 13 
key sports nationwide: table tennis, badminton, athletics, swimming, diving, 
gymnastics, lifting, football, basketball, volleyball, shooting, archery and speed 
skating. In late 1985, the SCSPE convened a working meeting on the training of 
excellent  athletic  teams  and  issued  a  guideline  intended  to  condense  the  task, 






Besides its focus on Olympic sports, China adopted two main strategies designed to 
 
 
78   Ibid., 485. 
79   Ibid., 493. 
80   The Olympic programme comprises sports, disciplines and events. A sport is that which is governed by an 
International Federation (IF). A discipline is a branch of a sport comprising one or more events. An event is a 
competition in a sport or discipline that is part of a finishing list or achieves a ranking. 
81   The National Bureau of Statistics. China Industrial Statistics Yearbook (1949-1991), volume 2, ( Beijing: China 
Statistics Publishing House, 1992), 191. 
82   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC(ed.), ‘Wang Meng's Work Report at the 1980 National Sports 
Work Meeting’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC 
(1949-1981), (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1982), 141. 
83   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), 'Summary of the 1985 Training Work Meeting of 
National Excellent Sports Team (excerpt)’, (16 January 1986), The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical 
Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986), (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1986), 427. 
221 
Chapter 7: Sports Policies and Systems in the Early Years 





strengthen selective and training systems in the 1980s. The first was to expand the 
channels of the selection system by mobilising various social forces. As early as 1979, 
the SCSPE called on sports committees at all levels to expand the cultivation of 
high-level athletes and the sports teams in both the sports and trades sectors.
84   
In 
1980, the SCSPE emphasised that the sports sector should support and help the trades 
 
sector to establish outstanding sports teams and thereby extend the selection and 
cultivation of outstanding athletes; amateur sports schools should be adjusted 
according to the arrangements of key sports; sports training should be actively carried 
out in schools with a sports tradition.
85   
In 1983, the SCSPE specifically required that 
high-level sport teams should be established in big factories, enterprises, and 
colleges.
86   
At the 1985 National Conference of Directors of Sport Commission, the 
SCSPE emphasised that sports operations had previously relied completely on 
resources from within the sports sector, particularly above the provincial level, and 
failed to account for social forces (such as neighbourhood and village associations), 
resulting in a lack of competitive vitality. Henceforth, the SCSPE advocated 





The government encouraged a combination of sports and education in the cultivation 
of athletic talent. In 1986, the SCSPE issued its ‘Speeding up the Cultivation of the 
Athletic  Reserve  for  Excellent  Sports  Teams’.  This  document  for  the  first  time 
directed  the  combination  of  sports  and  education  in  cultivating  reserve  talent  in 
athletic sports. Following this policy, in November 1986, the Education Ministry and 




84   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC(ed.), ‘Minutes of 1979 National Sport Work Meeting’, The 
Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1949-1981) (Beijing: People’s 
Sport Press, 1982), 136. 
85  The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC(ed.), Report on Several Issues on Accelerating the 
Improvement of Athletic Level (1980), The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents 
of the PRC (1949-1981) (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1982), 142. 
86   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), ‘Notification of the State Council's Approval of the 
SCSPE 's Request for Further Creation of a New Sports Situation’ (1983), The Collected Compilation of Sport 
and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986) (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 9. 
87   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), ‘Report of the SCSPE to the State Council on the 1985 
Work Meeting of the Directors of the Sports Committees (April 24, 1985)’, The Collected Compilation of 
Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986), (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1986), 47. 
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Improve Athletic Skill Performance of School Sport’. One year later, the Education 






Another policy was to introduce a competitive mechanism into the elite sports system. 
Prior to the 1980s, state enterprise employees in China were guaranteed lifetime 
employment and an occupation-based social welfare system (e.g. housing, healthcare, 
and even education and employment for their children) under a system dubbed the 
‘Iron Rice Bowl’. Prior to 1989, almost 90% of all employees worked in the state 
sector and had permanent job tenure.
89 
By 1994, 26% of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) offered employment contracts to their employees.
90   
The lifetime employment 
system effectively guaranteed social stability by providing permanent jobs and social 
welfare, but inevitably resulted in lower efficiency. Enterprises did not need to face 
pressure from market competition or the threats of takeover and bankruptcy, because 
SOEs could depend on the state to solve their troubles. Under this permanent 
employment system, being a coach in the sports system was a permanent role. To 
encourage coaches to work hard and improve athletic performance, the government 
set about dismantling the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ system. The policy document ‘On Further 
Creating New Situation of Sport’ released in 1983 stated: 
 
 
It is required to change the state of ‘Iron Rice Bowl’. The key is to activate 
an employment mechanism. The measures include: 1. Trial recruitment, 
self-reported and public discussion, the Association recommended contract; 
2. Regular assessment examinations, evaluations, promotion of titles; 3. 
 





88   Department of Science and Education of the SPCSC(ed.), ‘Notification on Pilot Recruitment of High Level 
Athletes in Colleges and Universities (9 April 1987)’, The Collected Compilation of Current Higher Sports 
Physical Education Documents (1980-1992) (Beijing: Beijing Sports University Press, 1993), 86. 
89   The National Bureau of Statistics (ed.), China Industrial Statistics Yearbook (1989), (Beijing: China Statistics 
Publishing House, 1989), 345. 
90   The National Bureau of Statistics, China Industrial Statistics Yearbook (1994), (Beijing: China Statistics 
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By implementing the above-mentioned measures and policies, the original three-level 
selection and training system was transformed into four levels: Olympic and national 
teams; provincial squads; high-level sports teams in trade sectors, enterprises and 
Colleges or Universities, including Elite Sport Colleges, Physical Culture and Sport 
Colleges; young athletes in sport schools and schools with a sports tradition at 
grassroots level (see Figure 7.3). A new pyramid system of selection and training 
emerged  in the 1980s  and China began  to transform the state-run system into a 


























Sport teams in ordinary sports schools and schools with a sports tradition 
Figure 7.3. Pyramid of the Selection and Training System for Elite Sport (by 
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In January 1980, Wang Meng, then-Head of the SCSPE, stated that: ‘Domestic 
competition should be in line with international competition; domestic competition 
must accommodate international competitions, particularly the Olympic Games’,
92   
to 
provide athletes with the maximum experience of international competition. 
Consequently, most of the competitive sports events in the National Games became 
Olympic events. As an example, 20 of the 22 sports events in the 1983 Fifth National 
Games were Olympic events. In order to cater still further to international competition, 
the SCSPE issued its ‘Regulation of Arbitration Commission, Rules of Judging and 
Conditions’  in  1980  and  the  ‘Methods  of  Recommending  and  Applying  for 
 




The Chinese government quickened the pace of its competition system reforms after 
launching a nationwide, holistic reform of sports systems. In 1986, the former Head of 
the SCSPE, Li Menghua, emphasised that the core theme underlying the reformation 
of the competition system was to enable competitions to mobilise various resources in 
the  comprehensive  development  of  elite  sports. 
93   
At  the  State  Conference  of 
Directors of Sport Committees in April 1985, the government adopted a strategy of 





Initially, China applied a hierarchical management structure. All sports competitions 
were classified and held on a regular basis: individual sports federations or 
associations,  such  as  the National  Gymnastics  Federation  or  National  Swimming 
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Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986) (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 48. 
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Federations, held annual championships organised by individual sports federations or 
associations. The SCSPE was responsible for comprehensive national sports 
competitions, such as the National Games and National Youth Games, held every four 
years, while sports associations in trade industries were responsible for sports 
competitions in those industries; provincial sport committees were responsible for 
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Next, China rescheduled the National Games and National Youth Games.
95   
Prior to 
 
1986, the National Games had been held five times in the PRC, with inconsistent 
spacing between the events. In the 1980s, the National Games were set to be held 
every four years.
96   
Prior to 1979, Beijing was universally selected as the venue. In the 
1980s, provinces and cities began to compete for the opportunity to host the National 
 
Games (see Table 7.2), with the aim of mobilising local government enthusiasm for 
 
95  The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), ‘Resolution of the SPCSC on the Reform of Sport 
System (Draft)’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC 
(1982-1986)    (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 72. 
96   In order to prepare for the 1992 Olympic Games, the Seventh National Games was held in 1993, 1 year after the 
Games. Thereafter, the National Games was scheduled to be held 1 year after the Olympic Games. 
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Regulations and the scale of national competitions were adjusted, in order to adapt to 
international competition and improve performance. Following this principle, sports 
events were divided into key and ordinary Olympic events, non-Olympic events and 
other events.
97   
National Games and National Youth Games were required to focus on 
Olympic  events. 
98   
Competition  conditions,  regulations,  schedules,  apparatus  and 
 
fields were identical to those used in international standards, to ensure that athletes 
could adapt themselves to international competition.
99   
China issued the slogans ‘Let 
the  national  competitions  serve  the  Olympics  (bian  quan  yun  wei  ao  yun)’ and 
‘Training the athletes in Chinese competitions and preparing them to fight for China 
at the international games (guo nei lian bing, yi zhi dui wai)’. 
 
In order to expand financing channels for developing elite sports, China introduced 
business sponsorship into sports competitions. In October 1984, the CCP Central 




97   The Editorial Committee of Chinese Sport Yearbook (ed.), ‘National Single-event Sporting Competition 
System (Trial) (June 11, 1989) ‘, Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1988) (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1989), 34 
98  The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ‘Resolution on the Reform of the Sports System (Draft)’, op. 
cit., 72. 
99   The Editorial Committee of Chinese Sport Yearbook(ed.), ‘National Single-event Sporting Competition System 
(Trial) (June 11, 1989)’, op. cit., 36 
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Sport is an undertaking in China of the whole Chinese people. Administering 
sport should not only rely on sport commissions, but also rely on and give play 
to the power of the whole society. To expand financing channels, money needs to 
be raised from the whole society and a sports fund needs to be established. 
Commercial  channels  should  be  explored  and  sports  television,  radio  and 






This step was remarkable for the PRC. Prior to the 1980s, Chinese marketisation in 
the private sector economy was practically zero. China’s reform and opening-up 
initiatives in the late 1970s, followed by the party’s decision in 1984 to push forward 
with comprehensive reforms nationwide, led to the emergence of a novel economic 
system. 
101   
The  centralised  planning  or  ‘command’  economic  system  began  to 
transition towards an efficiency-oriented economic system. Enterprises were 
encouraged to seek markets and customers, so they began to advertise their goods for 
sale,  and  one  of  the  advertising  strategies  was  to  sponsor  sports  teams.  Thus, 




In 1984, Guangzhou Bai Yun Shan (白云山) Pharmaceutical Factory became the first 
enterprise in the history of the PRC to sponsor a professional sports team. After 
signing a contract with the Guangzhou sports committee, Bai Yun Shan decided to 
sponsor a Guangdong football team for 200,000 RMB per year. The football team, in 
return, had to use the logo of Bai Yun Shan, marking the emergence of professional 
athletic  teams  that  were  run  jointly  by  enterprises  and  sports  committees. 
102
 




100   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), Notification of the Central Committee of CCP about 
Further Promotion of Sport (5 October 1984), The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education 
Documents of the PRC (1982-1986), (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 14-17. 
101   Ash, Robert F., Kueh, Y.Y. (ed.),, The Chinese Economy Under Deng Xiaoping, Oxford University Press, 
New York; Gao, Shangquan, & Chi, Fulin eds., The Development of China's Non-governmentally and 
Privately Operated Economy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1996), 85. 
102   Zhao Liping, ‘Guangzhou Football’s Fifty-five Years: Nearly Half a Century of the History of the Decline and 
Fall, Guangzhou Daily, 27 November 2007. 
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Xue Hua (雪花) refrigerator factory, Guangzhou Wanbao refrigerator and Dong Bei 
(东北) pharmaceutical plants, all signed contracts with local sport committees and 
sponsored provincial football teams, triggering wide-ranging cooperation between the 
trades and sports sector throughout the 1980s. By the end of 1989, over 300 high-level 






As economic reforms progressed through the 1980s, sports advertising became 
acceptable  in  China.  In  1983,  for  the  Fifth  National  Games  in  Shanghai,  the 
government  switched  from  100%  government  funding  to  allowing  advertising 
revenue to help pay for the games. Although the advertising revenues at the time 
amounted to only 113,600 RMB and accounted for just 1.16% of the total expenditure, 










As Lu Wenyun and Ian P. Henry have observed, the change in sports policy in China 
was jointly affected by the broad thrust of sports policy and the government’s overall 
policy.
105 
This section explores the development of the mass sports policies and 
systems throughout the countryside and urban areas in the 1980s, in the context of 
changes to state sports policies and China’s overall economic development. 
 
 
When the Chinese economy followed the Soviet model of economic development 
from  the  1950s,  it  operated  on  a  planned  basis,  prioritising  the  development  of 
industry,  particularly  heavy  industry,  while  the  agricultural  sector  consistently 




103   Yu Xuefeng and Lu Yuanzhen, The issue of running high lelvel sports team by interprises in China. Journal of 
Beijing University of Sports 16, no.1( 1993): 28-32. 
104   Ji Fang, Panoramic Universiade: The ‘Economic Magnetic Field’ Effect of the National Games is becoming 
more and more obvious, People’s Daily, 26 October 2009. 
105   Lu Wenyun and Ian P. Henry, Historical Review of Sports Policy in Rural China (1949-2008). The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 28,no.7( 2011): 1055-1071. 
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system initiated in the 1950s did not significantly increase agricultural production. In 
 
1977, Deng Xiaoping emphasised that only by dramatically increasing agricultural 
production could China ensure rapid development of the entire economy. The 
government introduced policies and measures to increase agricultural production and 
modernise agriculture. Every effort was made to improve the traditional way of tilling 
the land by introducing mechanisation, electrification and chemical fertilisers. China 
also launched its ‘household contract responsibility system with remuneration linked 






7.4.1 De-collectivisation and the Organisational Vacuum in 
the Early 1980s 
Prior to the 1980s, organising mass sports in rural China relied largely on people’s 
 
communes and county sports committees, which constituted the organisational 
foundation for collective ownership. De-collectivisation took place as a result of the 
market reforms that swept through rural China in the late 1970s. The household 
responsibility system, which resulted in systematic changes in rural communities, was 
launched at the end of the 1970s.
107   
As mentioned earlier, Chinese economic reform 
began in the countryside, the weakest link (i.e., the poorest, least productive sector) of 
the  centrally  planned  economy. 
108 
Pre-reform  collective  farms  in  China  were 
economically inefficient because of the high costs of monitoring sustained by their 
production teams.
109   
The introduction of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) 
in 1979 is commonly credited for addressing this inefficiency.





106   The household responsibility system was an agriculture production system that aimed to preserve basic unified 
management of the collective economy, while contracting out land and other goods to households. Households 
could make operating decisions independently within limits set by the contract agreement, and could freely 
dispose of surplus production over and above national and collective quotas. The household responsibility 
system was created by the peasants but spread nationwide with support from the central government. More 
than 93% of production teams had adopted the system by 1983. 
107   Jonathan Unger, The Transformation of Rural China, (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 56. 
108   Zhang Zhanbin, ‘The Historical Process of the Reform and Development of China's Economic System’, 
Theoretical Vision, no.8( 2007), 12-15. 
109  Peter Nolan, The Political Economy of Collective Farms: An Analysis of China’s Post-Mao Rural Reforms. 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 89. 
110   Justin Yifu Lin, ‘Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China’. American Economic Review 82, no. 
1(1992): 34-51. 
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adoption of this system throughout rural areas
111   
meant that the household became the 
basic unit of production and social life, replacing people’s communes. By 1985, the 





The collapse of communes resulted in de-collectivisation and greatly weakened the 
organisational base of rural sports (see Figure 7.5). As discussed earlier, prior to the 
1980s, communes played a crucial part in organising sport and recreation activities in 
the countryside, including military physical exercises, mass sports competitions, folk 
sports and recreational activities. The collapse of the communes and politicisation of 
mass sport practice that was cultivated in the Cultural Revolution witnessed sports in 
rural areas slumping to their lowest-ever levels. It was noted at the State Rural Sport 
Conference in January 1983 that “in most rural areas, mass sport does not develop 












People’s communes in villages 
 
 















Figure 7.5. Changes in the Rural Sports System in the 1980s 
 
 
111   The HRS was first put into practice in Anhui and other places, and was hugely successful. Subsequently, the 
system was rapidly introduced nationwide. 
112   Most communes were disbanded in the 1980s, but some are still in place today. Among them is the village of 
Nanjie in Henan province, where workers begin the day by singing in praise of the country's former leader Mao 
Zedong. In Nanjie, workers continue to toil for low wages, but in return are provided for in other ways by the 
commune, which includes very good welfare benefits and free education. For more detailed information about 
Nanjie village, see ‘Life in one of China's last communes’, accessed on 10 June 2013: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8278128.stm. 
113   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, Minutes of the National Rural Sports Meeting (27 January 
1983), The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986) 
(Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 266-271. 
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7.4.2 ‘Socialist Spiritual Civilization’ and the tipping point of 
rural sports in 1983 
In addition to rural economic reforms, the demographic, social and cultural changes 
 
resulting from the Reform and Open-Door Policy initiatives impacted greatly upon 
rural sports. Firstly, the traditional lifestyle of Chinese people underwent massive 
change in the 1980s with accompanying improvements in leisure time and living 
standards  resulting  from  economic  development,  as  well  as  the  introduction  of 
Western  culture  into  Chinese  society.
114   
In  the  1970s,  after  years  of  devastation 
during the Culture Revolution, China opened its doors to the world. Throughout the 
1980s, entertainment changed from traditional themes and introduced Western 
elements, including films, television programs and pop music. The more relaxed 
political environment enabled mass entertainment culture in China to develop with 
relative freedom. Some of the Party leaders began to express concern about this 
emerging culture of entertainment and pursuit of economic development. They 
considered  that  if  China  only  pursued  economic  growth,  society  would  advance 
economically but regress spiritually.
115   
In rural areas, for example, the household 
 
responsibility  system  promoted  economic  and  social  development  and  increased 
leisure time. This increase in leisure time led to concerns among Party leaders about 





To address these problems, the CCP formulated new values and concepts that were 







114   Western films, television programmes and popular music surged into China in the early 1980s. Most of this 
popular culture would not normally be seen as seriously challenging the Chinese way of life, but older 
comrades, in particular, feared that in the spiritual vacuum that prevailed following the Cultural Revolution, 
even otherwise innocuous concepts and products could be greatly damaging. 
115   Wu Yuan, ‘The Formation and Development of Socialist Spiritual Civilisation since the Reform and Opening 
up’. Accessed on 5 August 2013, from:  http://theory.gmw.cn/2018-07/17/content_29917310.htm. 
116   Lu Wenyun and Ian P. Henry, Historical Review of Sports Policy in Rural China (1949-2008). The 
International Journal of the History of Sport. 2011;28(7):1055-1071. 
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favour of a healthy physical and moral culture.
117   
The Party sought to build a system 
of ‘Socialist Spiritual Civilisation’ (SSC). Ye Jianying, then the Vice Chairman of the 
CCP Central Committee, voiced this concept in September 1979, which was enlarged 
upon by Deng Xiaoping in 1980. He argued that ‘we are about to build a socialist 
country, which not only includes a highly developed material civilisation, but also a 
high   degree   of   spiritual   civilisation’,   ‘without   spiritual   civilisation,   without 
communist ideology, without communist morality, how can we build a socialist 
society?’.
118 
According to Deng, the SSC should reflect and match the improved 
material conditions in large sections of society and at the same time, it should guide 
the cultural life of the people during the economic and social transformation of China, 
which had been taking place since the end of the 1970s. 
 
 
In June 1981, the SSC for the first time was ranked as a part of a target of socialist 
construction. At  the  12
th   
National  Congress  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  in 
September 1982, material and spiritual civilisation was announced as a strategic 
principle.
119   
Thus, the political rhetoric of the CCP had moved significantly from its 
earlier focus on material concerns (e.g., defence and production) to more abstract 





In November 1982, the State Rural Sport Working Conference was jointly hosted by 
the SCSPE, the Cultural Ministry and the Communist Youth League of China. 
Subsequently, the State Council issued its document ‘A Summary of the National 
Working Conference for Rural Sports’, which established a policy framework for the 
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Party Congress issued a series of principles and policies aiming to 
comprehensively create a new situation of socialist modernisation, 
providing a clear direction for the development of rural sports in China. 
The primary tasks of rural sport are to: extensively develop mass sports 
activities to improve farmers’ health, enrich leisure and cultural life, build a 






The Chinese government specified two stages for the development of rural sport from 
 
1983 to 1990. In the first three years from 1983 to 1985, except for a few rural 
communities with poor economic conditions, every town was required to have a 
cultural centre and every village was required to have a youth club, to accommodate 
all sorts of cultural and sport activities. During the five-year period from 1986 to 1990, 
the cultural centres were gradually equipped with sport facilities and even swimming 
pools in some villages. The government expected sport to become a part of people’s 






7.4.3 The Rise of Rural Sports in the Second Half of the 
 
1980s 
In response to the campaign for the SSC, rural sport was emphasised by state sports 
policies from the mid-1980s onwards.
123   
At a national sports committee meeting held 
in 1985, the Sports Minister Li Menghua announced that rural sports should hold an 
important position and that sports committees at provincial levels should pay equal 
 
121   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, Minutes of the National Rural Sports Meeting (January 27, 
1983), The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986) 
(Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 263. 
122   Ibid, p: 262. 
123   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ‘Concluding Remarks of Director Li Menghua at the 1984 
National Meeting of the Director of the Sport Committees (12 January 1984)’, The Collected Compilation of 
Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986), (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), p: 
42. 
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attention to both urban and rural sports, while sports committees at the national level 
should focus on rural sports.
124 
He stated that the rural economic situation was 
generally fine but that its development was unstable. If rural sport were not promoted, 






To adjust to the new situation in rural areas and strengthen rural sports,
126   
the SCSPE 
issued a document in December 1984 entitled ‘Suggestion on Strengthening Rural 
Sport Work’, which stated that ‘the county (rural areas) level is an important part of 
the implementation of the party’s principles and policy of sports. Therefore, to 
strengthen sport at county level is to adapt sport to such a new situation, and a 
strategic task of the development of China’s sports undertakings’.
127   
Subsequently, 
the government conducted a nationwide programme, ‘Selecting Advanced Sport 
County’, in 1985. The SCSPE simultaneously issued its ‘Sports Advanced County 
Selection Criteria and Methods’, which was modified in 1987. 
 
 
Under this policy, all those towns and villages that had a good foundation of sports 
were required to prioritise the development of both traditional and modern sports, 
increase sports funding and facilities and improve administrative organisations, while 
towns with good economic conditions were required to provide professional staff.
128
 
Wang   Xianqiong,   a   member   of   the   Chinese   People’s   Political   Consultative 







124   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ‘Concluding Remarks of Director Li Menghua at the 1985 
National Meeting of the Director of the Sport Committees (11 April 1985)’, The Collected Compilation of 
Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986), (Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), pp: 
52-59. 
125   Ibid, p: 52. 
126   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ‘Minutes of the National Rural Sports Meeting (27 January 
1983)’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986), 
(Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 266-271. 
127   Ibid., 266-271 
128   Ibid, 266-171. 
129   Wang Xianqiong, a Proposal to Restore the Establishment of Advanced Sports County. Accessed on January 8, 
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The implementation of this policy led to changes in rural China. Firstly, the 
administrative structure of sport at the county level recovered and strengthened. For 
example, in Tan County, Shandong Province, the county sports committee appointed 





Secondly, at the county level, sports budgets were guaranteed and even increased. In 
order to be designated as a State Advanced Sports County, county governments, 
particularly those in richer counties, strove to improve the sports budget. In 
Zhangjiagan County, for example, the sports budget was 48,000 RMB in 1985, or 
0.07 Yuan (CNY) per capita. In 1986, it increased to 77,500 RMB, or 0.1 Yuan per 
capita. Further increases between 1987 and 1990 led to a total of 120,000 RMB. The 
budget for building sports courts and fields amounted to 1.7 million Yuan.
131   
In 1987, 
the SCSPE designated 78 counties as State Advanced Sports Counties. 
 
 
Thirdly, sports facilities were improved at the county level. This policy required all 
towns and administrative villages in advanced sports counties to construct cultural 
centers,  youth  clubs  and  formal  sports  associations.
132   
From  1987  to  1992,  388 
counties were designated as State Advanced Sport Counties (or districts of the city), 
accounting for 12.9% of all counties in China.
133   
Thus, towns and villages in 12.9% 
of all counties established rural sports associations and sports facilities.
134   
In support 
of this policy, provincial sports committees developed the ‘Selecting Advanced Sport 
Towns’ policy. In October 1986, for instance, the Jiangsu Province sports committee 
selected the initial cohort of provincial towns with advanced sports.
135   
In 1987, Zibo, 
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a city in Shandong province, launched its programme ‘Selecting Advanced Sport 
Towns’. Eventually, nine towns were deemed to be advanced sport towns.
136  
Thus, 
rural sports developed far beyond its position in the mid-1980s. Whereas in 1982 only 
11 counties had ‘two sports courts, one gym and one swimming pool’, the number 





The “Socialist Spiritual Civilisation” and “Selecting Advanced Sport Towns” policies 
markedly strengthened the organisational structure for rural sports in the 1980s (see 
Figure 7.6). Peasant sports associations and sports equipment (e.g. gymnasiums, 
swimming pools, running tracks and stadiums) were widely established at the county 
and town levels. In response to this policy, provincial sport committees were 
encouraged to produce a policy ‘Selecting Advanced Sport Towns’, whereby town 
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In sum, de-collectivisation reform resulted in an organisational vacuum in rural sports 
by the early 1980s. Progressive economic and social development of rural China led 
to concerns amongst the CCP and Chinese government about the decline of spiritual 
life,  which  led  to  the  1983  policy  ‘Socialist  Spiritual  Civilisation’,  which  was 
intended to raise ideological awareness and  guide peoples’ recreational  activities. 
Rural sports were expected to be a part of socialist spiritual civilisation, to enrich the 
cultural life of the people and to promote a healthy physical and moral culture in rural 
areas, as well as match the pace of rural economic development and meet the needs of 
the  common  people.  Eventually,  the  government  adopted  a  policy of  prioritising 




7.5 Mass Sports Policies and Systems in Urban China 
 
7.5.1 The Danwei System and Employee Sports 
Prior to the 1980s, mass sports activities in urban areas were largely organized and 
played within danwei (work units), based on the public ownership system that had 
served  as  the  PRC’s  fundamental  economic  system  since  the  1950s.  Under  the 
socialist public-ownership system, the PRC’s labour system provided workers with 
lifelong  employment.  Permanent  employees  constituted  over  90%  of  all  urban 





Under public ownership, all of society’s resources, including sports, were controlled 
by a  planning  system  in  charge  of  mandatory  distribution. The  occupation-based 
welfare system provided employees with unprecedented economic security, covering 
their medical treatment, housing, education, physical fitness and recreation. As David 
Bray has observed, ‘centred on the urban workplace, the danwei   has been the 
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Although the de-politicisation or ‘economisation’ of Chinese general public policy 
liberated a leadership determined to strive for efficiency at the price of security in the 
1980s, market-oriented economic reform did not commence until 1992.
140   
Economic 
 
reform in the 1980s did not fundamentally eliminate the ‘eating out of the common 
big pot’ and the ‘iron rice bowl’ belief patterns. As shown in Table 7.3, permanent 
employment remained the leading form of employment in China during this period; 
there was no dramatic increase in the number of employees outside state- and 
collective-owned   enterprises   (i.e.   non-permanent   workers).   Mandatory   welfare 
systems failed to change fundamentally during the 1980s. 
 
 
Table 7.3. Workers and Staff in State-Owned Danwei by Type of Employment, 
 
1978-1990 (unit: 10,000 persons) 
 
State-owned Enterprises Collective-owned Employees in 
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In general, before the reforms and during the 1980s, the Danwei (work unit) served as 
the organisational foundation for sports in urban China and maintained its strong 
position in terms of resource allocation and welfare systems for the urban populace.
142
 








In response to the party’s decision in 1978 to commence its economic reforms and 
modernisation, a State Worker Sport Conference held by the SCSPE and All China 
Federation  of  Trade  Unions  (ACFTU)  in  February  1979  identified  the  principle 
‘shifting the focus to the development of sport, serving the four modernisations’. The 
conference emphasised the following: 
 
 
After shifting the focus of all Party work, employee sports must focus on 
achieving   the   ‘four   modernisations’. 
143    
Employee   sports   serve   the 
realisation of four modernisations through strengthening general fitness of 
employees. The universality and regularity of employee sports activities 
should be a sign to test whether sport serves the ‘four modernisations’. 
Carrying out employee sports activities must be oriented to the grassroots 
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reiterated the goal of realising the modernisation of agriculture, industry, national defence, science and 
technology, by the end of the 21th century. For more information about the formation and evolution of the ‘four 
modernisations’, see ‘The Important Literature Selection since the Founding of the People's Republic of China’, 
5th ed., (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House, 1993), 125; Central Chinese Communist Party Literature 
Research Office, ed. Selection of Important Documents since the Twelfth Party Congress, 3 volumes (Beijing: 
People’s Publishing House, 1986), 56. 
144   Rong Gaotang, Contemporary Chinese sports.(Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1984), pp: 62-63. 
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In 1981, in order to promote employee sports in urban areas, the SCSPE and ACFTU 
jointly issued their ‘Regulations on Sport Associations of Grassroots Level Factories, 
Enterprises and Institution Organisations (Trial)’. According to this document, 
grassroots sports associations were required to widely restore and/or establish 
committees comprised of the director of grassroots danwei (units), active practitioners 
and fulltime professional or part-time staff. Sports associations were required to 
actively carry out various sport activities that promoted employees’ physical fitness 
and  productivity. 
145    
The  early  1980s  witnessed  the  rapid  recovery  of  sports 
 
associations in trade unions. In March 1978, The Ministry of Railways (MoR) became 
the first to restore its sports association. By the early 1990s, there were 99,142 





As well as reinstating employee sports organisations at the grassroots level, China 
issued a variety of policies during this period intended to promote sports amongst 
workers  nationwide.  On  August  8,  1981,  the State Council  reaffirmed  its  policy 
‘Notification on Carrying out Work-Break Exercises and Other Sports in Government 
Agencies’ that was initially released in 1954. According to this document, government 
agencies at all levels were required to carry out mass sports and to strengthen workers’ 
health. 
147   
On  August  18,  1981,  13  Ministries,  including  the  SCSPE,  Education 
Ministry and Ministry of Health, jointly issued their ‘Actively Promoting the Sixth 
Set  of  Broadcast  Calisthenics’ across  the  country. 
148   
According  to  the  statistics 
released at this conference, in 1981 alone, ~20 million employees participated in mass 
sport activities, accounting for 20% of the total number of employees nationwide; 
sports activities were conducted in approximately 16,000 grassroots enterprises and 
government agencies; the number of sports instruction centres in urban areas had 
 
 
145   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC. ‘Statute of Sport Associations of Grassroots Level Factory, 
Enterprise, Institutional Organisation (Trial) (enacted by the SCSPE and ACFTU on 23 January 1981)’, The 
Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1949-1981), (Beijing: 
People’s Sport Press, 1982), 184. 
146   Wu Shaozu et al.(eds.), Sports History of the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1999 (Beijing: China Book 
Publishing House, 1999), 340-341. 
147   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport(ed.), Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1981) (Beijing: People’s 
Sports Press, 1984), 14. 
148   Ibid, 14. 
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grown  to  ~1,800  by  1982;  and  work-break  exercises  were  widely  practised  in 





At the 1986 National Conference of the Sports Committees, the SCSPE summarised 
the issues plaguing the sports system at the time of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981–
1986). As voiced at this conference, issues surrounding mass sports in urban areas 
largely included the following: 1) insufficient numbers were participating in mass 
sports; 2) the sports budget was far too low, at only 0.2% of the national budget and 
its recent increase was still only 0.37% of the budget); 3) the investment in the sports 
infrastructure was also too low, accounting for 0.2% of the total government 
national budget; 4) too few sport venues and facilities were available and what did 
exist was of inferior quality to those found in many other countries worldwide; and 5) 
low-quality    sports    administration    bodies    and    undeveloped    mass    sports 
organisations. 
150   
In  response  to  these  problems  and  in  order  to  respond  to  the 
 
Party/State’s decision in 1984 to speed up urban and nationwide reform, the SCSPE 
issued its policy document ‘A Notification about Moving Further Ahead in Sports 
Reformation  (Draft)’ in  1986.  This  intended  to  realise  ‘transformation  from  the 






At  the  1986  National  Sports  Conference,  the  government  identified  a  principle 
‘Socialisation of Sport’ that aimed to ‘adhere to reform as the centre, implement the 
opening-up and reform policy, actively promote sport socialisation, and vigorously 
carry out mass sports activities to promote the health of the entire nation’.





149   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport (ed.), Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1982) (Beijing: People’s 
Sports Press, 1985), 114. 
150   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC, ed., ‘Statute of Sport Associations of Grassroots Level 
Factory, Enterprise, Institutional Organization (Trial) (enacted by the SCSPE and ACFTU on January 23, 
1981)’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1949-1981) 
(Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1982), 184. 
151   The Sports Policy Research Office of the SPCSC (ed.), ‘Resolution of the SPCSC on the Reform of the Sports 
System’, The Collected Compilation of Sport and Physical Education Documents of the PRC (1982-1986) 
(Beijing: People’s Sport Press, 1989), 70. 
152   Ibid, p: 103. 
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seminar on socialisation of sports held from 25–29 July 1989, the SCSPE required 
sports to face and penetrate society, increase sports participation amongst the masses 





More importantly, for the first time, participation in sports was officially defined as a 
task that should ‘adapt to the development of society’.
154   
It was emphasised that 
‘sport, as a part of the greater society, must be adaptable to other parts of society (e.g. 
education, arts and culture) and coordinate with each other’. According to the SCSPE, 
the socialisation of sport should embody the integrity, functionality and conditionality 





Following the launch of the ‘Socialisation of Sport’ policy, China adopted three major 
measures to develop mass sport in urban areas in the second half of the 1980s. The 
first of these was to strengthen grassroots sports organizations in the industrial sector, 
which increased the number of grassroots worker sports organisations to 99,142 in the 





























153   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport (ed.)., ‘Minutes of the Symposium on Sports Socialisation’, 
Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1990) (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1991), 63. 
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155   Ibid, 63. 
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University press, 2001), 138. 
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Ministry (e.g. Ministry of 
Railway, Ministry of 
Agriculture) 






Trade Unions Department   of   Mass   Sport, 
Provincial Sport Committee 
 
 
31 Industrial sports 
associations 
 





99,142   Grassroots   sports   associations   and   45,491 
industrial sports associations 
 
 




The second measure was to develop a variety of mass sport associations nationwide, 
such as senior citizen sports associations, handicapped sports associations, fishing and 
pigeon racing associations. The senior citizen sports association of Zhanxian (儋县), 
 
Hainan Province, for example, was established in 1986, when the county government 
allocated 1.1 million RMB for the construction of a senior citizen sports centre, which 
included a gym, table tennis room, billiards saloon, croquet court and bocce ball 
court.
157   
At the same time, the government embarked on a widespread development 
of regional sport associations. In Shanghai, there were 54 regional sport associations 
in nine districts and two counties by the end of 1986.
158   
In Hebei Province, by the 
end of 1988, there were 619 industrial sports associations, including 18 provincial 
 
 
157   Hainan Local Chronicle Compilation Committee, ‘Chronicles of Danxian (儋县) County’. Accessed on 22 
June 2013 from:  http://www.hnszw.org.cn/data/news/2011/01/48505/. 
158   Editorial Team of the Yearbook of Chinese Sport (ed.), Yearbook of Chinese Sport (1987), (Beijing: People’s 
Sports Press, 1988), p: 232. 
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industrial sports associations, 102 city-level industrial sports associations and 499 
county trade sports associations.
159   
The growing number of regional and trades sports 
associations contributed to a boom in urban sports in the late 1980s. In Sichuan 
Province, for instance, 32 large and medium enterprises set up united sports 
associations, enabling the organisation of mass sports activities and competitions 
between enterprises.
160  
As noted by Li Menghua, former Sport Minister, employee 
sports in urban areas increased dramatically in the 1980s as a consequence of the 





The third strategy was to encourage nationwide mass mobilisation to promote mass 
sport, as it was during the Maoist era. The SCSPE and All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU) launched a programme called ‘National Million Employee Winter 
Long-distance Running’ covering the period from 15 December 1986 through 31 
March 1987, involving over 10 million workers from 20,690 grassroots dan wei from 
 
36  provinces,  autonomous  regions  and  municipalities.  Another  programme,  the 
 
‘National Football Competition of Grassroots Workers’, was launched in July 1987 
and by the end of June 1988, involved 2,077,624 workers from 19,907 grassroots 
units  in  62  cities. 
162   
By  1989,  sports  teams  were  established  in  over  490,000 
grassroots factories and mines, involving about 4,161 million workers, accounting for 
30% of China’s total population of workers.
163   
Promoting physical culture and sports 
 
via mass movements or organizing large-scale sports programmes was an important 
legacy of the Maoist era that was used to develop sports in urban and rural China in 
the 1980s. John King Fairbank has claimed in his book ‘The United States and China’ 
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(1949-1991), (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1993), p: 121. 
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revolutionary generation who had turned to the Marx doctrine in 1921 to save the 
nation.
164   
Fairbank notes that as the achievements of most of the movements led by 
Enlai  and  Zedong  may  still  apply,  it  is  not  possible  to  evaluate  them.
165   
In  an 
interview conducted as part of this research, a Chinese scholar of sports history 




Emphasising mass sport and promoting sport for the people became an 
integral part of Chinese sports ideology in the Maoist era. Even today, it is 
still  used  as  an  important  organisational  method.  […]  As  long  as  the 
Party-state remains an entity, neither the Party nor the government 
[governmental sporting bodies] can ignore this practical method, which has 
become a political tradition that demonstrates the powerful vitality and 









Following ideological breakthroughs, Party leaders under Deng Xiaoping strategically 
decided in 1978 to transfer the focus of work from class struggle to economic 
construction, leading to a new era of reform and opening-up of China to the West. 
This decision triggered substantial changes in many aspects of China, including sports 
policy. Given the fact that China would soon participate in the 1980 Olympic Games 
and that Chinese elite sporting performance lagged far behind the West, the 
government changed its sports policy in the 1980s from a strategy simultaneously 
promoting mass sports and competitive sports to one of prioritising elite sports. This 
was intended to win more Olympic medals to promote national pride and identity, 




164   John King Fairbank, Zhang Lijing(trans.), The United States and China (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1999), 
18. 
165   Ibid, 19. 
166   Interviewer No. 6 (Xiao Huanyu, Professor of Sport History, Shanghai Sport University) in a discussion with 
the Author, 25 August 2014. 
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Enormous achievements in Chinese elite sports in the 1980s proved that the policy 
prioritising  elite  sports  was  not  only  valid  but  also  necessary.  Nationalism  or 
patriotism  was  utilised  to  assume  the  function  of  ideological  legitimacy  as  a 
coalescing  force  to  unite the  general  public.  Pragmatic  Party  leaders  encouraged 
performance-based legitimacy to secure the people’s consent, i.e. sporting successes 
in the 1980s were framed as a way of proving the correctness of Deng’s pragmatic 
ideology in  the  post-Mao  era.  China’s  Olympic  strategy  further  reinforced  the 
prioritisation of elite sports. Nevertheless, the emergence of this prioritisation was not 
only a consequence of the Party’s ambition to become a ‘great power in sport’, but 
also a consequence of sports system reform itself. In the mid-1980s, economic system 
reforms were launched in urban areas, leading to an all-round systematic reform in 
many areas. Reform became a significant issue for the SCSPE. Competitive sports 
secured more resources and emphasis from the government at all levels, which 
ultimately strengthened the system of elite sports in the 1980s. 
 
 
State  policy  for  mass  sports  experienced  two  different  trajectories  in  the  1980s, 
largely as a result of the ‘Reform and Opening-up’ policy and practice. Reform in 
rural areas assumed precedence. De-collectivisation reform greatly weakened the 
organisational base of rural sports, yet they were soon included as a part of the SSC, 
as  a  means  of  guiding  people’s  recreational  activities  and  promoting  a  healthy 
physical and moral culture in socialist China. This attitude fostered the emergence of 
state policy for rural sports in the 1980s that focused on the county level. In urban 
China, mass sports were required to support economic reform and the modernisation 
of industry. However, economic reform in the 1980s did not fundamentally change the 
leading role of the permanent employment system and occupation-based welfare 
system. The danwei (work units) remained the main arena for mass sports in cities. 
Although the 1980s witnessed a rise in mass sports policy for urban areas, the focus 
remained  fixed  on  employee  sports  within  the  danwei.  More  importantly,  sports 
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participation for the first time was officially defined as ‘adapting to the development 
of society’. The 1980s witnessed the widespread practice of developing mass sports 
activities; an important legacy of sports ideology from the Maoist era. 
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This chapter summarises the main findings of this study, discusses theoretical 
implications and explains how the thesis is intended to contribute to the existing body 
of knowledge.  In  addition  to  tracing the  development  of  PRC  sports  policy and 
systems from 1949 through 1989, this thesis has focused on three concrete objectives. 
First, to investigate the effects of dominant political ideology upon sports policies and 
systems  throughout  different  eras.  Second,  to  elucidate  the  role  played  by  the 
party-state    system    that    drove    changes    in    sports    policies    and    systems 
between 1949 and 1989. Third, to evaluate how changes in the dominant ideology 
between 1949 and 1989 impacted upon sports policies. After a discussion of research 




8.2 Discussion and Research Findings 
 
8.2.1 Maoism as a Decisive Factor in the Formation and 
 
Evolution of the PRC-initiated Sports Policies before 1978 
 
One of the research questions posed by this study sought to determine the extent to 
which dominant ideology imposed itself upon sports policies and systems. The CCP’s 
ideology penetrates every aspect of political, social and economic life in China, 
including culture, arts and education. The decisive role of the dominant ideology on 
sport policy can be clearly seen in Mao’s China. In fact, in the early period of 
Communist China, sport and its policies were incubated within a strong ideological 
and  political  context,  serving  the  dual  purposes  of  stabilising  the  regime  and 
nation-building. However, Communism was not always the dominant ideology 
directing  sports  policies  and  associated  changes  in  Mao’s  China.  Mao  Zedong 
Thought or Maoism was established as the guiding ideology at the Seventh Congress 
of the CCP in 1945. In practice, Maoism had greater influence on sports policies than 
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Communism. In this regard, this study shares the views of several scholars (Dong-Jhy 




). Hwang and Chang (2008) have claimed that, 
since the nineteenth century, the development of sports in China has been influenced 
to varying degrees by imperialism, nationalism, Maoism, and postcolonial thinking.
3
 
Hwang and Chang highlight the relationship between Mao’s philosophy on bodily 
health, which was deeply influenced by militarism and strong nationalist sentiment, 
and China’s sports policies after 1949. For instance, Mao’s principle of ‘health above 
all’ developed into China’s early policy of physical education in schools. However, 
Hwang and Chang failed to analyse the relationship between the components of Mao 
Zedong Thought or Maoism, such as the mass line, and sports policies after the 
founding of the PRC, especially in relation to the early years of the PRC; Hwang and 
Change also failed to discuss the ideological roots of the formation of the PRC and 
how this impacted upon sports policy. 
 
 
The Chinese Government’s official interpretation of Mao Zedong Thought described 
three pillars: seek the truth from facts; reinforce the mass line; and maintain 
independence  and  keep  the  initiative  in  our  own  hands.
4   
Mao’s  mass  line  is  a 
far-reaching  guiding  ideology  that  not  only  helped  the  CCP  win  victory  in  the 
domestic revolution, but also directed the Chinese Communists to undertake many 
aspects of socialist state construction, including arts, education and sports. In regard 
to sports, in order to gain mass consent and stabilise the new Communist regime 
during the early years of the PRC, Mao and the CCP expanded the principle of 
‘gaining broad mass consent’, i.e. the ‘mass line’, into post-1949 nation-building. 
Hence, the policy ‘sport serves the people’ embodied Maoism. For instance, during 
the early years of the PRC, the Party and Governmental policy by-line ‘physical 
culture  and  sports  serve  the  people’  was  echoed  by  Mao’s  later  instructions: 
 
 
1   Dong-Jhy Hwang, Li-ke Chang, ‘Sport, Maoism and the Beijing Olympics: One Century, One Ideology’, China 
Perspectives, no. 1 (2008): 4–18. 
2   Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. 
3   Dong-Jhy Hwang, Li-ke Chang, ‘Sport, Maoism and the Beijing Olympics: One Century, One Ideology’, op. cit. 
4   Ren Lixuan, ‘Seeking Truth from Facts, Mass Line and Independence Are the Three Magic Weapons for the 
Party to Rejuvenate the Country, People's Daily, 1 November 2013. 
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This thesis has attempted to analyse the impact of ideology and sports policy from the 
perspective of Gramsci’s theory of cultural leadership and hegemony. Unlike Karl 
Marx’s theories of domination, Gramsci relegates economic determinants to the 
superstructure and highlights the role played by culture and dominant ideology in this 
process.  Both  Gramsci  and  Mao  emphasise  the  concept  of  hegemony  and  the 




According to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Maoism and communism helped the 
CCP and the party-state realise ideological hegemony in the superstructure of Chinese 
society  and  consolidate  its  political  power  in  the  ‘New  China’.  In  contrast  to 
Gramsci’s hegemony, Mao’s revolutionary hegemony highlights insurrection and 
violence and enables one class to overthrow and dominate another. Ideological purity 
was achieved during the Cultural Revolution not only through public dissemination of 
Maoist ideology to gain the consent of the masses, but also through criticism and 
destruction of the old ideals and revolutionary means. 
 
 
The impact of Mao’s hegemonic ideology on sports and related policies reached its 
zenith during the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976. In order to maintain 
their dominance over Chinese society and political legitimacy, Mao and the ruling 
party, the CCP, dominated all aspects of culture and superstructure, including sports, 
through Maoist ideology. From the point of view of Gramsci’s hegemony, sports 
policies can be perceived as a reflection of the dominant political ideology of the 
Party on superstructure or culture, where sport and physical culture exist (see Figure 











5  For a more detailed explanation, see W Huang, B Li, ‘Comparative Studies on Hegemony Between Gramsci and 
Mao Zedong’, Journal of Tsinghua University 27, no. 3 (2012): 125-133. 
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Dominant Ideology (Maoism, Communism) 
 
 


















Figure 8.1. The relationship amongst dominant ideology, sports and political 




8.2.2  Pragmatic  Ideology  Assumes  Greater  Influence  on 
 
Sports Policies in the Post-Mao Era 
 
The second question posed by this thesis sought to determine whether any changes in 
sports policies have occurred over the years under the dominant ideology. Table 8.1 
not only visualises the impact of dominant ideology on sports policy in different 




Compared with the Maoist era, sports policies in the 1980s were less affected by 
ideological requirements, as political ideology in the Party and government policy 
began to transition into economic pragmatism. This transition fostered the growth of 
pragmatic and performance-based features in sports policies. From 1977 to the 1980s, 
ideological and political factors continued to play an important role in shaping the 
development of Chinese sports policies. In view of China’s poor athletic record and its 
determination to participate in the Olympic Games, China adopted the ‘elite sport first’ 
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policy in 1979. Subsequently, the remarkable achievements of Chinese elite athletes, 
particularly in the Olympic Games, meant that the policies ‘elite sport first’ and 
‘Olympic  priority’  were  emphasised  throughout  the  1980s.  These  policies  were 
largely enforced by the emergence of nationalism in sports, deliberately fostered in 
order to boost Chinese confidence to compete with Western powers on the world stage. 
Nationalism, from the perspective of Weber’s revised legitimacy (Zhao, 2009; Yang & 
Zhao, 2015), assumed the function of ideological legitimacy as a coalescing force to 
unite the common people. Sporting success in the Deng Xiaoping era during the 
1980s was used to gain the consent of the masses and thus prove the correctness of 
 




The continuing impact that ideology had upon sports policies was also reflected in the 
policy ‘Socialist Spiritual Civilisation (SSC)’. Besides adopting a pragmatic policy 
that sought to reconcile politics with the economic reforms, the CCP strengthened the 
domination of ideology in the culture and superstructure. The SSC sought to preserve 
the CCP’s socialist ideological orientation and protect against the unwanted societal 
impacts of ‘bourgeois liberalism’. Including this policy as a part of the SSC reveals 
the impact of political and ideological requirements upon sports (see Table 8.1). 
 
 
In general, however, the impact of politics and ideology requirements on sports 
policies lessened during the post-Mao era, as illustrated by two features: 
 
 
Firstly, the rise of the elite sports priority policy in the 1980s was not only a 
consequence of the Party’s ambition to become a ‘great power in sport’, but also due 
to reform in the sports system. In the mid-1980s, the launch of economic reforms in 
urban areas was a significant issue for the SCSPE. The ‘elite sports first’ policy meant 
that competitive sports were granted more resources and emphasis from the 
government at all levels, which ultimately strengthened the elite sports system in the 
1980s. 
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Table 8.1. The Impact of Dominant Political Ideology on Sports Policies and 











1.  The  policy  ‘sports  serve  construction’  contributed  to  the  proper 
functioning and stability of the new state; 

























































































nationalism to resist external threats to the Chinese nation-state; 
3. The policy ‘Physical culture and sports serve the people’ was intended 
to make sport and physical education available to the masses rather than 
only a privileged minority; 
4. The policy ‘Developing physical culture and sports for the people’ 
began to serve as an ideology and principle for the development of 
sports policies during the Mao era. 
 
 
1. The Soviet model established the SPCSC as a powerful, centralised and 
hierarchical  government  organisation  that  displaced  the  ACSF,  a 
semi-official sporting organisation in China in 1952; 
2. The Soviet Union’s ready for labour and defence system (LDS) was 
widely promoted through China and served as an organised, efficient 
model for motivating the population for socialist construction in the 
1950s; 
3. The Sino-Soviet split weakened the ideological impact of the Soviet 
model on Chinese sports; 
4. The policy ‘Developing physical culture and sports for the people’ 




1. The early years of the Cultural Revolution (1967–70) witnessed a 
breakdown of sport elitism and of the entire system of competitive 
sports; 
2. Large-scale mass sports programmes became extraordinarily successful 
due   to   the   prevalence   of   Maoism,   based   on   Chairman   Mao’s 
charismatic personality and his proletariat ideology; 
3. The policy ‘Sport for the people’ reached its zenith during the Cultural 
Revolution and throughout the Mao Era. 
 
 
1. The Chinese government demonstrated its strong ambition to develop 
sports policies and systems by socialising and commercialising sports; 
2. An Olympic strategy reinforced a policy of prioritising elite sports; 
3. A competition mechanism was introduced into the elite sports system; 
4. The ways in which mass sports activities were conducted in the Mao 
era were retained as an important legacy for the development of mass 
sports in the post-Mao era. 
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Secondly, the government revealed its strong ambition to develop sport policy and 
systems by using its influence outside the political system, such as through the 
socialisation and commercialisation of sport. Since the Maoist era, Chinese society 
transformed from a traditional society to one that was modern, encouraged by the 
market-oriented reforms introduced from 1978 with the launching of the ‘Open Door 
and  Reform’  policy.  This  market-oriented  transformation  was  reflected  by  an 
evolution in sports policies and systems, with self-funded initiatives launched by 
individuals participating in sports, increased private sector involvement, legalisation 




Under China’s economic reforms (1978-1989), those who participated in sports had to 
 
‘adapt  to  the  development  of  society’.  The  socialisation  of  sport  in  this  era  is 
attributed to its fundamental relationship with other parts of society, such as politics, 
economy and culture. The commercialisation of sport in the 1980s is in sharp contrast 
to policies ruling sports in preceding eras, with the introduction of competition into 
elite sports. Before the 1980s, state enterprise employees had a guaranteed income 
under the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ policy and an occupation-based welfare system. The 
government’s dissolution of this policy was intended to encourage coaches to work 
hard and improve the performance of their athletes. In order to expand financing 
channels for developing elite sports, the government introduced business sponsorship 
into sports competitions, which was a remarkable move for the PRC. As economic 
reform progressed through the 1980s, sports advertising became acceptable. Prior to 
the 1980s, there was virtually no marketisation. The introduction of commercial 
sponsorship greatly expanded the ability to host sports competitions. 
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8.2.3 The Party-State System as a Determinant for the 
Formulation of Chinese Sports Systems and 
Implementation of Chinese Sports Policies 
The concept of the party-state system is key to understanding the role played by the 
 
Chinese government in developing the sports systems, as well as changes in Chinese 
sports   policy   from   1949   onwards.   As   Zheng   Yongnian   has   observed,   in 
late-developing countries such as China, political parties often dominate over states.
6
 
The principle difference between China and Western countries in terms of political 
 
systems lies in the fact that China adopted a one-party or party-state system. A 
common feature of a one-party system is that the position of the ruling party is 
guaranteed by constitutional law and all forms of political opposition are outlawed. 
The one-party state system penetrates every aspect of political, social and economic 
life of the country. 
 
 
Party leaders in the single-party system are responsible not just for the effective 
functioning of the party apparatus under their control but also for peace and good 
governance in their region, for its successful economic performance, supervision of 
the unification of China’s production, for maintaining high levels of morale amongst 
the people and for smooth operations in all aspects of life.
7   
Hence, a one-party or 
party-state system impacts significantly upon the government’s role and the way in 
which it develops sports and related policies. China’s political system under Mao and 
thereafter has emphasised ‘the horizontal concentration of state power in the party 
organisation, and longitudinal concentration in the Central Committee of the Party, 
 









Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction, and 
Transformation (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 9. 
7   
The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), 7. 
8   Interviewee No. 4 (Xiao, Huanyu, Professor in Chinese Sport history, Shanghai Sports University) in discussion 
with the author, 8 July 2014. 
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The formulation and evolution of China’s sports systems and policies embody the 
following  characteristics:  a  powerful,  centralised,  hierarchical  governing  body  in 
sports and a situation in which the leader’s will and determination can be quickly and 
efficiently translated into government policy. This latter feature is well documented 
during the Maoist era. Thirdly, the Party plays a strategic role in controlling and 
developing government policy and sports policies. To a large extent, the Party’s 
ideology maintains hegemony and effectively controls sports policies. 
 
 
Importantly, China’s party-state system does not equate to totalitarianism. Thomson 
and Womack attribute the establishment of China’s Communist political system after 
1949 to the following four factors: Chinese political tradition; the history of the 
modern Chinese revolution; the influence of the Soviet Union; and the history of the 
Chinese Communist Party before 1949.
9   
Of all of these factors, the influence of the 
Soviet Union undoubtedly played a crucial role in establishing Communism as the 
dominant ideology of the CCP. The theory of totalitarianism originally developed 
from the study of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia; the Soviet Union served as a 
principle model of post-war totalitarianism for China, which sought to emulate the 
Soviet model. Maoist politics are marked by psychological pressure and ideological 
control, as well as strict personal supervision by cadres, as opposed to terrorist tactics 
delivered by the police force.
10   
Thus, China’s political system sits within a historical 




The party-state system that was formed and developed in the Maoist era remained 
fundamentally the same  during the  next  era,  from  1977  to  1989.  The launch  of 
market-oriented reform affected more and more aspects of Chinese society, including 
the sports system. This led to the following contradictions: political and ideological 




James Roger Townsend and Brantly Womack, Politics in China (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Press, 1994), 30-80. 
10   Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 31. 
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and systems, while post-Maoist market-oriented reform played a profound, irrefutable 
role in the shaping of sports policies and systems by promoting the modernisation of 
Chinese sport. Consequently, whereas Western countries developed sports policies 
based on free-market capitalism, China followed a socialist market-oriented economy 
in the 1980s, in which ideological and policy requirements based on the party-state 





8.3 Theoretical Contributions 
 
As far as political factors are concerned, some scholars (Fan, Wu & Xiong, 2005; 
Hwang and Chang, 2008; Lu, 2016) attribute the evolution of China’s state sports 
policies to power struggles and ideologies, such as imperialism, nationalism, Maoism, 
and postcolonial thinking.
11   
In the analysis of the relationship between ideology and 
sport, researchers are more concerned about the direct impact of ideologies on sports 
or sports policies. 
 
 
Considering the key role played by ideology in China’s changing sports policies and 
systems,  this  research  adopted  Gramsci’s  theory  of  hegemony  as  a  principle 
theoretical perspective for exploring the relationship between ideology and sports. 
Gramsci’s  concept  of  hegemony  provides  a  critical  analytical  perspective  for 
exploring how the CCP, China’s ruling party, has realised hegemony and affected 
sports policies through ideology. Gramsci’s theory of Cultural Hegemony emphasises 
the importance of the ideology of the ruling class in realising the domination of 
society. It provides us with a lens or perspective through which we may understand 
the production of sport policy and its resulting changes can be seen as a result or 
reflection of the impact of the Party’s dominant ideology on sport, as a part of a 
 
11  Fan Hong, Ping Wu & Huan Xiong, ‘Beijing Ambitions: An Analysis of the Chinese Elite Sports System and 
its Olympic Strategy for the 2008 Olympic Games’, The International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no.4 
(2005): 510-529; Lu Zhouxiang. ‘Sport and Politics: The Cultural Revolution in the Chinese Sports Ministry, 
1966–1976’, The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no.5(2016): 569-585. Dong-Jhy Hwang, 
Li-ke Chang. ‘Sport, Maoism and the Beijing Olympics: One Century, One Ideology’, op. cit. 
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The concept of legitimacy is linked with hegemony and ideology, as state power must 
be seen as legitimate by both rulers and the ruled. Weber’s classification of legitimacy 
is illuminating. However, Weber did not include the performance of the regime in his 
original theory of political legitimacy. In this research, by taking Lipset’s point of 
view,
12   
I have identified three bases of state legitimacy: legal election; ideology; and 
performance. A revision of Weber’s classification is adopted for explaining the 
relationship between ideology and sport in the course of a shift of state legitimacy 
from 1949 to post-Maoist China. Enormous achievements in Chinese elite sports in 
the 1980s proved that the policy prioritising elite sports was not only valid but also 
necessary. Nationalism was utilised to assume the function of ideological legitimacy 
as a coalescing force to unite the general public. Pragmatic Party leaders encouraged 
performance-based legitimacy to secure the people’s consent, i.e. sporting successes 
in the 1980s were framed as a way of proving the correctness of Deng’s pragmatic 
ideology in the post-Mao era. 
 
 
Overall,   this   research   has   made   a   useful   contribution   to   the   analysis   and 
understanding of the transformation of sport policy in modern China from the 




8.4 Research Limitations and Future Research 
 
8.4.1 Research Limitations 
This research has made a significant contribution to the body of knowledge, although 
it must be recognised that certain limitations exist not only in regard to the research 
that was carried out but also for any future work into this topic. Firstly, the research 
 
 
12   For more explanation about the revision of Weber’s legitimacy and this research, please see Chapter 2, Section 
2.3.2, in this thesis. 
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involved relatively small numbers of policymakers and government officials. As 
explained in the methodology chapter, China’s tightly centralised political system 
makes it extremely difficult for ordinary researchers, including this researcher, to 
interview high-ranking officials, even for academic research. 
 
 
Another limitation arises from the documents and statistics consulted for this study. 
This research was designed to comprehensively explain the transformation of the 
sports  policies  and  systems  from  different  perspectives,  adopting  documents  and 
semi-structured methods in relation to the research questions. However, statistical 
data used to support research outcomes were derived from other reference sources. 
Official Chinese statistics are concealed to some extent. Although this research cites 
official statistics related to sports funding in its investigation into national investment 
and budgets in elite and mass sports, China’s annual statistical yearbooks have not 




8.4.2 Future Research 
 
More research is warranted into Chinese ideology and government policy, to explore 
their impacts on sports systems. This research focuses on a macro-level analysis of the 
changes and development of the Chinese state policy and system, involving elite and 
mass sports; the research has yielded a number of potential research topics. For 
example, one useful research area would be an analysis of discourse surrounding 
sports policies in China’s political system, with an interrogation of the evolution of 
sport policy from the local perspective, focusing on the relationship between central 
and local government. 
 
 
Another  potential  research  area  could  adopt  other  approaches,  such  as 
figurational sociology and path dependence theory, to examine the development and 
evolution of the Chinese sports policies and systems. Specifically, path dependence 
theory could help to determine the extent to which urban sports depended upon the 
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unit system (danwei) in the post-Mao era. Similarly, path dependence theory could be 
used to demonstrate how difficult it was to restore rural sport to the level of prosperity 
it enjoyed during the Maoist era, because of de-collectivisation reforms undertaken 
after 1978, which fundamentally caused the collapse of the commune, which served 
as the organisational foundation for the survival of rural sports. 
 
 
Finally, ideological and political factors ensure that the achievement of Olympic gold 
medals is and will continue to be a top priority for the Chinese government. Thus, the 
‘whole  country supports  elite  sport’ and  ‘Juguo  tizhi’
13   
policies  will  not  change 
 
fundamentally in the near future. Chinese policymakers will continue to improve 
China’s elite and mass sport systems in the context of market-oriented reforms and the 
modernisation of Chinese society. This research provides assistance to policymakers 
and administrators, by providing them with an overview of the transformation of 
China’s sports policies and systems. This researcher personally hopes that the 
government, academic institutions and various social organisations will further 
collaborate in research to explore how to improve the coordination between elite and 


























13   For more explanation about ‘Juguo tizhi’ and the ‘whole country support for the elite sport system’, see Chapter 
2 of this thesis and Hao Qin. ‘The Definition, Characteristics and Functions of the Chinese Elite Sports 
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Interviewees: Research fellows, officials, participants who have experienced different periods 





 Do you think the state sports policy is a reflection of the Party’s will and zhidao sixiang 
 
(guiding ideology) on sports? In what aspects? 
 
 What’s your opinion about the effect of politicisation on sport policy and systems? 
 
Can you provide detailed information? 
 
 What is your opinion about the difference in the influence of the Party on sports policy 
between the Mao era and the post-Mao era? 
  Before and after the Reform and Opening Policy, do you think the government has made 
any fundamental changes in formulating sports policies? 
 What is your opinion about the role of sport and government-oriented sports systems in 
contemporary Chinese society? 
 Do you think the influence of the Party on sports in the Mao era continued or was retained in 
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I: Hello Liang. 
 
A: Thank you very much for receiving my interview. I really do appreciate it, your participation. 
As you know, my research topic is about transformation of sport policy and ideology. We will be 
talking about something related to this topic during the following 20 to 30 minutes, does that 
sound ok? 
 
I: Yes, that sounds fine, thank you. 
 
A: Let’s start with ideology. The topics related to ideology in China is kind of sensitive, but its 
(ideology) influence and effect are everywhere. What do you think is the difference between the 
neutral words like ‘zhi dao si xiang’ (guiding ideology) and ‘zhi dao fang zhen’ (guideline) in 
policy documents and the real discourse system? 
 
I: Indeed, as you said, ideology is a sensitive topic in China, but it is also a social consciousness 
that accompanies the development of the People’s Republic of China from the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China to the contemporary era. Actually, the concept of ‘zhi dao si xiang’ is 
broader than ideology. Ideology is a special form of social ideology separated from the social 
ideology structure, including political thought, legal thought, morality, art, religion, philosophy 
and other forms of social consciousness. 
 








Communist Party of China is its guideline for action, as well as the theoretical system guiding all 
the activities of the Communist Party of China, including ideology, organisation, style of work, 
culture, system, as well as for anti-corruption and building a clean government. Therefore, there 
are  conceptual  differences  between  the  two,   but  in  reality  and   public  life,  they  are 
interchangeable. If you ask a common people, what are the differences between ‘zhi dao si xiang’ 
and ideology, it is estimated that, not to mention ordinary people, even scholars without political 
background may not be able to distinguish between the two. 
 
A: Yes, I used to be confused with the two terms. 
 
I: To be frank, the CCP has always attached great importance to the leadership in the fields of 
culture, art and sports. This is mainly due to the importance attached by the main Party leaders, 
including Mao Zedong, to the role of ideology in the superstructure and the control of society as 
a whole. 
 
A: Do you think that the influence or control of the ideology on sports exists only in China, or in 
a certain kind of country or is it a common phenomenon in the world? 
 
I: I think this is a universal phenomenon in the world. In this respect, the CCP is actually 
learning from the Soviet Union, because these two countries belong to the Socialist camp back to 
1950s. In the early years of the founding of the PRC, influenced by the political and international 
situation at that time, the CCP must keep in line with the Soviet Union ideologically. The Labour 
and Defence System is a good example. Sports at that time (in 1930s) was considered a way of 
preparing for war for the Soviet Union. 
 
If you’ve been to the Dinamo subway station in Moscow, you’ll see quite spectacular arched 
walls in there. The wall was built in 1938 just at the climax of Stalin’s cleansing campaign. The 
reliefs of football, tennis players, skiers and mountain climbers on the walls are symbols of the 
Soviet Union’s national strength. Stand in these reliefs, you can feel the strong power of sports as 
a way of war preparation, and behind this there is a strong will of the political party to guide and 
control. This system is ‘Ready for Labour and Defence of the USSR’. China introduced the 
Soviet Union’s LDS in 1952, which was largely influenced by Soviet ideology at that time. 
 
It is noteworthy that the LDS in the Soviet Union went into effect in 1931, covering all citizens 




Putin restarted this system (LDS) in Russia. It can be said that this system is a sports policy and 
system with distinct political and ideological imprint. 
 
A: So in the rest of the conversation, let's equate zhi dao si xiang with ideology. 
I: That’s fine. 
A: When do you think PRC’s sports zhidao sixiang (guiding ideology) was established? 
 
I: I think it roughly was formed in the early years of the founding of the People’s Republic. Since 
 
1949, the guiding ideology of sports in RRC has gone through many changes in different stages. 
For example, the original guiding ideology was marked by Mao Zedong’s inscription 
‘Developing Sports and Enhancing People’s Physical Fitness’ on 10 June 1952. In the early years 
of PRC, the Party and Government decided on the guiding ideology of sports work with ‘sports 
serving the people’ as its core, and formed a sports development pattern with its principles, such 
as ‘serving labour production and national defence construction’, ‘developing sports and 
enhancing people’s physique’ as its basic task and ‘popularising and regularising’. 
 
Afterwards, influenced by various factors, including domestic political movement and 
international situation, the guiding ideology of Chinese sports has experienced many changes. 
[. . .] 
 
A: What kind of changes has it experienced over the past decades? 
 
I: Generally, I think it has gone through several stages: ‘Strengthening people’s physique and 
giving priority to the development of mass sports’, ‘Combining popularisation with 
improvement, focusing on competitive sports through system reform’, ‘Deepening reform, going 
to the market, governing the body according to law’, and ‘Putting people first, competing with 
the Olympic Games and strengthening the physique of the whole people’. [. . .] 
 
A: Do you think the state sports policy is a reflection of the Party’s will and zhidao sixiang 
 
(guiding ideology) on sports? In what aspects? 
 
I: That’s for sure. It is largely influenced by ideology, especially in the early  years of the 
founding of the People’s Republic. At that time, the Party did not attach as much importance to 
sports as it did later, especially in the field of competitive sports. The top department of sports 




Although its branches were established in almost all provinces, the main content of its work was 
mass sports. In today’s words, it’s fitness-for-all. Of course, the emphasis on mass sports was 
also influenced by the ideology of Communism, especially Mao Zedong Thought, which 
emphasised serving the people and the mass line. Of course, after the reform and opening up 
(1978), the Party’s work focused on economic construction, not as much on ideology as before 
[Mao  era],  especially  class  struggle,  but  the  Party’s  leadership  of  sports  work  remains 
unchanged. 
 
A: What guiding ideology do you think China attached importance to competitive/elite sports 
later? What are the reasons for this? 
 
I: As I mentioned earlier, It’s largely influenced by the Soviet Union. As you know, many 
Western countries, such as the USA and the UK, adopt society-oriented model for the 
development of sports. Most of Socialist countries, such as the former Soviet Union and China, 
adopted state-dominant model. In fact, China was learning from the Soviet model. In 1952 
Helsinki Olympic Games, although China did not get any medals, Chinese [officials] saw the 
strength of sports and elite sports and the efficiency of sports management model in the Soviet 
Union.  That  is,  from  then  on,  China began  to  set  up  the SECPRC.  And  from  then on,  it 
[SECPRC] became a government department. In addition, we [China] also learned the three- 
level training network from the Soviet Union, which consists sports schools, provincial sports 
teams and national teams. What is the purpose? To train excellent athletes to participate in 
international competitions is to win glory for the country, thus demonstrating the superiority of 
socialism. [. . .] 
 
A: What’s your opinion about the effect of politicisation on sport policy and systems? Can you 
provide detailed information? For example, do you think the sports policy at that time was 
related to ideology? Did it play the main role? 
 
I: That’s for sure. It was during the Cold War that China belonged to the Socialist camp, so we 
[China] had to be consistent with the Soviet Union ideologically and politically. The influence of 
this ideology on us [society] is manifold, such as culture, sports, art and education. For a long 
time, our sports system and policies were influenced by this ideology. [. . .] 
 




on China’s sports policy before the reform in 1978? 
 
I: China is a socialist country, the state’s political system determines the direction of the 
development of China’s sports system and policy. The dominant leadership of the CCP Central 
Committee on China's sports has never changed. And this should be the main reason. [. . .] 
 
A: Before and after the Reform and Opening Policy, do you think the government has made any 
fundamental changes in formulating sports policies? 
 
I: In terms of management system, no fundamental changes have taken place. After the reform, 
even after the market-oriented reform of sports in 1994, the management mode of sports in China 
is still dominated by the Government, and the market only play a supplementary role. This 
situation has not changed fundamentally. In the field of competitive [elite] sports, China still 
adopts a three-level training network, and the main competitive sports talents are still trained by 
the ‘Juguo tizhi’. On mass sports, China began to attach importance to comprehensive fitness, 
diversified forms of running sports, and also began to attach importance to the role of society, 
such as the development of community sports, but this state-led management model has not 
fundamentally changed.  [. . .] 
A: What is your opinion about the role of sport and government-oriented sports systems in 
contemporary Chinese society? 
 
I: Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, this government-led sports management 
model has not changed, and this model is largely related to China’s political system. Because the 
system of the integration of the Party and the government in China determines that China’s 
sports system will maintain this model of the whole nation system for a long time. [. . .] 
 
A: Do you think the influence of the Party on sports in the Mao era continued or was retained in 
the post-Mao era, specifically in the 1980s and after that? In what aspects? 
 
I: China’s reform is top-down, not bottom-up. The development of Chinese sports is not 
dominated by the society, but by the consciousness or ideology of the Parties and the interests of 
the state. This is the characteristic of the evolution of China’s sports policy and also a feature of 
China’s social development. [. . .] This was reflected at the beginning of the reform. This 
characteristic has not changed fundamentally before and after the reform and opening up in 




people’s understanding of sports is also changing. For example, more people are engaged in 
sports for fitness, instead of emphasising the collective awareness of sports and winning glory 
for the country as before, but Chinese officials still attach great importance to the guidance of 
sports to serve the national interests. Many methods adopted in Mao’s era of running sports are 
still in use today. For instance, emphasising mass sport and promoting sport for the people 
became an integral part of Chinese sports ideology in the Maoist era. Even today, it is still used 
as an important organisational method. [. . .] As long as the Party-state remains an entity, neither 
the Party nor the government [governmental sporting bodies] can ignore this practical method, 
which has become a political tradition that demonstrates the powerful vitality and resilience of 
this government, consolidating its legitimacy. 
 
A: As a scholar, how do you think of the role of ideology in the current social and economic 
development of China? 
 
I: In my opinion, from the historical perspective, it is reasonable for the CCP to strengthen the 
importance of ideology in realising the stability and development of Chinese society. The end of 
the Qing Dynasty in 1911 marked the end of the imperial era with history of over two thousands 
years in China. The republican system advocated by the Revolutionary Party at that time, but the 
Beiyang government (1912–1928) experienced eight heads of state and thirty-two cabinet prime 
ministers in just 16 years, and the situation was extremely chaotic! Since 1949, China has also 
experienced a series of political chaos and social unrest, such as the Cultural Revolution and the 
Great Leap Forward [. . .]. In my opinion, for ordinary people, what China needs most is steady 
development and gradual democratic reform. In fact, the ideological approach of the Communist 
Party meets the realistic appeal of most of Chinese people. I can only say that existence is 
possibly reasonable. 
 
A: Thank you very much for accepting this interview. I will transcribe the interview later. There 
may be some content need to be added or revised in late period. I hope to continue to get your 
support. Thanks. 
 
I: Okay, that’s fine. 
 
A: Thank you. Let’s make another appointment. 
I: Okay, goodbye. 
